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Cryptographic security protocols are used to allow agents to communicate securely
over an insecure network. Although security protocols are usually quite short, they
often have subtle flaws in them which allow the protocol to be 'attacked' and security
breached.
Interactive inductive theorem proving has been used to verify properties of security
protocols. However, trying to verify a flawed protocol will result in an attempt to prove
an incorrect conjecture. A user might waste a lot of time proposing generalisations and
lemmas etc. in a futile attempt to prove a falsehood. In addition, even if he suspects
the protocol is flawed, it can be extremely difficult to find the attack (the sequence of
messages needed to expose the flaw). What is required is an automated tool which can
not only detect incorrect inductive conjectures, but also present a counterexample.
This thesis describes the development of such a tool, coral, based on the refu¬
tation complete Comon-Nieuwenhuis method for 'proof by consistency'. We describe
the testing of coral on some standard protocols known to be flawed, and two case
studies on new protocols, in which coral discovered five previously unknown at¬
tacks. Coral does not find attacks as fast as some competing approaches, but in its
successful modelling of two very different group protocols, shows a flexibility other
systems lack. This should make it suitable for a variety of future developments, in¬
cluding the investigation of some more unusual protocols.
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Inductive theorem provers are frequently employed in the verification of programs, al¬
gorithms and protocols. The use of induction allows us to reason about structures with
infinite models, e.g. a program with loops in, a recursive function or a protocol that
may involve an arbitrary number of participants. However, programs and algorithms
often contain bugs, and protocols may be flawed, causing the proof attempt to fail. It
can be hard, even for expert users, to interpret a failed proof attempt: is it the proof
attempt or the conjecture under investigation which is at fault? In this situation, what
is required is an automated tool which can not only detect an incorrect conjecture, but
also supply a counterexample to allow the user to identify the flaw.
The aim of cryptographic security protocols is to prescribe a way in which users
may communicate securely over an insecure network. A protocol describes an ex¬
change of messages in which the principals involved establish shared secrets, in order
perhaps to communicate privately or to protect themselves from impersonators. These
protocols are designed to be secure even in the presence of an active attacker, who may
intercept or delay messages and send faked messages in order to gain access to secrets.
Unsurprisingly, given this hostile operating environment, they have proven very hard
to get right. What's more, protocol flaws are often quite subtle. New attacks are often
found on protocols many years after they were first proposed.
The work presented in this thesis represents the combination of these two areas of
research. L.C. Paulson has proposed a method for verifying the correctness of security
protocols using inductive theorem proving, [Paulson, 1998]. This method is attractive
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in that it tries to prove security properties in the context of an arbitrary number of pos¬
sible participants and parallel runs of the protocol. Hence, if a proof of correctness can
be found, it provides a strong guarantee that the protocol is, in fact, secure. Paulson's
method can also be used to prove properties of group protocols, where an arbitrary
number of participants may be involved in a single round. Its simplicity also makes it
easy to adapt to different kinds of protocols, for example where elapsed time may have
to be considered, or where we may be interested in properties such as plausible deni-
ability. However, finding a proof is a challenging task, requiring some considerable
expertise. This means that a failed proof attempt is especially hard to interpret. Addi¬
tionally, in order to convincingly show a protocol is flawed, it is not sufficient merely
to cite a failed proof attempt. Rather, it is necessary to exhibit a sequence of messages
leading to some compromise of security. This exchange constitutes a counterexam¬
ple to the security property. So this would seem to be an area in which an automated
counterexample finder for inductive conjectures would be of particular value.
The method for finding counterexamples we investigate in this thesis is based on
a technique for inductive proof, called proof by consistency. This method was first
proposed in the 1980s, [Musser, 1980]. The idea is to show that a conjecture is a
theorem by proving consistency with the axioms in the intended semantics. Later
versions of the technique had the property of being refutation complete, i.e. in addition
to be able to show some theorems correct, it can refute any false conjecture in finite
time. Recently, Comon and Nieuwenhuis have proposed a new version of the technique
allowing any automatic first-order theorem prover to be used to search for proofs and
refutations, [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000], Our work is based on their ideas. We
have implemented their strategy in our system called Coral, employing the first-order
theorem prover Spass, [Weidenbach et al., 1999], and have used it to find attacks on a
number of protocols, including 3 previously unknown attacks on a protocol for ad-hoc
wireless networks, [Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000], and 2 new attacks on a multicast
key management protocol, [Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003].
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1.1 Results
coral has rediscovered a number of known attacks on faulty protocols, as described
in Chapter 8. Coral's heuristics were initially developed on a set of four protocols,
before the tool was applied to a 'test set' of ten protocols from Clark and Jacob's
corpus, [Clark and Jacob, 1997]. Coral found all ten attacks.
More interestingly, coral has discovered several previously undiscovered at¬
tacks. Three were found on the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol for establishing a secure
session amongst a set of Bluetooth-enabled laptops, [Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000],
This is especially significant because the protocol is designed to allow an arbitrary
number of participants to take part. Modelling this protocol in a general way, i.e.
without deciding on the size of the group in advance, is something that we can do in
Coral because of its inductive model. Most other techniques for finding attacks can¬
not do this. This enabled us to find attacks on the protocol for groups of size 2 and 3.
The details of our case study on the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol are in Chapter 9.
coral has also been used to discover two new attacks on a group multicast key
management protocol originally proposed by Tanaka and Sato, [Tanaka and Sato, 2001],
and then improved by Taghdiri and Jackson, [Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003], This proto¬
col consists of a suite of sub-protocols which an agent may take part in an unbounded
number of times. Again, our inductive approach meant that we could model the im¬
proved protocol without difficulty. Some minor additions to the formalism were re¬
quired, but the simplicity of our approach meant that this was easily done. This case
study is described in Chapter 10.
Additionally, we have used Coral to refute some incorrect conjectures from other
inductive theorem proving case studies. These results are given at the end of Chapter 5.
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1.2 Contribution of this Thesis
The contribution of this thesis is an investigation of two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 By using the Comon-Nieuwenhuis strategy to refute incorrect inductive
conjectures in a first-order version of Paulson's security protocol model, we can
effectively find attacks on faulty security protocols.
Hypothesis 2 The use of a simple first-order trace based formalism for analysing pro¬
tocols allows us to quickly adapt to unusual protocols, such as group key agree¬
ment and key management protocols, which approaches optimised for standard
2 and 3 party protocols would struggle with.
Evidence to support the first hypothesis is given by the results of testing on ten proto¬
cols from the standard corpus at the end of Chapter 8. Given that there are many other
tools that can also find protocol attacks, the second hypothesis is more significant. Ev¬
idence to support the second hypothesis is given in the form of two case studies, the
first in Chapter 9, where 3 new attacks were discovered, and the second in Chapter
10, where 2 new attacks were found. A comparison with other approaches is made in
Chapter 11. Here we will see that in terms of discovering previously unknown attacks
on group protocols, coral is currently the leading tool.
1.3 Layout of this Thesis
Chapter 2 introduces cryptographic security protocols, gives some examples of how
these protocols have been attacked, and describes other attempts to analyse security
protocols using formal methods.
Chapter 3 surveys previous work on automated refutation of incorrect conjectures.
Chapter 4 explains the theory of first-order theorem proving and the Comon-Nieuwenhuis
method for proof by consistency.
Chapter 5 describes the implementation of the Comon-Nieuwenhuis technique in the
Coral system.
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Chapter 6 is a description of our first-order version of Paulson's inductive model for
security protocol analysis.
Chapter 7 gives the additional heuristics we used to enable Coral to find security
protocol attacks in reasonable time.
Chapter 8 shows how we used CORAL to rediscover some known attacks on a number
of security protocols.
Chapter 9 contains the details of our case study on the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol for
key agreement in an ad-hoc network of Bluetooth enabled laptops. Three new attacks
are given.
Chapter 10 documents our case study on the Tanaka-Sato protocol for group multicast
key management. Two new attacks are presented.
Chapter 11 compares Coral to related work, both in the field of security protocol
analysis, and refuting incorrect inductive conjectures.
Chapter 12 suggests possible further work.
Chapter 13 summarises the thesis and draws conclusions.
Four appendices complete the thesis:
Appendix A gives the specification files used for two protocols involving a fixed num¬
ber of parties: the Needham-Schroeder Public Key and Otway-Rees protocols.
Appendix B gives the specification file used for a group protocol, the Asokan-Ginzboorg
protocol.
Appendix C contains the specification file used for the Tanaka-Sato multicast key man¬
agement protocol.




Cryptographic protocols are used in distributed systems to allow agents to commu¬
nicate securely. A protocol specifies an exchange of messages between some honest
users (the first two of which are by convention called Alice and Bob) and (possibly)
a secure server. Protocols are required to be secure in the presence of a spy, who can
see all the traffic in the network and may send malicious messages in order to try and
impersonate users and gain access to secrets.
Although security protocols typically describe an exchange of just 2 to 5 messages,
they have proven to be extremely difficult to get right. Subtle flaws are often found in
them after they have been in use for years. In this chapter, we examine the general
problem setting, and look at some proposed protocols. We will see how attacks have
been found and how these have suggested modifications. We will also survey some
attempts at formal protocol analysis.
2.1 General Principles
We assume that Alice and Bob have access to a cryptographic algorithm functioning
as described in Figure 2.1. Suppose Alice has a message P she wishes to transmit
across the network securely. The algorithm converts P from plaintext into ciphertext, a
form which is unintelligible to anyone monitoring the network. This process is called
encryption. The exact form of the encrypted text depends on the key K which Alice
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uses. In order for Bob to be able to recover the original message from the ciphertext, a
process called decryption, he must use a second key K~l. So, the secrecy of messages
depends on being able to control access to keys.









Figure 2.1: Encryption and Decryption, [Clark and Jacob, 1996]
There are two schemes for organising encryption and decryption keys. In sym¬
metric key cryptography, the decryption key K~x and the encryption key K are easily
obtainable from each other by public techniques. Often, they are identical, and we gen¬
erally assume this to be the case. The best known algorithm for symmetric key encryp¬
tion is probably the Digital Encryption Standard (DES), [FIPS, 1977], In a symmetric
key scheme, each pair of principals will have their own key for communicating with
each other. We use Kab to denote the key used for communication between principals
A and B. To minimize the damage done if a key is lost to a spy, each key has a limited
lifespan, after which it is no longer used. This means that principals will occasionally
need to communicate to set up a new short term key (also called a session key). How¬
ever, they cannot use their old session keys to set up a new one, as this could allow
a spy who has obtained the old key to obtain the new one as well. Setting up a new
session key is one application of security protocols.
In public key cryptography, each principal A has a public key, pubK.A, known to all
users of the network, and a private key priKA, known only to herself. Knowledge of a
user's public key provides no help in finding her private key. All users of the network
can encrypt messages for A, and these messages will then be unintelligible to everyone
except A. The best-known public key cryptographic algorithm is the RSA algorithm,
[Rivest et al., 1978], Under many public key schemes, including RSA, public keys
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and private keys can be used for both encryption and decryption. So, a principal A
can encrypt her transmission with her own private key, priK&. This creates a message
readable by everyone (they can decrypt it using A's public key), with the property that
it must have been written by someone in possession of A's private key. A disadvantage
is that public key encryption and decryption are generally much slower than shared key
operations for an equivalent1 key length.
2.2 A Simple Example: Needham-Schroeder Public Key
Cryptographic security protocols were first proposed by Needham and Schroeder,
[Needham and Schroeder, 1978]. Two different protocols for interactive communica¬
tion were proposed, one using shared key encryption and one using public key encryp¬
tion. We use the so-called Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK) protocol as our
first concrete example of a security protocol. NSPK has become the standard example
in the protocol literature. It actually consists of seven messages, but four of these just
involve the principals obtaining each other's public keys. Attention is usually restricted
to just the three messages we give here. First, we introduce some more notation2. We
denote Alice sending a message to Bob encrypted with Bob's public key by writing
A —> B \ {] message$pubKB
The message consists of a number of items which may be agent identifiers (like A,
B or S for the server), keys, or unique identifying numbers called nonces3 which we
subscript with the agent who generated them (e.g. Na,Nb etc.). The aim of the NSPK
protocol is to establish authenticity - this is pertinent because everyone is assumed to
know everyone else's public keys, so an intruder could easily send a message pretend¬
ing to be someone else. In order to prevent this, Alice and Bob exchange nonces in a
manner designed to establish mutual authenticity. The protocol runs like this:
'The concept of equivalent key lengths for shared and private key encryption is a slightly informal
one, but an equivalence of sorts is generally accepted.
2Our protocol notation follows that in [Paulson, 1998], which is based on the notation Needham and
Schroeder introduced in [Needham and Schroeder, 1978].
3Nonce is short for 'oNly used ONCE' - i.e. a number which once used in a full protocol exchange
is never used again.
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1. A -»• B : {] NA,A\}pubKB
2. B ->■ A : {| NA,NB§PubKA
3. A —■» B : D NdhpubKs
This can be described informally as follows:
1. Alice initiates a session with Bob by sending him a new nonce, NA.
2. Bob decrypts the package from Alice, and sends her back both the nonce Alice
sent him, NA, and a new nonce he has generated, NB.
3. Alice decrypts that package from Bob, and checks that nonce NA is indeed the
nonce she generated to start the run. Only Bob can have returned the same nonce
encrypted with her key, as only he could have read message 1. Alice responds by
sending Bob back his nonce, NB. Bob will receive this and assume that it must
have come from Alice, as only she could have decrypted message 2.
Alice and Bob can now use nonces NA and NB to sign their messages to each other. This
is designed not only to establish authenticity, but also freshness, i.e. if Bob receives
a message signed with nonce NA, he believes it not only to be from Alice, but also to
have been sent after the protocol run establishing the nonce took place. Without this
safeguard, a spy may intercept messages and then replay them later, with potentially
serious consequences (e.g. if the message is 'enemy will attack in two days time').
This looks simple enough: the idea of accepting a nonce based on the fact that only
the intended recipient could have read the original transmission seems to be a sound
one. But this protocol is flawed, as we demonstrate in §2.3.3
2.3 Protocol Attacks
To understand protocol attacks, we must first understand what properties we would
like our protocols to have, and also what we expect an intruder in the network to be
able to do.
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2.3.1 Protocol Goals
As new communication scenarios arise, the properties we would like our protocols to
establish are constantly updated. However, there are a number of common objectives
that we often want to achieve:
• Authenticity, that a message supposedly from principal A really is from principal
A, and often, additionally, the setting up of a nonce that can be used to establish
authenticity of future messages.
• Secrecy, that certain parts of messages broadcast over the network are only read¬
able by their intended recipients.
• Non-repudiation, that a principal may not plausibly deny sending a particular
message.
The exact meaning of these high level goals (and in particular authenticity) are
open to a certain amount of interpretation. Some authors have worked on translating
them into more formal language and have highlighted the importance of being precise
about what a protocol is supposed to do, [Lowe, 1997, Gollmann, 2000], The attacks
presented below will illustrate some of these issues.
2.3.2 The Spy
Mention is made in [Needham and Schroeder, 1978] of the assumptions made about
the behaviour of the principals and the spy. This is an issue central to work on cryp¬
tographic protocols. Needham and Schroeder made the following assumptions, which
have been broadly accepted by the computer security community and are used either
implicitly or explicitly in the vast majority of the literature:
• Keys used in cryptographic protocols are not readily discoverable by exhaustive
search or cryptanalysis.
• The spy can interpose a computer in all communication paths. This means that in
addition to being able to see all traffic in the network, the spy can delay messages
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or prevent them from ever reaching their intended recipient, and can add fake
messages of his own.
• Principals in the network other than the spy are trying to communicate securely.
Security protocols do not attempt to force all communication to be carried out in
a secure fashion.
In [Dolev and Yao, 1983], Dolev and Yao formalised a model of a spy with these abil¬
ities, adding the further assumptions:
• The spy can break down messages he has seen in traffic into component nonces,
agent identifiers etc, and build new fake messages out of these parts.
• The spy can forward packages he cannot read (because they are encrypted).
Later work usually also assumes:
• The spy knows the long term or private key of one agent4. Usually we just
assume that the spy himself is accepted as an honest agent by the other principals,
and has long term keys of his own. This is the same thing in practice as the spy
'stealing the identity' of an honest agent, i.e. obtaining an honest agent's private
keys.
This model of an intruder became known as 'the Dolev-Yao intruder', and is used in
almost all research in cryptographic protocol analysis.
2.3.3 Lowe's attack on Needham-Schroeder Public Key
Here is an example of how such a spy may attack a protocol. This attack was found
by Gavin Lowe in 1995, [Lowe, 1995], on the NSPK protocol presented above (§2.2).
Here, A attempts to start a run with the dishonest agent C. This is plausible under the
above assumption that the spy is accepted as an honest agent by the other principals.
Then, C starts a parallel run with B (marked with 's on the message numbers), in which
4Originally the spy was assumed to hold the long term keys of an arbitrary number of agents,
but it has since been shown that a spy holding the keys of just one agent is just as powerful,
[Syverson et al., 2000].
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he masquerades as A, using A as an oracle to decrypt B's message 2' in messages 2 and
3. The attack runs as follows:
1. A -A C H Na i A^pubKc
1'. Ca -> B {] NA,A^pubKB
2'. B —> Ca {] NA,Nb\}pubka
2. C A {| NA,Nb%ubka
3. A -»• C {] NB\\pubKc
3.' CA ->• B {] Nb^spubks
We use Ca to indicate that the spy C is playing Alice's part in the protocol. At the
end of this sequence of events, Bob believes he has carried out a complete run of the
protocol with Alice, when in fact he has not. The intruder C can use the nonces Na
and Ns to impersonate A to B. Lowe suggests a scenario where B is a bank and the spy
sends the faked message:
Ca —> B : || Na,Nb,transfer £1000 from my account to C's$pubKB
Like many published protocol flaws, this attack caused some controversy. Needham
argued that the protocol was never intended to be used in situation where a spy may
be accepted as an honest player, and certainly not in the banking scenario suggested
by Lowe. However, others argued it was perfectly valid to show the limitations of the
protocol, and that the acceptance of the spy as an honest player is a possibility that
must always be considered.
2.3.4 Needham-Schroeder Shared Key
The shared key version of the Needham-Schroeder protocol (NSSK) was also found to
be subject to attack, [Denning and Sacco, 1982]. This is an example of a freshness or
replay attack, i.e. an attack in which the spy re-sends a message an honest agent sent
earlier. The aim of this protocol is to securely distribute a new session key to Alice
and Bob, Kab- Alice and Bob both have keys shared only with the server, Ka5 and Kb
respectively. These keys are only used occasionally, and then just to set up new session
keys, and so are assumed to remain secure. The protocol is described here:
5Some authors write this as Kgs, as it is the key Bob shares only with the server S.
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1. A->S:A,B,Na




This protocol starts with Alice sending a message to the authentication server indi¬
cating her intention to start a conversation with Bob, including a nonce NA generated
by her. In message 2, the server replies with Alice's nonce, Bob's identifier and a fresh
session term key to use for talking to Bob, KAB. Also included is a package that Alice
can't read, encrypted under Bob's long term key KB. The whole message to Alice is
encrypted under her long term key KA
Message 3 consists of Alice forwarding to Bob the package she received encrypted
with his key, containing a copy of the session term key to be used and an indication
that it is to be used in conversation with Alice. The next part of the protocol is called
the handshake, i.e. a pair of messages exchanged by Alice and Bob under the new
key. The purpose of this is to convince Bob that Alice's message 3 was timely, i.e. it
is not the result of a replay attack. Bob replies to Alice with a nonce he has generated
encrypted with the new session key. Alice knows that this must have come from Bob,
since only he could have decrypted message 3. Alice replies with NB — 1, encrypted
with the same key. Bob knows that only Alice could have decrypted his nonce and
subtracted 1, so he accepts the use of KAB for talking to Alice.
However, despite this handshake, Denning and Sacco were able to show that the
protocol is still susceptible to a replay attack. Suppose a spy C has obtained a session
key, Kab. The protocol must allow for this; if session keys are considered to be indef¬
initely secure, then we would not need a protocol for setting up new ones. The spy
can then fool Bob into using that key for a new conversation span, and masquerade as
Alice, by the following sequence of messages:
3. CA B : {] Kab,A$KB
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4. B^CA:^NB^KAB
5. CA^B:S\NB-\$KAB
C does not need to know Bob's long term key KB to create message 3 - he just
replays it, as Alice must have sent it as a genuine message 3 earlier. At the end of
this sequence, Bob believes a correct protocol run has been followed, and accepts KAB.
Denning and Sacco suggested a fix for this problem involving the use of timestamps.
This requires the assumption that principals have access to at least loosely synchro¬
nized clocks, an assumption that Needham and Schroeder were disinclined to make.
The protocol now requires no final handshake, and runs as follows, where Ts denotes
a timestamp generated by the server S:
1. A S: A,B
2. S ^A: $ B,KAB,TsAA,KAB,TsbKBhA
3. A^B:$A,KAB,TskB
Needham and Schroeder suggested their own fix involving an extra handshake
at the beginning of the protocol, and no need for synchronised network clocks
[Needham and Schroeder, 1987]. The issue of synchronised network clocks remains
a controversial one: Gong exhibited a new risk of relying on network clocks for secu¬
rity ten years after the Denning and Sacco protocol was proposed [Gong, 1992],
2.3.5 The Otway-Rees Protocol
In [Otway and Rees, 1987], Otway and Rees proposed a shared key protocol designed
to eliminate the risk of replay attack. The major departure from the Needham-
Schroeder shared key protocol was to require Alice to inform Bob of her wish to com¬
municate in message 1, before any interaction with the authentication server. This way,
both principals are involved with obtaining the session key. Three nonces are required:
one to assure Alice of Bob's identity, NA, one to assure Bob of Alice's identity, NB, and
one to identify the run, N. The protocol is:
1. A-^B \N,A,B, {] Na,N,A,B$ka
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2. B->S: N,A,B, { iVA,iV,A,^ A Nb,N,A,B$Kb
3. 5 -> B : N, {] NA,KAB$KA , {| NB,KA$KB
4. B->A:N,-QNa,KabI}Ka
In the first message of this protocol, Alice generates nonce N and nonce NA to
identify a new run, and then signals to Bob her desire to establish a fresh shared key
(which will be KAB). During the course of the protocol, the common nonce N gets
encrypted by both parties - hence it is sent in the clear in message 1. The identifiers
for the principals, A and B, also have to be sent in the clear so that the server knows
which keys to use to decrypt the contents of message 2 and obtain NA and NB. Nonce
Na is sent encrypted with Alice's long term key. Bob receives the encrypted package
{] Na,N,A,B§ka, but cannot read it. He forwards it along with a package containing a
nonce he generates himself (NB) encrypted with his own long term key to the server
S. The server knows all long term keys, so can decrypt both the packages it receives.
It generates a fresh shared key, packages it up separately for A and B, and sends the
whole lot to B in message 3. Bob decrypts his part of message 3, and checks that the
nonce NB is as he generated. If it is indeed the same, he accepts session key KAB. B
then forwards the rest of the message to A, who checks her nonce before accepting
Kab.
In later literature, [Burrows et al., 1990], Burrows et al. suggested that the same
guarantees could be derived from a protocol using only two nonces. They also sug¬
gested, mistakenly, that nonce NB need not be encrypted in message 2. Attacks were
found on this simplified protocol by Mao and Boyd, [Mao and Boyd, 1993], and Paul¬
son, [Paulson, 1998], Paulson also showed that a version of the protocol that encrypted
Nb but had only two nonces was secure with respect to his assumptions. Here is the
simplified protocol as suggested by Burrows et al. - it operates in the same manner as
the standard Otway-Rees, except that there is no nonce N, NA is used instead of N in
messages 2, 3 and 4, and nonce NB is sent in the clear in message 2:
1. A-+B:Na,A,B^Na,A,B$Ka
2. B -> S : NA:A,B, {] Na,A,B$Ka,Nb, {] Na,A,B$Kb
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3. S -» B : Na, {] A^-KabI}/^ , {] NB, ^ABD/sTs
4.
Paulson discovered the following attack on the simplified version:
1. A^Cb:Na,A,B,$Na,AMka
1.' C—» A : Nc,C,A, {) Nc,C,A§Kc
2: A -» C5 : Nc,C,A, { Nc,C,A^Kc,NaI, iVC,C,A^
2"Ca -> 5 : Nc,C,A,{ Nc,C^Kc,NAJ Nc,C,A$Ka
33 5 CA : NC, H Nc,KCAhcA NA,KCAhA
4. Cb —> A : Na, {1 Na,KCA§Ka
Informally, what's going on this attack is:
1. A tries to start a session with B, but the message is intercepted by the spy C, who
notes nonce NA.
1C starts a new run with A.
2.' A believes C to be an honest agent, and so sends message 2 of the protocol to
the server, having generated another new nonce, Nai. C again intercepts this
message.
2!' C mixes up the message A tried to send the server with the nonce NA he noted
earlier to trick the server.
3!' The server is fooled and sends C back the old nonce NA encrypted with A's secret
key.
4. C can now masquerade successfully as B.
In terms of authenticity, this is a serious attack: Alice has no way of telling if she
is talking to the real Bob or not. We look at how Paulson discovered this attack in
§2.4.4.1 below.
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2.3.6 The Neuman-Stubblebine Protocol
The Neuman-Stubblebine protocol was designed to improve on previous shared key
protocols by using timestamps as nonces, [Neuman and Stubblebine, 1993]. Here is
the key establishment part of the protocol:
1. a^b:a,na
2. B->S:B:U,MaMKb,Nb
3. s-+a: {B,na,kab, mka J A, kab, t$kb , nb
4. A^B-.^A.KABMksANBUAB
In message 1, a generates a nonce na and sends it to b to signal that she wants to
establish a new key. b then generates both a timestamp, tb, and a nonce nb. The
timestamp he sends to the server encrypted under his long term key, while the nonce is
sent in the clear. In message 3 the server sends a a package containing 5's identifier,
A's nonce, the fresh session key kab and the timestamp for the key. A knows the key
must be good, because only the server could encrypt her nonce na under her long term
key, and by the presence of 5's identifier, the server has also indicated the key is for
use with b, preventing an impersonation attack. In message 4, A forwards to b the rest
of message 3, but this time encrypting nonce nb under the fresh session key kab. b
now receives the package containing A's identifier, the new key kab and the timestamp
he generated. He uses kab to obtain nonce nb from the final part of message 4, which
proves to b the identity of A, since only A could have got the session key from the
server and used it to encrypt nb.
The attack on this protocol is an example of a type attack, and is dependent on the
implementation of the protocol using the same length bit strings for nonces as it uses
for keys. Here is the attack, due to Hwang et al. [Hwang et al., 1995]:
1. a^b:a,na
2. B^S-.B,$A,NaMKb,Nb
4. ca -» b : {] a,na,tb$kb, {] nbdv.4
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In this attack, the spy first notes nonce Na, sent by A in the clear in message 1. The
spy intercepts 5's message 2 to the server, and then uses the encrypted package at the
beginning of that message and the nonce Nb sent in the clear at the end to construct a
fake message 4 to send to B. This fools B into accepting nonce Na as the session key,
because the encrypted package he is expecting has the same structure as that sent in
message 2, and the spy can use nonce Na to encrypt nonce Nb.
Some research has focused on eliminating the risk of type attacks by distinguishing
different types of object using tagging techniques, [Heather et al., 2000]. In this work,
the authors prove that by using a simple tagging system (which is assumed to be known
to the spy) whereby each agent attaches a few bits to each message element indicating
its intended interpretation, type attacks can be eliminated. What they in fact show is
that if there is a type attack which cannot be prevented by this tagging, then there is also
a simple attack where the spy makes up a value of his own. Informally, the intuitive
idea here is that type attacks usually involve a spy forwarding an encrypted packet,
hoping that it will be misinterpreted by an honest agent. However, he cannot actually
get inside the encrypted packet to change the tag, so the tagging prevents the attack.
If the type attack involves forwarding an unencrypted value for misinterpretation, then
the spy can just as effectively forward a value he has made up. We can conclude from
this work that a good implementation can remove the risk of type attacks. Some of the
formal approaches below, such as Paulson's §2.4.4.1, assume such an implementation
will always be used, and so adopt a strongly-typed formalism in which type confusion
cannot occur.
2.4 Formal Methods for Protocol Analysis
The attacks presented above give an indication of just how tricky it is to specify a
secure protocol. One of the main thrusts of security research has been to apply formal
methods to the problem. Researchers have applied techniques from term rewriting,
model checking, theorem proving and modal logics amongst others. We look at some
of this work below.
The essential problem faced by designers of methods for protocol analysis is that
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the problem is, in general, undecidable, even under quite severe restrictions on protocol
design, [Durgin et al., 1999]. There are at least three unbounded factors in the general
case: an unbounded number of agents who may be involved, an unbounded number of
parallel protocol runs (and so an unbounded number of nonces), and an unbounded set
of terms known to the intruder.
2.4.1 State Exploration Approaches
One way to analyse security protocols is to model them as some kind of state-transition
system. This idea has been used by a number of researchers.
2.4.1.1 The Dolev and Yao Approach
An early attempt to formalise the security protocol problem was presented by Dolev
and Yao, [Dolev and Yao, 1983]. The intruder modelled by their system became the
standard model in terms of its ability to intercept all messages and send fake messages
based on what has appeared in the traffic. However, their spy did not start with any
secret information, such as a private key belonging to one of the agents. The system is
modelled as a machine used by the intruder to generate words. The rules of the system
are expressed as rewrite rules. The problem of the intruder trying to discover a secret
is then expressible as a word problem in a rewrite system. Dolev and Yao presented
several algorithms that could be used to decide the problem for certain classes of pro¬
tocols. However, the model had several weaknesses. It could not model the storing of
information by agents, and could not be used to prove authenticity or freshness.
Other researchers have developed tools based on Dolev and Yao's work with aug¬
mentations aimed at addressing these shortcomings. These include Millen's Interroga¬
tor, [Millen et al., 1987], and Meadows' NPA6, [Meadows, 1996b], NPA has been
used to analyse many protocols, including group protocols, [Meadows, 2000a], with
a certain amount of success. It can also be set to present counterexamples in the case
of a flawed protocol, yielding an appropriate attack. Proving authenticity guarantees
with NPA can be messy though, [Meadows, 2000b].
6NPA stands for 'NRL Protocol Analyser'. NRL in turn stands for 'Naval Research Laboratories'.
Meadows' tool is sometimes also referred to as 'NRL'.
2.4. Formal Methods for Protocol Analysis 21
2.4.1.2 Model checking
Model checking is a state exploration based technique that has been applied particu¬
larly successfully to hardware verification and communication problems. The idea of
model checking is to first construct a model of the system you are interested in as a
finite state machine. A model checker then exhaustively searches the reachable states
in the model to determine whether or not they conform to some property. Properties
are typically specified in a modal logic of some kind, which means that typically both
secrecy and authenticity properties can be checked for.
Lowe used the FDR model checker to find an attack on the Needham-Schroeder
public key protocol, presented in §2.2, [Lowe, 1996]. One of the key advantages
of model checking is its ability to present a counterexample when asked to verify a
faulty system. When analysing the public key Needham-Schroeder protocol, the model
checker informed Lowe that the system was able to perform an action committing Bob
to a session with Alice even though Alice is not trying to establish a session with Bob.
By examining the CSP trace that formed this counterexample, the attack can be found.
Lowe's team have continued to use the FDR model checker to analyse protocols, suc¬
cessfully applying the technique to at least 50 protocols, [Donovan et al., 1999].
A disadvantage of model checking for security protocol analysis is that, in order
to guarantee termination in a reasonable time (and without exhausting available mem¬
ory), a small finite abstraction of the system has to be considered, e.g. with only two
agents, each agent only able to generate one nonce, only one run of the protocol etc.
This could lead to attacks going undiscovered, and faulty protocols being certified as
correct. There are two ways to attack this problem: one, adopted by Lowe, is to first
check the small finite instance of the protocol, and then to prove on paper that if an
attack exists on the larger system, then there must also be an attack on the smaller
system, [Lowe, 1999]. Another is to do away with finite instances, and just look for
attacks on the unconstrained infinite system with arbitrary numbers of agents, nonces
etc. Termination (without a guarantee of correctness) can be achieved by checking all
traces of up to 10 messages say, or by using a time limit. This is the approach adopted
by Basin [Basin, 1999], who also adds some heuristics to prune and re-order the search
space, resulting in attacks being found very quickly. We compare Basin's approach to
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ours in more detail in Chapter 11.
2.4.2 The BAN logic
Burrows, Abadi and Needham were the first to propose a formal modal logic analysis
of the security protocol problem [Burrows et al., 1990]. They demonstrated the use
of a logic based on beliefs, where formulae express what an agent may infer upon
receiving a given message. This logic has become known as the BAN logic. It is simple
to understand and can be used to prove a variety of properties of protocols. However, in
general, it does not result in a counterexample in the case of a flawed protocol, though
it may suggest how one might be found. BAN logic has been used to detect flaws in
several protocols, but it has also missed others. Nessett exhibited a protocol that was
deeply flawed, yet the BAN logic showed it to be correct, [Nessett, 1990]. Burrows
et al. responded that this was because the protocol violated one of their assumptions -
that no messages should give away secret keys. However, as Nessett pointed out, this
assumption should be verified. It may be possible to trick an agent into giving away
a key. There are also some quite subtle issues involved in the translation from formal
specification to the BAN logic - a common problem in all formal methods work. A
good discussion of these issues is given in [Meadows, 1996a].
Various researchers have proposed augmented versions of the BAN logic, de¬
signed to verify secrecy properties such as that referred to by Nessett, [Kindred, 1999,
Kessler and Wedel, 1994], However, one of the chief attractions of the original logic
was its simplicity. Others have produced automated implementations of BAN-like
logics, e.g. [Schumann, 1997], where Schumann used the theorem prover SETHEO,
[Letz and Stenz, 2001], to automate proof in the calculus. However, this approach suf¬
fered from the same drawbacks as BAN logic described above, and though proofs were
often found very quickly, SETHEO's failure to find a proof provided no information on
where the flaw might be (it would just run forever). One advantage of doing the proofs
by hand was that the breakdown of a proof attempt would often lead to the discovery
of an attack.
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2.4.3 The Spi Calculus
Abadi proposed an improved calculus for reasoning about security protocols called the
spi calculus in joint work with Gordon, [Abadi and Gordon, 1997]. This is an aug¬
mentation of Milner's pi calculus, [Milner, 1993]. Abadi and Gordon define a notion
of equivalence called observational equivalence, i.e. that two processes are the same
as far as another process (i.e. an attacker) can observe. This allows them to reason
about security properties in terms of this equivalence, e.g. item X remains secret if a
protocol with X is observationally equivalent to a protocol with X' for any X'. The
spy is modelled rather neatly as an arbitrary spi calculus process. The spi calculus has
been used to specify and prove both authenticity and security properties of a number
of protocols. Gordon and Jeffrey have also produced a tool called Cryptyc that type
checks protocols specified in spi calculus, [Gordon and Jeffrey, 2001]. Typing tags are
added to the protocol, which means the type checker can show correctness in terms
of security and authenticity in the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder. Properties can
be checked very quickly, though the tool is quite rigid in terms of what properties can
be checked for, what elements are allowed in protocols and what kinds of encryption
can be used. There is also the slight chance of a perfectly good protocol failing to
type check, though if it does type check it is at least guaranteed to be secure. No
counterexamples are given in the case of a flawed protocol.
2.4.4 Theorem Proving
Theorem proving of some kind has been used by a number of researchers to tackle the
protocol analysis problem. A variety of different models have been used.
2.4.4.1 Paulson's Inductive Method
Paulson has used an inductive approach to verify properties of protocols,
[Paulson, 1998]. Protocols are formalised in typed higher-order logic as the set of
all possible traces, a trace being a list of events like 'A sends message X to B'. Intruder
knowledge is specified in terms of what has been seen in the trace so far, using the
synth and analz operators. For a trace T, analz(T) specifies every individual term a
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spy may extract from the trace, and synth(analz(T)) specifies everything he can build
from those terms. This formalism is mechanised in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.
Properties of the security protocol can be proved by induction on traces. Paulson has
proved theorems both of authenticity and secrecy by specifying them in terms of prop¬
erties of traces, e.g. 'If A receives message 3 with nonce N, and he sent message 1 with
nonce N to B, then message 3 came from B.'
Sometimes a theorem cannot be proved, and in these situations an attack may be
suggested, as in the Otway-Rees variant shown above (§2.3.5). However, Paulson notes
that it can be hard to interpret a failed proof attempt. It may be that some additional
lemmas need to be proved or a generalisation made. So, while Paulson's formalism
is expressive enough to capture a good model of the system with arbitrary numbers
of agents and nonces, agents with compromised keys etc., it does not provide much
assistance in finding attacks on faulty protocols.
Paulson's formalism has been used to model the Needham-Schroeder protocols,
the Otway-Rees protocol, smart card protocols and the SET online payment protocol
amongst others [Paulson, 1998, Bella et al., 2002, Bella, 2003].
2.4.4.2 First-Order Formalisms
Weidenbach has developed a first-order formalism of the security protocol problem,
[Weidenbach, 1999], His aim was to combine the benefits of Paulson's inductive
method and finite state analysis methods. By formalising the problem in a frag¬
ment of monadic Horn logic, Weidenbach is able to specify an inductive model
where the intruder's knowledge is, in general, unbounded, but still to carry out
proofs automatically using the Spass saturation-based first-order theorem prover,
[Weidenbach et al., 1999]. A flavour of the formalism can be gained from the fol¬
lowing example of a translation from our protocol notation (introduced in §2.2) to
Weidenbach's formalism. Weidenbach used the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol for his
case study (§2.3.6). Weidenbach formalises the first message in this protocol with
these three formulae:
(1) Ak(key(as,t))
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(2) P{a)
(3) M(sent(a,b,pair(a,na))) A Sa(pair(b,na))
Formula (1) expresses that Alice (a) shares key as with the server t (Weidenbach uses t
to stand for 'trusted server'). Formula 2 tells us that a is one of the principals involved
in the protocol. Formula (3) tells us firstly that a sent and stored message 1 of the
protocol, and secondly that she has stored the nonce she generated for verification
later on. Weidenbach formalises the rest of the protocol in a similar manner. He also
formalises a spy able to synthesize messages based on previous traffic, and is then able
to find the type attack on the protocol first discovered by Hwang et al. (§2.3.6) by
proving a conjecture that there exists some x that B thinks is a secure key for A, but is
in fact known to the spy, allowing him to impersonate A.
The main advantages of Weidenbach's work are that proofs are fully automatic and
attacks are quite easy to construct from the output provided by SPASS. It is a matter
of inspecting the proof and working backwards through it to see what messages have
been exchanged. This process could probably be automated. However, Weidenbach's
formalism is not as expressive as Paulson's, and the proofs presented are not quite as
strong, for the following reasons:
1. The abilities of the spy are weaker. He does not control the private keys of any
legitimate agents, and cannot generate fresh nonces of his own. This severely
limits the scope for impersonation attacks that break authenticity properties.
2. There are only two agents in Weidenbach's model. This means that to show that
the whole system is secure, we would have to prove theorems such as are proved
in model checking work, showing that if there is an attack on the large system
(i.e. with any number of agents and simultaneous protocol runs) there must be
an attack on the small system (with just two agents and one protocol run) as well.
3. Each agent modelled only knows one half of the protocol. An attack may require
one agent to be performing both halves of the protocol at once to two different
agents, e.g. Paulson's attack on Otway-Rees [Paulson, 1998], Clark's parallel
session attack [Clark and Jacob, 1996],
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We compare our work to Weidenbach's in detail in §11.
Blanchet has developed another Horn-clause model, in which the spy has full
Dolev-Yao capabilities, [Blanchet, 2002]. A specification in a spi calculus variant is
translated automatically into Horn clauses, and then a customised prover is used to
determine whether a certain term is derivable. If it is derivable, then an attack can be
found by stepping through the proof to see what messages were exchanged, in a similar
way to Weidenbach's work. The method can verify protocols assuming an unbounded
number of nonces and parallel runs, though not an unbounded number of agents. It is
also not complete, in the sense that it may not terminate, or it may terminate with a
false attack. These false attacks are due to the way Blanchet represents freshness to
avoid having to use an explicit trace-based inductive formalism. False attacks seem
not to occur in practice though, and often secrecy and authenticity properties can be
verified in under a second for typical protocols.
Other first-order formalisms use rewriting as the basis for searching for attacks.
For example Jacquemard et al. have proposed a rewrite rule formalism suitable for the
theorem prover daTac, [Jacquemard et al., 2000]. A key feature of the daTac is that
it enables associative-commutative (AC) unification over the arguments of AC oper¬
ators. This is used in the modelling of sets of messages that have been sent and sets
of terms the intruder has learnt. They also proposed a high-level specification lan¬
guage for protocols, which can then be automatically compiled to the rewrite formal¬
ism. The system produced is called Casrul. It has been tested on a number of flawed
protocols from the Clark-Jacob corpus, [Clark and Jacob, 1997], with good results,
[Chevalier and Vigneron, 2002], though it does require the user to decide a scenario in
advance, i.e. what agents will be involved and what role they will play in the protocol.
We compare Casrul to Coral in more detail in §11.3.
Ernie Cohen has produced a first-order formalism for verification based on invari¬
ants, called TAPS [Cohen, 2000]. TAPS models protocols as a transition system. A
state is represented by the set of steps that have been executed and the set of messages
that have been sent. The TAPS system constructs first-order invariants for the system
that capture desirable security properties. Sometimes, particularly in the case of simple
protocols, these protocols are constructed automatically, but sometimes hints from the
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user are required. Once the invariant has been found, it is sent to a first-order theorem
prover and typically solved extremely fast (when the protocol is secure). If the proto¬
col has a flaw however, TAPS does not give a counterexample. TAPS has been used
to verify a large number of protocols, and Cohen has published plans to add bitwise
operations and modelling of algebraic properties of cryptographic functions to the sys¬
tem, [Cohen, 2003]. However, these plans look unlikely to become reality, as Cohen
has moved into a different area.
2.4.5 The Strand Space Model
A lot of recent interest has been sparked by Fabrega, Herzog and Guttman's strand
space model for analysing protocols, [Fabrega et al., 1999], A strand space is a collec¬
tion of strands, with a graph structure which expresses causal relations. A strand is a
sequence of events that a single party may engage in. An event is the sending or recep¬
tion of a message, represented by a node in the graph. Nodes have a sign: a positive
sign indicates a message was sent, and a negative sign indicates it has been received.
There are two kinds of strands in the model, those for honest participants and in¬
truder strands. A strand belonging to an honest agent contains that agent's actions in
one particular run of the protocol. If an agent is involved in several runs, each of these
will have its own strand. Nodes in separate strands are adjacent when they represent the
sending and reception of the same message. As an example, the Needham-Schroeder
public key protocol as represented by a strand space model is presented in Figure 2.2.
The intruder strands are sequences of nodes representing the intruder doing any¬
thing that he is able to do, e.g. intercepting a message, breaking it down into compo¬
nent parts, building new messages and sending them. Useful intruder actions may be
modelled by connecting many strands. For example, in Figure 2.3 we show Lowe's
attack on the NSPK protocol (§2.3.3) represented in a strand space model. There are
two short intruder strands, 1\ and I2.
A bundle is a finite acyclic subgraph of the strand space that is in a certain sense
backwards-closed: all received messages occurring in strands in the bundle must have
come from nodes also in the bundle, and if an event on a strand is in the bundle, then
all preceding events on that strand must also be in the bundle. Secrecy and authenticity


















Figure 2.3: NSPK attacked
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properties of the protocol can be expressed in terms of the connections between differ¬
ent kinds of strands and bundles. For example, the property of the NSPK protocol that
is violated in Figure 2.3 would be roughly stated as:
Proposition 1 If:
1. C is a bundle in an NSPK strand space
2. C contains a responder strandfor B using nonces Na and Nb, in apparent commu¬
nication with A
3. The spy does not have A's private key, and
4. Nb is a fresh nonce
Then C also contains an initiator strandfor A using nonce Na and Nb
In the original work, [Fabrega et al., 1999], proofs of these properties were carried
out by hand. For example, the authors showed that the property in Proposition 1 is true
for Lowe's revised version of the NSPK protocol. More recently, an automated tool
called Athena which uses the strand space model has appeared, [Songetal., 2001],
Athena can also present counterexamples when a protocol is found faulty.
The advantages of the strand space model seem to be that, once understood, it pro¬
vides a simple and succinct way of expressing the causal relationship between differ¬
ent parts of a protocol, and together with some techniques for cutting down the search
space, it can be used to efficiently obtain automated proofs. However, it is not as flexi¬
ble as, for example, Paulson's model. Athena, the automated strand space prover, can
verify many protocols in a fraction of a second, though it does require a limit on num¬
ber of concurrent runs and length of messages to achieve termination sometimes. We
compare the strand space model work with our own in detail in Chapter 11.
2.5 Outlook
The need for secure cryptographic protocols increases daily. The higher uptake of
the Internet and electronic commerce makes fraud potentially more profitable, increas¬
ing the risk of attack and hence the need for security. Proposed new applications of¬
ten require the development of a new kind of protocol, e.g. Internet auction houses
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[Stajano and Anderson, 1999] and mobile phones incorporating Internet access. How¬
ever, protocol designers continue to make simple design mistakes. For example, the
"secure" mail protocol proposed by GCHQ has been criticised for ignoring many
known protocol flaws, [Anderson and Roe, 1997],
As formal protocol analysis methods develop, researchers are looking to take it in
new directions. For example, some work has involved developing more fine-grained
models of the encryption algorithms used, taking into account properties such as as¬
sociativity and commutativity, [Millen and Shmatikov, 2003], Others have looked at
verifying properties of protocols which assume some underlying level of secrecy has
already been established, [Bella et al., 2003].
While the field of formal protocol analysis is a very active one, with a huge variety
of techniques and tools now available, formal methods are not widely used by protocol
designers. In fact, almost all published formal protocol analysis has been carried out
by the designers of the particular techniques used. This is probably because often
the formalisation of the protocol into the syntax required by the theorem prover or
model checker, and the subsequent use of the tool, demands a great deal of specialist
knowledge. Formal methods will only be used more widely when these tasks can be
made easier. Formal protocol analysis has other limitations. For example, it relies on
the abilities of an attacker being captured by a small number of assumptions. It may be
possible for an intruder to perform some action outside of this model and thus effect an
attack. So, a formal guarantee of protocol security is only as strong as the spy model
used.
However, formal methods have been responsible for the uncovering of many pub¬
lished protocol attacks. It is possible that without these techniques, these attacks would
not have been discovered until a malicious user made use of them to commit fraud. The
model checking techniques seem to be particularly good at detecting simple errors in
protocols, while theorem proving methods can provide much stronger guarantees of
security than informal reasoning. So, the field of formal methods for protocol analysis
remains a promising one.
A large amount of security protocol literature is not concerned with formal
methods, but rather with good engineering practices, [Abadi and Needham, 1996,
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Gong and Syverson, 1998], Also, authors such as Anderson have pointed out
that many security compromises arise as a result of implementation level errors
[Anderson and Needham, 1995]. Good system security can only arise as a conse¬
quence of well designed and verified protocols, prudent engineering and sound im¬
plementation.
In summary, the field of cryptographic security protocol design and analysis is one
of increasing importance. Formal techniques for protocol analysis form a key part
of research in the field, but cannot guarantee security on their own. Formal analysis
methods must be made simpler to use and understand in order for them to gain wider




We saw in the previous chapter that Paulson's model for the cryptographic protocol
analysis problem provides a very flexible and expressive setting for proving security
properties. However, some considerable expertise is required to complete the proofs. If
a protocol is flawed, a user may waste a lot of time trying to prove a conjecture about
the protocol's security which is in fact false. An automated tool that can not only
detect these incorrect conjectures but also present a counterexample, i.e. an attack on
the protocol, would clearly be very useful. In this chapter we survey various different
approaches to the refutation of incorrect conjectures, and evaluate how suitable they
would be for discovering protocol attacks in a Paulson-style inductive model.
3.1 First-Order Finite Domain Enumerators
Several tools have been developed to find counterexamples to first order formulae over
finite domains. These include Finder [Slaney, 1995], and MACE [McCune, 1994].
These programs search a finite domain, evaluating a given conjecture at each point to
see if a counterexample has been found. Finder is a generic counterexample finder that
can be used with any search algorithm, whereas MACE has been designed specifically
to use the Davis Putnam procedure. As automated first-order theorem provers become
more powerful and can be applied to more complex problems, it is likely that the de¬
velopment of tools like MACE and Finder will continue in a complementary fashion.
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However, they are not suitable for applying to security protocols, since security proto¬
cols in general have infinite models.
3.2 Finding Counterexamples by Instantiating with
Constructors
Inductive models are often specified in terms of a constructor theory - indeed, Paul¬
son's model for the cryptographic protocol problem is such a theory. A set of construc¬
tors for a datatype is a set of symbols such that any term in the datatype can be built
from those symbols. A set of constructors is free when every element in the datatype
has a unique representation in terms of these constructors, and any two non-identical
constructor terms are unequal in the theory. At least two authors have suggested ways
of finding counterexamples in these kinds of theories. We describe their approaches
below, and evaluate their suitability for discovering protocol attacks in §3.2.3.
3.2.1 Protzen's Calculus for Refutation
In [Protzen, 1992], Protzen presents a calculus which is sound and complete for the
refutation of faulty universally quantified conjectures in inductive theories specified
by universally quantified axioms and using only free datatypes. Given a universally
quantified and (possibly) incorrect conjecture, the method of refutation is as follows:
first, formulate an existentially quantified negation of the conjecture. Then, attempt to
find an instantiation of the existentially quantified variables such that the counterexam¬
ple statement is satisfied. So it is a search to satisfy a conjecture in a III theory. The
search for the counterexample is guided by the recursive definitions of the function
symbols in the counterexample formula. For example, suppose we are trying to refute
the false conjecture:
\/n,m : nut.plus(n+ l,m) ^ 1 (3.1)
with definitions
\/x,y : not. x = 0 => plus(x,y) = y
\/x,y : nat. x / 0 =>• plus(x,y) = plusjx— l,y) + 1
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A counterexample must be a witness to the formula:
3n,m : nat. plus(n + l,m) = 1
The method proceeds by propagating a restriction on the value of plus(n + 1 ,m) to its
subterms. The definition above of plus has two cases, and the first one gives us the
formula
3n,m : nat. n + I = 0 f\m = 1
which is unsatisfiable. The second case of the definition, after some simplification and
propagation of restrictions, gives us the formula:
3n, m : nat. n = 0 /\ m — 0
This gives us values for the variables n and m which satisfy the original (negated)
formula.
The method will not always terminate, as a semi-decision procedure is as good as
can be obtained for arithmetic formulae. So, for the method to be useful in practice, a
depth limit is specified. Protzen has implemented the counterexample finder as part of
the INKA inductive theorem prover, [Hutter and Sengler, 1996]. Its chief application
in this context is to refute incorrect generalisations. The method is quite suitable for
this, since the over generalisations that occur in this context are often quite trivially
false, and a counterexample can be found very close to the base case values.
3.2.2 Reif's Counterexample Finder
Reif et al., [Reif et al., 2001], have implemented a method for counterexample con¬
struction for infinite datatypes in first-order constructor specifications. It is integrated
with the interactive theorem prover KIV, [Reif, 1995]. Their method incrementally in¬
stantiates the variables in a formula with constructor terms and evaluates the formulae
produced using the simplifier rules made available to the system during proof attempts.
A heuristic strategy guides the search through the resulting subgoals for one that can
be reduced to false. If such a subgoal is not found, the search terminates when all
variables have been instantiated to constructor terms. In this case the user is left with
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a model condition, which must be used to decide whether the instantiation found is a
valid counterexample.
For example, take the conjecture:
sorted{l\) f\sortediyh) —> sorted(append(l\,l2))
with the usual definitions of list append and the predicate sorted. This is not true in all
models of the specification, and Reif's system finds the counterexample
l\ = cons{e\,nil) I2 = cons(e2,nil)
with the model condition
-i(ei < e2)
The user sees that this model condition can be satisfied, e.g. with e\ — 1 and e2 = 0,
and so accepts the counterexample.
3.2.3 Evaluation of Protzen's and Reif's Approaches
Reif's system is attractive in that it is tightly integrated into the theorem prover, al¬
lowing it to be easily called during a proof attempt. It can also deal with non-free
datatypes, which Protzen's method cannot. However, although the examples tackled
by Reif are larger than those in [Protzen, 1992], they all involve domains where the
datatypes can be easily enumerated. For example, Reif refutes a number of false graph
theory conjectures by using a non-free datatype for graphs, in which a vertex may be
explicitly added to the graph, or may be be implicitly added in an edge. This means
that any combination of vertices and edges constitutes a valid graph, making it easy to
construct candidate counterexamples.
Reif's method does not seem be suitable for inductive datatypes, such as are used
in protocol analysis. The relatively simple technique of combining constructors would
tend to generate many non-valid traces, for example, traces in which an honest agent
sends message 3 in a protocol without having received message 2. This could be
accounted for in the specification by using a predicate to specify valid traces, but it
would seem too inefficient to keep generating invalid traces only to later reject them.
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The vast majority of traces generated by constructor symbols would indeed be invalid.
Protzen's method generates its instantiations by a slightly different method, but has the
same drawback.
3.3 Monroy's Non-theorem Work
In 1993, Raul Monroy produced an MSc thesis, [Monroy, 1993], on correcting in¬
correct inductive conjectures in first-order logic. The non-theorem detection was
carried out by a simple 'formula tester', borrowed from the Clam proof planner,
[Bundy et al., 1990]. This system tests conjectures by evaluating their truth at a few
pre-chosen values, typically 0, 5(0) and 5(5(0)) for conjectures over the natural num¬
bers. Monroy used information based on the nature of the failure of the proof as a basis
for choosing a patch attempt. The idea is to synthesize a corrective predicate step by
step as the proof is attempted. At the end of the process, the corrective predicate gives
conditions under which the conjecture is a theorem.
Monroy's latest work, [Monroy, 2000], proposes a more powerful technique
for correcting faulty conjectures. This new mechanism performs non-theorem de¬
tection by referring to a user-defined finite set of obvious contradictions, e.g.
x^x,s(x) =x,s(x) = p(x). If, when proving a conjecture, the proof of a particular
subgoal fails, and that subgoal is not one of the known contradictions, then the sub-
goal is abducted into the patch predicate as a condition for the original conjecture to
be true.
For example, given the non-theorem
MN : nat.double(half(N)) = N (3.2)
with definitions
double (0) = 0 half(0) = 0
double(s(N)) = s(s(double(N)) half(s(0)) = 0
half(s(s(N)) = s(half(N))
Monroy's mechanism synthesizes a corrective predicate with definition




which specifies that the conjecture (3.2) is true for even numbers.
Note that if a subgoal is a non-theorem that is not included in the user-defined
contradiction set, then the process does not identify it as being incorrect. So, the
output from the process is of the form, 'I can't prove conjecture X as you presented it
to me, it may or may not be incorrect, but given conditions Y I can prove it to be true.'
However, the same 'folk knowledge' that leads us to look for simple counterexamples
around the base cases of recursive definitions suggests that a small but well chosen
set of contradictions may well trap a large proportion of the non-theorems, at least in
simple applications.
Monroy is currently working on extending the idea to more complex problems and
to higher-order theories, [Monroy, 2003], He also observes that the corrective predi¬
cates synthesized are sometimes 'unnatural', and is working on trying to characterise
families of corrective predicates to improve the quality of the patches.
An attraction of Monroy's work is that we would like be able to say how to fix a
protocol that is found to be faulty, and Monroy's corrective predicates may provide a
means of doing this. They might also allow us to specify requirements for the secure
implementation of an otherwise insecure protocol (this would be useful in the context
of legacy protocols which cannot be changed for backwards compatibility reasons).
However, the system for actually detecting incorrect conjectures is currently much too
basic for our requirements.
3.4 Proof by Consistency
Proof by consistency is a technique for automating inductive proof. It has also
been called inductionless induction, inductive completion, and implicit induction,
as the actual induction rule used is described implicitly inside a proof of the con-
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jecture's consistency with the set of hypotheses. It was first proposed by Musser,
[Musser, 1980], and developed by Huet and Hullot, [Huet andHullot, 1982], Jouan-
naud and Kounalis, [Jouannaud and Kounalis, 1989], Bachmair, [Bachmair, 1991],
Ganzinger and Stuber, [Ganzinger and Stuber, 1992], and Bouhoula and Rusinow-
itch, [Bouhoula and Rusinowitch, 1995], amongst others. Recent versions, from Bach-
mair's work onwards, have been shown to be refutation complete, i.e. are guaranteed to
detect non-theorems in finite time.1 This is in contrast to classical 'explicit induction'
techniques, [Boyer and Moore, 1979], that generally offer no such support.
Proof by consistency has generally fallen out of favour as a method for automat¬
ing inductive proof, although it has recently been used to verify some properties of
the JavaCard bytecode verifier, [Barthe and Stratulat, 2003], and new hybrid versions
incorporating some techniques from more conventional explicit induction are still be¬
ing proposed, e.g. [Deplagne and Kirchner, 2001, Avenhaus et al., 2003], The loss of
interest in the technique was mainly due to problems encountered when scaling up
the method to larger problems, and because it is not very similar to the way humans
do induction, which makes combining it with an interactive approach quite difficult.
However, the suitability of the technique for refuting non-theorems of significant size,
e.g. a conjecture about properties of a security protocol, had not previously been tested.
Recently, Comon and Nieuwenhuis have proposed a setting of the proof
by consistency technique that encompasses and extends previous versions,
[Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000], It allows proof by consistency to be carried out
using any saturation-based first-order theorem prover. There is no need for any spe¬
cialised completion procedure. This allows powerful simplification and redundancy
rules developed for automatic first-order theorem proving to be utilised. Much of the
work in this thesis is based on this setting, and it will be explained in detail in the next
chapter.
'Such a technique must necessarily be incomplete with respect to proving theorems correct, by
Godel's incompleteness theorem.
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3.5 Evaluation
In order to detect and refute incorrect security conjectures, and so obtain protocol at¬
tacks, we require a refutation technique suitable for infinite, inductive models. Various
techniques have been proposed to refute small non-theorems that arise in automated
reasoning systems, as we have seen (§3.2.1, §3.2.2, §3.3). However, little attention
has been paid to refutation of larger non-theorems where enumerating the domain is a
non-trivial task. We decided the proof by consistency technique was the most promis¬
ing for this purpose, since it allows us to use the full power of a modern first-order
theorem prover, and it will be interesting to see how useful this aspect of the proof
by consistency technique is in a practical example. Also, it gives us at least a theo¬
retical possibility of working towards a proof of the correctness of a secure protocol
at the same time as we search for an attack. We describe the theory of the proof by
consistency technique in more detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
The Theory of the
Comon-Nieuwenhuis Method
In this chapter we outline the theory that lies behind the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method
for proof by consistency. The chapter is organised as follows: first we give the back¬
ground required in terms of notation, definitions etc. Then we give a description of
the theory and terminology of automatic first-order theorem proving. This is followed
by an overview of how the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method works. We then describe the
method for Horn clause problems in detail, and describe different methods for obtain¬
ing I-Axiomatisations (defined in Definition 4 below). Sections 4.3 to 4.6 draw heavily
on [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 1998] and [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000]. In particu¬
lar, all proofs are from [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000], except for Corollary 1, which
we prove here, and Theorem 3, which is proved in [Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1994],
4.1 Background
We use the standard notations of [Dershowitz and Jouannaud, 1990], T (¥ -,X) is the
set of terms over a set of symbols and a denumerable set of variables X. T(]T) is
the set of ground terms over J. The subterm of t at position p is denoted t\p, and the
result of replacing t\p with s in t is written as t[y]p.
A multiset over a set S is a function M : S —> N. The union of multisets is defined
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as Mi UM2(x) = Mi (x)+M2(x), sometimes written as My.Mj-
If -4- is a binary relation, then 4— is its inverse, -H- is its symmetric closure, ->+
is its transitive closure and -»* is its reflexive-transitive closure. We write s -V t if
s —>* t and there is no t' such that t —> t'. Then t is called irreducible and a normal
form of s w.r.t. —>. The relation —> is well-founded or terminating if there exists no
infinite sequence si —> S2 -» .... We define the join of two relations, —h o —>2, to be the
following binary relation: s —»i o —>2 t iff 3u.s —>1 u —>2 t. A relation —> is confluent
if the relation 4—* o —»* is contained in —»* o <—*. A relation —y on terms is monotonic
is s —> t implies u[s\p —>■ u[t]p for all terms s,t and u and positions p. A congruence is
a reflexive, symmetric, transitive and monotonic relation on terms.
An equation is a multiset {s,t} of terms, denoted s = ? or equivalently t — s. A
first-order clause is a pair of finite multisets of equations T (the antecedent) and A (the
succedent), written as T —> A. It is a Horn clause if A contains at most one equation,
and a definite Horn clause if A contains exactly one equation. The empty clause □ is
one with both T and A empty. We will adopt the notational convention of sometimes
writing the multisets T —> A as disjunctions, i.e. we will write -1P1 V... V ->Pn V Q\ V
• • • VQm to denote {Pi,...,P„} —> {<Qi,...,Q„}•
A substitution a is a function a : X —> T(jF, X). so is the term obtained by apply¬
ing substitution 0 to s.
A rewrite rule is an ordered pair of terms (s,t), written s t, and a set of
rewrite rules R constitutes a term rewrite system (TRS). The rewrite relation with R
on T(iF,A), denoted —>■/{, is the smallest monotonic relation such that lo ro for
all I —> r e R and all substitutions o. If s —t then we say that s rewrites into t with
R. A rewrite system R is convergent if it is confluent and terminating; then every
term t has a unique normal form w.r.t. —>r, denoted by «//?(?), and s = t is a logical
consequence of R iff n f/fis) — nf/fit).
A Herbrand model H of a set of clauses E is a set of congruence classes containing
only ground terms referred to in E such that H \= E. A minimal Herbrand model H for
a set of clauses E is a set of congruence classes such that H \= E, with the number of
congruence classes in H less than or equal to the number in any other Herbrand model
for E. An equality Herbrand interpretation is a Herbrand model constructed from a set
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of ground terms and a congruence on those terms.
Let R be a set of ground equations or rewrite rules. Then the congruence <y-*R
defines an equality Herbrand interpretation denoted by R*, where the only predicate =
is interpreted by S = t iff s y>R t. We write s = t G R* if s <y*R /. R* satisfies (or is a
model of) a ground clause T —> A, denoted by R* \= T —» A, if R* T, or R* n A 0.
The empty clause □ is hence satisfied by no interpretation. R* satisfies a set of clauses
S, denoted by R* |= S, if it satisfies every clause in S.
A (strict partial) ordering on CT{ffi,X) is an irreflexive, transitive relation >-. It is a
reduction ordering if it is well-founded and monotonic, and stable under substitutions:
s y t implies so y to for all substitutions o.
An example of such an ordering is the recursive path ordering (RPO). For this
ordering, we first set a strict precedence on the symbols in our signature , >-?• We
extend this to a suitable ordering y on T(jf ,X), by the following scheme:
f(s\,... ,Si,... ,Sn) y g{sl i • • • j si—l j
th...,tk,Si+h...,Sn) iff — g or fyyr,
si y ti,...,Si ytk,k>0
4.2 First-Order Theorem Proving
Automated first-order theorem proving really took off with the advent of Robinson's
resolution inference rule send first-order unification algorithm, [Robinson, 1965]. We
give the resolution inference rule below, Unification is the process of finding substitu¬
tions a such that so = to for some terms s,t. The crucial point is that the resolution
inference rule is in some sense complete (as explained below), and the first-order uni¬
fication algorithm is decidable. This means that first-order theorem proving can be
attempted completely automatically using Robinson's methods.
Although many refinements have been made to Robinson's technique, the basic
idea remains the same. Suppose we have a set of axioms A. Axioms are the formulae
we know to be true or assume to be true without proof in our intended semantics.
Additionally, suppose we have a conjecture C, that is a formula we would like to prove
f(si,...,sn) y si
f(si,...,sn) y g(ti,...,tm)
Vi, 1 < i <n
iff^<Tg,f(s\,---,sn) yth...,tm
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to be a logical consequence of our axioms. We must first convert the problem into
a suitable form for the resolution rule. To accomplish this, quantifiers are stripped
from the formulae by moving universal quantifiers to the outside, and by Skolemising
existentially quantified variables. Skolemising is the process of replacing existentially
quantified variables with fresh Skolem functions that indicate the dependence of the




with / our new Skolem function. Then we stratify the logical connectives ->,A,V,
putting the axioms and conjectures into conjunctive normal form, i.e. clauses of the
form we described in §4.1:
-Pi V...V-P„V<2l V...Vfln (4.1)
We call the individual -P, and Qj literals, and the number i or j identifying the literal is
known as the index of the literal. We will sometimes use the T —> A form for denoting
clauses in the rest of this section when it makes the inference rules clearer.
The conjecture C is negated, and the idea then is to prove C by deriving a
contradiction from -CUA. The resolution inference rule is defined like this:
Resolution:
P, Ti —> Ai ct the most
T2 —> A2, Q with general unifier
(Thr2—» Ai,A2)a of P and Q
We call the conclusion of the resolution inference rule the resolvent. The ver¬
sion of the resolution rule given here is known as binary resolution, as there are only
two resolving literals, P and Q. In order for this form of resolution to be refutation
complete, i.e. guaranteed to find the empty clause from an inconsistent set of clauses
in finite time, we require a rule known as factoring:
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Factoring:




of Qi and Qj
The process of searching for the empty clause is typically organised as follows:
clauses are stored in two sets, the usable set and the worked off set. In general, we
start with all clauses in the usable set, though if we know our axioms are consistent
we may use the so-called set of support strategy, in which case only the conjecture
clauses are placed in the usable set, and the axioms in the worked off set.
Proof search then proceeds by picking a clause from the usable set, typically by a
simple weight heuristic, e.g. the clause with the fewest variables and function symbols
is chosen first. This clause is then called the given clause. The given clause is con¬
sidered for resolution against all the other clauses in the worked off and usable sets,
unless we are using the set of support strategy in which case given clauses are only
considered for resolution against worked off clauses. Any resolvents produced from
these inferences are placed in the usable set. The given clause is then placed in the
worked off set. This continues until the given clause has weight 0, i.e. it is the empty
clause.
4.2.1 Modern Provers
In the years since Robinson first proposed the resolution calculus, a number of
important refinements have been made which have significantly increased the power
of automated first-order provers. One refinement has been to introduce slight variants
to the inference rules in order to better handle theories with equality. The paramodu-
lation calculus was introduced by Robinson and Wos, [Robinson and Wos, 1969], and
later the superposition calculus was developed by Bachmair and Ganzinger amongst
others, [Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1990, Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1994], In the latter,
techniques from rewriting theory are used to restrict the application of the inference
rule while still preserving completeness. This requires us to choose well-founded
ordering on the terms in our theory, X. Informally, the idea is that if our set of clauses
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is inconsistent, then we can get to the empty clause by deriving new clauses which are
smaller (w.r.t. >-) than those it was derived from. The superposition calculus for an
equational problem requires the following four inference rules1. The informal idea of
the superposition rules is to use a positive equation from the left premise as a rewrite
rule to simplify the rightmost clause.
o = mgu(l, ,s|p) and s is not a variable,
and lo >- ro, and la = ro is maximal
w.r.t. >- in (Ti —y I = r, Ai)a,
and so >- to and so = to is maximal
in (T2,s = t —> A2)ct
Superposition left:
Ti—» / = r,Ai r2,s = r—> A2
(ri,r2,s[r]p = r —» A],A2)O
Superposition right:
T1—W = r,Ai T2—>A:2,s = t
if
(r i,r2 —>• s[r]p = /, Ai,A2)ct
a = mgu(l, s|p) and s is not a variable,
and lo >- ro and lo = ro is maximal
in (T1 —> Ai, I = r)o, and
so >- to and so = to is maximal
in (T2 —» A2,s = t)o
and (s = t)o (Z = r)o.
Equality factoring:
T—>A,l — r,s~t o = mgu(I,s) and ro )£_ lo
if
(T, r — t —y A,s = t)o and lo = ro is maximal in (r —y A,1 = r,s = t)o
Equality resolution:
T, Z = r—y A a = mgu(l,r), and lo = ro is maximal in
(T —y A)a (T, Z = r —y A)a
Additionally, we can use information from our ordering >- to check for redundancy.
If we derive a new clause that can itself be derived from smaller clauses we already
'For superposition left and right, the given clause is the rightmost premise
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have, the new clause is redundant and so is pruned from the search space. More for¬
mally, we write S^c to denote the set of all ground instances of clauses S that are
smaller than a ground clause c w.r.t. and then define:
Definition 11. A ground clause c is redundant in a set of clauses S if S<c |= c.
Similarly, a non-ground clause is redundant ifall its ground instances are.
Definition 2 A ground inference with rightmost premise c and conclusion c' is redun¬
dant in a set ofclauses S ifS<c \= c'. Similarly, a non-ground inference is redundant if
all its ground instances are.
Definition 3 A set of clauses S is saturated if all inferences with premises in S are
redundant in S.
If we derive a set of saturated clauses S, then we know that it is consistent, so there
is no chance of deriving the empty clause. Techniques exist for constructing a model
from a saturated S (see Definition 11).
In order to determine whether a newly derived clause is redundant in practice, a
number of techniques have been proposed. One is to check for subsumption, i.e. if a
clause we have newly derived is a more specific instance of one we already have, then
it is redundant. In general, checking for subsumption is an NP-complete problem, but
various algorithms have been proposed that produce acceptable performance on a good
number of cases, [Gottlob and Leitsch, 1985],
A simpler test for redundancy is to look for tautologies, for example clauses of the
form T, E —> A, E or T —> A ,t = t. Most modern provers employ rules to detect these
kinds of clauses and a number of other such rules.
As well as rules for testing redundancy, modern provers also employ a number
of rules which simplify the derived clause. These are known as reduction rules.
For example, provers often employ some kind of rewriting based reductions, based
on the rewrite rules inferred from other clauses. The theorem prover SPASS,
[Weidenbach et al., 1999], employs the following rules for local rewriting:
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Vi—»Ai,s = t T2,E—> A2 E\p = so, s — t is strictly maximal
Ti—> Ai ,s = t if inTi—» Ai ,s = t,
Y2 ,E[to]p —A2 and sy t and Tier C T2, Aicr C A2
Ti—>Ai,s = r T2—> A2,E
Ti —> A\,s = t
r2 —>A2,E[to\p
E\p = so, s = t \s strictly maximal
if in Ti —> Ai,s = t,
and sy t and Tig C T2, Aja C A2
Another refinement to the method is literal selection, the rough idea being that,
since we need to eliminate all literals in a clause to obtain a refutation, it cuts down
the search space if we decide to work on eliminating one literal at a time. For this
we define a function that selects a (possibly arbitrary) negative literal from a clause,
and then only that literal is considered as an equation s = t in a superposition left
inference. Only maximal selected literals (w.r.t. our ordering >-) are considered for
the other equations in superposition inferences. Superposition remains complete under
selection. A common strategy is to select a literal in a clause only if that clause has
more than one maximal literal.
4.2.2 Memory Allocation
A major improvement to the efficiency of theorem prover implementation has resulted
from the use of term indexing. This is used both to save memory, and to speed up
operations such as searching for unifying literals for use in inference and reduction
rules. The principle of the method is to try to store every subterm that occurs in the
worked off or usable set only once, together with a set of links to superterms containing
that subterm. These superterms are linked back to their own superterms, and hence
back to literals and then to clauses. Normalisation techniques are used to allow non-
ground terms to be shared more efficiently. This saves memory, and therefore also
allows the program to run faster.
To see how term indexing also allows inferences and reductions to be calculated
faster, suppose we have a given clause T, s = t —> A and we want to consider it for
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inferences by superposition left on our selected literal s = t. We can retrieve possible
right premises for the inference rule application by looking at the subterms of s, ex¬
tracting unifying subterms from the index, and then tracing back their superterm links.
This avoids the potentially very laborious process of looking through all the clauses
we have, looking through each literal in each clause and then looking in each literal
for a unifying term. In terms of efficiency improvement, term indexing is probably the
biggest implementation based advance to have been made in theorem proving in the
last 20 years.
4.2.3 Answer Extraction
Some applications of theorem proving require that we extract an answer, i.e. we prove
an existential goal 3x.P(x) and extract a witness t satisfying P(t). This can be done in
resolution style theorem proving by the use of answer literals, [Green, 1969]. These
literals contain an occurrence of all the universally quantified variables2 that we are
interested in an instantiation of. As unifications are found and applied to the literals in
a clause, they are also applied to the answer literals. However, the answer literals are
hidden in the sense that they don't count towards the weighting of a clause, and they
are never used for inferences. When the empty clause is derived, we simply look in the
answer literal and read off the value of the variable, yielding our answer t.
Answer extraction extends naturally from the resolution calculus to equational cal¬
culi like the superposition calculus. We just need to accumulate the unifiers in the same
way. Some recent work has shown completeness of the method for equational calculi
(i.e. if we find all the proofs of a 3x.P(x) = y conjecture, we will have obtained all
valid answers t such that P(t) — y), [Lynch, 1997],
2Recall that we negate a conjecture in order to try and prove it, so our existentially quantified vari¬
ables in the original conjecture will now be universally quantified.
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4.3 Overview of Comon-Nieuwenhuis Method
The proof by consistency technique was developed to solve problems in equational
theories, involving a set of equations defining the initial model3, E. We will refer
to these as the axioms. The problem then is to establish the truth (or otherwise) of
a conjecture C with respect to this equational system, where C is not an equational
theorem of the system (i.e. there may be models of E in which C is not true), but C
may be an inductive theorem of E, i.e. it is true in the initial model.
The approach is to produce a first-order axiomatisation EL of the minimal Herbrand
model such that CUELUE is consistent if and only if C is an inductive consequence
of E. As we saw in §4.2.1, modern first-order theorem provers have two modes of
termination: one in which a contradiction is derived and the (negated) conjecture is
refuted, and one where the prover ascertains that a refutation cannot be found, and
so the conjecture is consistent with the axioms. If we can show consistency with our
axiomatisation EL and the axioms E, then we have shown that C is a theorem of the
initial model of E. Note that this is the other way round to ordinary resolution theorem
proving, where we check the consistency of E U ->C, and if the consistency check fails
(i.e. we derive the empty clause), we have proved C. In proof by consistency, if our
consistency check of CUELUE fails, then we have shown that C is not an inductive
theorem of E.
4.4 The Comon-Nieuwenhuis Method for Horn Clauses
Although the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method can be applied to non-Hom specifications,
the method for Horn clauses is easier to understand, as we have a unique minimal
model of the axioms. All the security protocol problems in this thesis are specified in
terms of Horn clauses.
We assume the axioms contain only equations, i.e. that equality is the only pred¬
icate symbol. Other specifications could be transformed to meet this requirement by
converting literals A into A = true, with true a new, minimal function symbol. We will
3The initial or standard model is the minimal Herbrand model. This is unique in the case of a Horn
or purely equational specification.
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also firstly assume that our set of axioms is saturated under superposition and equality
resolution (i.e. they could be written as a convergent rewrite systems). Later we will
show how to drop this requirement.
Suppose we have a saturated set of Horn clauses E, a set of conjectures C, and a
total ordering >- on the terms in E. Then there is a unique minimal Herbrand model of
E, which we will call I. In order to reduce the problem of proving or disproving C to
first-order consistency, we require an I-Axiomatisation\
Definition 4 A set offirst-orderformulae EL is an I-Axiomatisation ofI if
1. EL is a set ofpurely universally quantifiedformulae
2. I is the only model ofE U EL up to isomorphism.
EL must therefore contain enough negative information to rule out all non-minimal
Herbrand models. Assuming a total ordering on terms, y, we define a normal I-
Axiomatisation.
Definition 5 A ground term t is normal if it is the minimum (w.r.t. y) representative of
its congruence class in 1. A ground clause c is normal ifall terms in c are normal. A
substitution a is normal ifxa is normalfor all x in the domain of a.
Definition 6 Let Elbe a set offirst-order clauses s.t. I \= EL and EL j= sf t for all pairs
ofdistinct normal terms s and t. Then EL is a normal I-Axiomatisation.
A proof that a normal I-Axiomatisation is indeed an I-Axiomatisation can be
found in [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000], Not all I-Axiomatisations are normal,
however we need our I-Axiomatisations to be normal for Theorem 2 below. Nor¬
mal I-Axiomatisations are also convenient to construct. For example, suppose E is the
following specification of natural numbers and the plus symbol:
0 + jc = x
5(x)+y — ^(x + y)
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Then the following two formulae constitute a normal I-Axiomatisation, with >- defined
such that + is bigger than ^ or 0:
0 ^ 5(x)
s(x) = s(y) —> x = y
This theorem about I-Axiomatisations states a property central to the Comon-
Nieuwenhuis technique:
Theorem 1 IfSI is an I-Axiomatisation, then SAUElJC is consistent <=> I f= C
Proof: If I [= C, then 11= SAUE UC, and hence SAUEUC is consistent. Conversely,
if the set SA U E U C is consistent, then it has a Herbrand model, as it is a set of purely
universal formulas. Now, this model must be 7, as I is the only Herbrand model of
EUSA. □
Comon and Nieuwenhuis discuss techniques for constructing I-Axiomatisations for
various classes of problem. We will look at this issue in §4.6 below.
We will now move on to the method of showing the consistency of SA. U E U C.
Informally, an attempt to show consistency involves two parts. In one, we pursue a
fair induction derivation. This is a restricted kind of saturation, where we need only
consider overlaps between axioms and conjectures, and produce inferences from an
adapted superposition rule. In the second part, every clause in the induction deriva¬
tion is checked for consistency against the I-Axiomatisation. If any consistency check
fails, then the conjecture is incorrect. If they all succeed, and the induction derivation
procedure terminates, the theorem is proved.
We now describe the first part of the method more formally. The only inference
rule required by the prover is conjecture superposition. This is a superposition rule
restricted to simplification of conjectures by axioms. The left premise of the rule is a
(definite) Horn clause from E and the right premise is a conjecture c from C:
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Conjecture superposition:
a = mgu(c\p, I) and c\p is not a variable, and
DVl = r c
^ for some ground 0:
pVc[r]p)ff loQ y (roQ,DoQ), and, if p is inside s in a
negative literal s = t of c then sa0 >- m0
The notion of redundancy is slightly different to that in conventional saturation-
based theorem proving, in that it includes the use, without ordering restrictions, of
any formula known to be true in I. This includes lemmas, i.e. arbitrary first-order
clauses L such that I f= L. We might have proved these in previous runs of the
Comon-Nieuwenhuis method or by other means. Redundancy is also defined with
respect to unproved conjectures which are smaller with respect to y than our possibly
redundant conjecture. This is where the essence of induction is found - the use of
smaller conjectures in this manner is similar to applying an induction hypothesis.
Let C<c be the set of all formulae in C smaller than conjecture c with respect to our
ordering >-. We then define the following:
Definition 7 A ground conjecture c is redundant in a set of conjectures C if EL) EL U
L\JC<C (= c. A non-ground conjecture c is redundant ifall its ground instances are.
Definition 8 A ground inference by superposition with rightmost premise c and con¬
clusion c' is redundant in a set of conjectures C ifE L) ELL) LL)C<C f= c'. Similarly, a
non-ground inference is redundant ifall its ground instances are.
Definition 9 A set of conjectures C is saturated if all inferences by conjecture super¬
position with rightmost premises in C are redundant in C.
We can now define a fair induction derivation. Informally, it is a sequence of sets
of conjectures in which all conjectures are, at some finite point in the sequence, shown
to be redundant, or considered for conjecture superposition.
Definition 10
1. An induction derivation is a sequence of sets of conjectures Co,Cj,... such that
each C,+i is obtained from Q either by adding to Q a logical consequence of
E, EL,L, Ci or by removing from C, some conjecture that is redundant in C;.
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2. A conjecture is persistent in the derivation if for some j it belongs to all Q with
k > j-
3. A derivation is fair if every conjecture superposition inference with a persistent
rightmost premise is redundant in Cj for some j.
The second key theorem of the technique is this:
Theorem 2 Let A be a normal I-Axiomatisation, and Co,Cj,... be a fair induction
derivation. Then I f= Co iffSA U {c} is consistentfor all clauses c in U ,-Cj.
To prove this theorem, we need a lemma, which states the fact that our inference system
only need reduce non-normal clauses:
Lemma 1 Suppose SA is a normal I-Axiomatisation and c is a clause. Let co be a
normal clause such that I co. Then SA U {c} is inconsistent.
Proof: (from [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000]) SI U {co} is inconsistent if (i) every
model of SA satisfies the negative literals of co, and, (ii) no model of SA satisfies any of
the positive ones. If / ^ co then 11= s = t for all negative equations s = t in co. Since
,s and t are both normal, it must be the case that s = t, which implies (i). For (ii), let
u = v be a positive equation in co. Since I co, we have u ^ v, and hence, by the
normality of SA, SA f= u ^ v, and hence no model of SA satisfies u = v. This implies the
inconsistency of SA U {co}, and hence of SA U {c}. □
We also require a definition of how to construct a model R* for a saturated set of
(Horn) clauses. The idea to define a rewrite system R based on the rules generated by
the clauses, and then to use this to define a congruence for constructing a model.
Definition 11 An instance G of the form, T —> I = r, of a clause in E generates the
rule I —» r if
1. R*g £ G,
2. I y r, and (/ = r) ye efor all equations e in T,
3. I is irreducible by Rq- where Rcj is the set of rules generated by all instances D of
clauses in E such that G>~g D. We denote by R the set of rules generated by all ground
instances ofE.
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Theorem 3 (from [Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1994]) The ground TRS R is convergent.
Furthermore, ifE is saturated under superposition and equality resolution then either
□ £ E or else R* is a model for E, i.e. E is consistent. More precisely, I is isomorphic
toR*.
Equipped with these definitions and results, we are now in a position to prove Theo¬
rem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: For the forward implication, suppose 3 some c £ some Cj s.t.
EL U {c} is inconsistent, then 1 \/= Co, since all such c are logical consequences from
E, EL, L, Co and I \= E,FL, L.
For the reverse implication, assume El U {c} is consistent Vc £ U,'C;. Suppose for
contradiction that I ^ Co- Then we derive a contradiction from the existence of a
minimal (w.r.t. y) ground instance ca of a clause c in U,-C,- s.t. 1 ca.
If c is redundant in some Cj then from the definition of redundancy of conjectures, it
follows that there is some false instance of a conjecture in Cj that is smaller than ca,
contradicting the minimality of ca.
Otherwise c must be persistent. By lemma 1, ca is not a normal clause, otherwise
EL U {c} would be inconsistent. Furthermore, a must be normal, since otherwise a
must be reducible by R (see definition 11) into some a' such that I ^ ca' and ca y ca',
contradicting the minimality assumption on ca. Since ca is therefore not a normal
clause, ca is reducible at some position p by a rule /0 —> rQ in R, generated by some
clause D Ml = r in E. Then (ca)|p = /0 and hence c\p and I are unifiable by some mgu
a.
Furthermore, if ca is reducible by some rule in R only by some negative literal
5a = ta, then, since I f= sa = ta, the normal forms of sa and ta w.r.t. R coincide.
Hence, if so >>- ta, the maximal side sa is reducible by R. Therefore, there exists some
inference by conjecture superposition
DM I = r c
(DMc[r]p)a
whose conclusion has an instance ca[r0]p such that I ca[r0]p and moreover ca y
ca[r0]. By fairness of the induction derivation, this conclusion is redundant in some
56 Chapter 4. The Theory of the Comon-Nieuwenhuis Method
Cj. But then from the definition of redundancy of inferences, it follows that there is
some false instance of a conjecture in Cj that is smaller than co, contradicting the
minimality of ca. □
A key point about Theorem 2 is that it also gives us refutation completeness.
Corollary 1 The Comon-Nieuwenhuis system is refutation complete, i.e. will refute
any conjecture c inconsistent with EiJJT in finite time.
Proof: Suppose c is our conjecture such that I c. Then the second half of the proof
of Theorem 2 shows that A ^ {c'} for some c' in U,-C;. By fairness of the induction
derivation, we will eventually consider this c'. All that is required is that we do indeed
detect the first-order inconsistency between d and the I-Axiomatisation. If we use a
standard resolution-style theorem prover, for example, then as observed in §4.2, we
have the completeness required. □
Having refuted a non-theorem in this way, we now have an overall proof of the
falsehood of our original universally quantified inductive conjecture C. This consist
of two parts, first a derivation of some d via conjecture superposition inferences, and
then a derivation of the empty clause from d U EL by standard first-order resolution type
methods. This refutation constitutes a resolution style proof of the theorem ->C. Hence,
we can extract the counterexample, t, using Green's answer literals, as described in
§4.2.3.
Note that we used the normality of EL in the proof of Theorem 2. In fact, this
is required not just for this particular proof but for the theorem itself to hold. For
a counterexample, suppose we have a set of axioms E = a = b, c = d for constants
a, b, c, d, ordering ay b y c y d, I-Axiomatisation EL — c, and C the false conjec¬
ture b = d. We now have no available conjecture superposition inferences that can lead
us to a = c, and so detection of the inconsistency is not possible. In §6.9, we show that
the I-Axiomatisation we use in our security protocol model is normal, so preserving
refutation completeness.
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4.5 Non-saturated Sets of Axioms
A key advance on previous proof by consistency techniques made by the Comon-
Nieuwenhuis technique is its ability to handle non-saturated sets of axioms E, i.e.
specifications which cannot be expressed as a convergent rewrite system. Instead, we
require that E is a reductive definition, which is defined in terms of constructors. We
explain this part of the method here.
We defined constructors informally in §3.2. More formally, let be the union
of fo, a non-empty set of constructor symbols, and fD, a set of defined symbols. As¬
sume Eq is a saturated subset of E build over T^^X). Terms in T(^v,X) are called
constructor terms. The constructors are called free if Eq is empty. We additionally
assume E is sufficiently complete, i.e. for every ground term 5 there is some ground
constructor term t such that E \= s = t.
As an example of a simple constructor specification, the two equations we gave
after Definition 6 in §4.4 specify + as a defined symbol in terms of constructors s
and 0. As an example of a function that cannot be defined in a convergent rewrite
system, we give the gcd function, as shown in Example 1. Our constructors here are
s and 0, and + and gcd are the defined symbols i.e. + is defined in terms of 5 and 0,
and gcd is defined in terms of 5,0 and +. Our term ordering >- should ensure that all
defined symbols are larger than all constructor symbols, e.g. by using the RPO with














This is not a saturated specification, but it is what Comon and Nieuwenhuis call a
reductive definition:
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Definition 12 Let E be a possibly non-saturated constructor-based specification
where E = Eq U E\ is a set of Horn clauses. Eq contains clauses axiomatising con¬
structor terms, and E\ contains clauses defining the defined symbols.
Furthermore, assume that for every ground term u of the form f(t\,....tn) where
tj 6 T(fio) for j = l..n and f G fD, there is some clause in E\ with an instance T —
I — r such that E (= T,l = u, I is headed by f, and u y (r, r). Then E is called a
reductive definition.
To see that our gcd definition in Example 1 is reductive, take any term u of the form
gcd(sn(0),sm(0)). If n (respectively m) is 0, then u is equivalent to the smaller term
sn (respectively sm). Otherwise, without loss of generality, let m = n + n'. Then E [=
gc<i(^w(0),sn+M'(0)) = ga/(s"(0),.s"(0) + sw'(0)), which can be reduced by the fifth rule
to gcd(sn(0),sn'(0)), which is smaller w.r.t. X- than u. Hence Example 1 is a reductive
definition.
In the proof of Theorem 2, sautratedness was used for showing that if ca is not normal,
then ca is reducible by R. The purpose of this is to show that for non-normal ca such
that I ca, there is some conjecture superposition inference yielding a smaller false
conjecture. We can also show this in the case of a reductive definition, as long as our
conjecture has a definition pattern:
Definition 13 A definition pattern is a term of the form f(x\,... ,xn) where f is a
defined symbol and x,- and xj are distinct variablesfor 1 < i, j, < n, i f j.
Lemma 2 Let E be a reductive definition and let c be a conjecture such that c\p, with
p the position of the innermost defined symbol, is a definition pattern.
Then for every ground instance ca where a is normal, there exists some inference
by conjecture superposition at position p with a conclusion c', and a normal substitu¬
tion a' such that 1 ca implies I c'a', andfurthermore, ca y c'a'.
Proof: Let c\p be f{x\,...,xn)a. By Definition 12, there exists an instance C2 V/ = r
of a clause c\ in £j such that E / = s, I is headed with /, and s >- (02, r). Further¬
more, since a is normal, I y s y r. Hence there exists an inference of c\ on c, whose
conclusion has an instance of the form C2 V ca[r]p with the desired properties. □.
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We can appeal to this lemma instead of saturatedness to complete the proof of
Theorem 2 in the case where E is not saturated, but is a reductive definition. However,
we must be sure we have a definition pattern. In [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000,
p.21-22], Comon and Nieuwenhuis give details of how this can be achieved using
variable abstractions.
Our formalism for the security protocol problem is a reductive definition rather than
a saturated one. However, it has a very simple equational part of the theory, and defined
symbols are always the outermost function symbols in a literal, allowing us to recover
refutation completeness without recourse to the variable abstraction mechanism. The
details of this are given in §6.8, after we have presented the formalisation itself. The
idea is to prove a stronger form of Lemma 2 without requiring definition patterns, and
thence to prove Theorem 2 for our formalism.
4.6 Finding l-Axiomatisations
There are a number of ways of obtaining a suitable set of clauses to be an
I-Axiomatisation .T. In Musser's original setting for proof by consistency,
[Musser, 1980], he assumed the presence of a completely defined equality function,
i.e. a function eq with the property that two terms are equal under the congruence re¬
lation given by the equation set E if and only if eq(s,t) = true, and unequal if and only
if eq(s,t) = false, true and false are assumed to be irreducible.
Lemma 3 In this situation, a sufficient I-Axiomatisation is the single equation true f
false.
Proof: 11= EL as true false as soon as the initial algebra is not trivial. If M (= E U A,
then for any two ground terms s,t, if I s = t, then the normal forms of 5 and t
are different. It follows that E f= eq{s,t) = false, hence M \= eq(s,t) = false. Since
M |= true false, M \f= eq(s,t) = true, hence M s = t.
For any two ground terms, we have M f= s = t iff I \= s = t. If M is a Herbrand model,
it is isomorphic to I. □
For problems for which we have a set of free constructors, we can use Huet and
Hullot's technique, [Huet and Hullot, 1982],
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Definition 14 A set ofconstructors C is free if:
E U{s 7^ t\s,t G T(C),s ^ t} is consistent.
If we have this condition for our theory E, then we simply define EL to express the
inequality of any two non-identical constructors, like this:
For every constructor symbol c:
V*i,... ,xn,y\,... ,yn.c(xi,... ,xn) = c(yh...,yn) —¥ x\ =yi A... Axn =
yn
For every pair of distinct constructors c, c':
\/x\,...,xn,yi,... ,yn.c(x\^ cf{y\,...,yn)
Huet and Hullot also assume that E is a convergent rewrite system and, quite reason¬
ably, that constructor terms are considered smaller than defined symbols.
Lemma 4 Under Huet and Hullot's assumptions, EL as specified above is a normal
I-Axiomatisation.
Proof: Let s and t be distinct ground terms such that s y t and S is minimal in its
equivalence class. Then s is irreducible, by convergence of the rewrite system, hence £
is a constructor term. Since s y t,t must also be a constructor term. Since £ and t are
distinct, then we must have EL \= sf^t.
For problems with non-free constructors, we may be able to use an
inductive reducibility predicate, as described by Jouannaud and Kounalis,
[Jouannaud and Kounalis, 1989], This applies when the problem can be specified in
terms of a convergent rewrite system R. A term is defined to be inductively reducible
w.r.t. R if all its ground instances are reducible. Our I-Axiomatisation J4 is the rewrite
system R, and J4 U {c} is inconsistent iff c is an equation I = r, I ^ r, and I is not
inductively reducible. Alternatively, Comon and Nieuwenhuis describe a method for
lifting the rewrite system to a finite set of clauses EL so that consistency checking can
be carried out with a standard prover[Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000, p. 32].
Comon and Nieuwenhuis also give a general procedure for determin¬
ing I-Axiomatisations for Horn clause examples based on disunification,
[Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000, p. 29]. However, the details are quite complex
and it is not really relevant to our work. Our protocol model uses free constructors, as
does Paulson's. We describe the I-Axiomatisation we use in §6.9.
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have defined the notation we will use in the thesis, and explained
the theory of first-order theorem proving. We have given an overview of the Comon-
Nieuwenhuis method for proof by consistency, and explained in detail how it works for
the Horn clause case. The most important result is Theorem 2, which we have shown
gives us refutation completeness. Following the proof of this theorem, we made the
important observation that the answer extraction mechanism explained in §4.2.3 can
be simple adapted for extracting counterexamples from our refutation.
We have also discussed the theory of construction I-Axiomatisations. For free





This chapter is divided into three sections. First, we describe the adaptation of a first-
order prover to pursue a fair induction derivation. Then we describe the parallel archi¬
tecture of our system (which we decided to call coral) and explain how this facili¬
tates the I-Axiomatisation check. Finally we give some results from testing coral.
5.1 Adapting a First-Order Prover
The aim of the system was an implementation of the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method for
proof by consistency in a fast, modern theorem prover. The first stage of this task
was to adapt a prover to construct fair induction derivations (Definition 10, p. 53).
This included the 'conjecture superposition' inference rule (see §4.4), and the use of
lemmas to show redundancy (also §4.4).
5.1.1 Choosing a First-Order Prover
The first issue addressed by our implementation work was the choice of first-order
theorem prover to adapt for proof by consistency. We chose Spass, because it had
shown good performance in recent CASC first-order theorem prover competitions,
[Pelletier et al., 2002], and because the source code is freely available from the Spass
website. The code is written in C and is well commented (in English), which also
contributed to the decision to use it.
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Spass is described in [Weidenbach et al., 1999] and, more extensively, in
[Weidenbach, 2001], It features term indexing, an extensive set of reduction rules,
and a variety of inference rules for different syntactic classes of problem.
5.1.2 Separation of Axioms and Conjectures
The inference rule described in §4.4 is similar to the normal superposition rule, except
that it requires that only overlaps between conjectures and axioms be considered, i.e.
the left premise is always an axiom and the right premise a conjecture. This means
that our system has to keep derived clauses and axioms separate, rather than putting
them together in a set of 'worked-off clauses' as is the standard practice in first-order
theorem proving.
In common with all modern first-order theorem provers, Spass uses term indexing
to allow fast checking for clauses containing literals that unify. This is used both
when looking for a clause to partner the given clause in an application of an inference
rule, and also when performing redundancy checks on derived clauses. We only need
to check for unifications between axioms and conjectures (or usable clauses) when
considering inference rules, but when checking for redundancy we will need to check
lemmas and previously derived (i.e. worked off) clauses as well. In this process, the
worked off clauses and lemmas have the same status, so we can save some memory
and time by putting them in a shared index together. This is indeed what coral does,
producing a theorem prover with 3 sharing indexes, instead of the normal 2:
Axioms - used for conjecture superposition rule and redundancy checking
Worked Off - contains lemmas as well as worked off clauses, used for redundancy
checking
Usable - contains derived clauses yet to be considered as given clauses
Input to spass is via a file in DFG syntax, [Hahnle et al., 1996], This is a common
syntax used in several provers, and translators exist to convert from and to this format
to and from other commonly used standards. DFG syntax only contains provision
for the input of axioms and conjectures. It would be a shame to deviate from this
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format. So, in the coral system, instead of changing the format to add in a section
for lemmas, we just use the existing label mechanism. Any axiom or conjecture in a
DFG syntax file can have a label attached, which is then used when referring to the
formula in the output of a proof. If no labels are given, Spass creates its own labels,
like 'axiom2' or 'conjecturel'. So, Coral treats any axiom the user has given a label
matching iemmaN' as a lemma, and adds it to the worked off index instead of the
axiom index.
5.1.3 The Use of Lemmas in Reduction Rules
By our definition in §4.4, we are permitted to use both axioms, lemmas and worked off
clauses in our proofs of redundancy. Lemmas in this context are taken to be theorems
added by the user to the input set that have been proved already. Our implementation
fully supports this. Some reduction rules required no modification to work with our
newly organised shared indexes. These are the ones that only compare the clause being
reduced to one other clause, such as subsumption checking (see §4.2)1. For these, we
just need to repeat the subsumption check firstly with the axiom index, and then with
the worked off index. This is precisely what Coral does.
Only slightly more complicated is the implementation of rules such as rewriting,
where several previously derived rules may be used. In the standard implementation
of Spass, this is done in one of two modes, depending on whether we have specified
complete inter-reduction or lazy reduction at the command line. In complete inter-
reduction mode, we may use rewrite rules inferred from either the worked off set or
the usable set. In lazy reduction mode, we only reduce with respect to the worked off
set. In Coral, we made changes to allow the axiom set to be used for generating
rewrite rules in both these modes, although for our protocol experiments we used only
complete inter-reduction.
Coral must exhaustively reduce a clause by rewriting, and in order to do this, it is
not sufficient to exhaustively rewrite using rules from one index, and then again with
the other indexes. It may be that by applying a rewrite rule from one index, we reduce
'The rules requiring no modification were: trivial literal elimination (in SPASS notation Obv), unit
conflict (UnC), tautology elimination (Taut), subsumption deletion (Sub), removal of redundant equa¬
tions (AED), and condensation (Con)
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a literal such that a rule from another index may apply. So where previously Spass
would have reduced a clause using rules from the worked off set, Coral's rewriting
loop checks first for applications of rules from the axiom index, and then from the
worked off index. If either of these produces a reduction, then we go back and look
again for a rule to apply to the newly reduced clause. When complete inter-reduction is
specified, we combine our new mechanism for reducing with respect to rules from the
axiom and worked off indexes with the existing mechanism for additionally reducing
with respect to the usable set, allowing exhaustive reduction via rules from all three
sets of clauses.
5.1.4 Recovery of the Counterexample
A system designed to detect incorrect conjectures is only of practical use if it can also
exhibit counterexamples. For our proposed application to cryptographic protocols, a
counterexample to a security property will constitute an attack on the protocol, the
vital piece of evidence required to show that the protocol is indeed flawed.
To present counterexamples found, we used the same mechanism involving answer
literals explained in §4.2. In order to implement this in Coral, it was necessary
to keep the answer literals 'unshared', i.e. not to place them into the term index.
This stops them from being picked up as potential partners for an application of the
inference or reduction rules.
When using Coral for a problem where the counterexample is of interest, the
Ans command line flag must be set. In this case, Coral will move any answer literals
in the conjecture to the end of the clause, and keep them unshared. To see the final
answer, the standard Spass flag PEmp should also be set. This means that when an
empty clause is derived, it is printed out, revealing the answer.
5.2 l-Axiomatisation Checking
Theorem 2 requires that we check every clause in the fair induction derivation against
an I-Axiomatisation. If an inconsistency is found here, this indicates an incorrect con¬
jecture. The fair induction derivation process is not guaranteed to terminate. In order
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to retain refutation completeness, we have to do our I-Axiomatisation checking at the
same time as the fair induction derivation is being computed.
In implementing the I-Axiomatisation check in coral, we were faced with two
choices: first, to combine I-Axiomatisation checking and inductive completion in a
single super prover, whereby we would keep a separate I-Axiomatisation set of clauses
in memory, and check each derived clause against it before adding it to the worked off
set. Second, we could feed derived clauses off to a parallel I-Axiomatisation checker.
We decided to opt for the latter option, for several reasons. One is that it allows us
to carry out the check at the same time as the induction derivation, as required in the
specification, but without resulting in a large, messy and unwieldy program. Another
advantage is that we are able to easily devote a machine solely to inductive completion
in the case of harder problems. It is also very convenient when testing a new model to
be able to just look at the deduction process before adding the consistency check later
on, and we preserve the attractive separation in the theory between the deduction and
the consistency checking processes.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the operation of coral. The induction derivation, as de¬
scribed in §4.4, is pursued by the modified Spass prover on the right of the diagram.
Every non-redundant clause derived is passed to the refutation control client on the left,
which launches a standard spass prover to do the check against the I-Axiomatisation.
Crucially, these spawned spass s are not given the original axioms - only the I-Axioms
are required (by Theorem 1, p. 52). Communication between the processes is via sock¬
ets.
If, at any time, a refutation is found by a spawned prover, the proof is written to a
file and the completion process and all the other spawned Spass processes are killed.
If completion is reached by the induction prover, this is communicated to the refutation
control program, which will then wait for the results from the spawned processes. If
they all terminate with saturation, then there are no inconsistencies, and so the theorem
has been proved (by Theorem 2, page 54).
One final issue was the passing on of answer literals. The I-Axiomatisation check
may frequently make further instantiations of variables in the answer literals, and we
would like the final answer presented to reflect these. To achieve this, we simply pass















Figure 5.1: Coral system operation
the answer literals on to the spawned Spass processes in their partially instantiated
state, and any further substitutions are accrued in the usual way, resulting in the cor¬
rect final answer being presented. It may well be that different spawned processes will
return different answers, but this is expected, and all the answers will be valid coun¬
terexamples. This is proved in Green's original paper on the use of answer literals,
[Green, 1969],
5.3 Testing
Before proceeding to develop the formalism for the cryptographic security protocol
verification problem, we tested the system. The separation of inductive completion
and I-Axiomatisation checking means that almost all of the search for an inconsis¬
tency is done by the prover designed for inductive problems, and the spawned Spass
processes are just used to check for inconsistencies between the new clauses and the
I-Axiomatisation. This should lead to a false conjecture being refuted after fewer in-
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ference steps have been attempted than if the conjecture had been given to a standard
first-order prover together with all the axioms and I-Axioms. Additionally, we have
refutation completeness for our method, whereas a standard prover will not be able to
deal with commutativity conjectures. We tested this on a number of small examples
from the non-theorem refutation literature.
The results of this are in Table 5.1. The first three examples are from Protzen's
work, [Protzen, 1992], and the next three from Reif et al.'s, [Reif et al., 2000]. As ex¬
plained in §3.2.1, §3.2.2, these are two well-known techniques for refuting incorrect
inductive conjectures. Their examples are taken from verification case studies in in¬
ductive theorem proving. The first example is the one given as a worked example in
§3.2.1. The next two are slightly tougher examples from inductive theorem proving
case studies. In particular, the third example shows how the splitting up of the in¬
ference process into the fair inductive derivation and the I-Axiomatisation checking
allows us to tackle commutative type conjectures.
The fourth example is a lists conjecture from one of Reif's case studies. The fifth
and sixth are from a case study in graph theory. In Reif's graph theory work, a graph
is represented by a list containing entries v(x), which indicates the graph contains a
vertex x, and e(x,y), which indicates the graph contains a directed edge from x to y.
Referring to a vertex in an edge constructor implies it is also in the graph. So, the
counterexample to the conjecture 'all graphs are acyclic' is a graph with one vertex,
a, and a loop edge from a back to a. The counterexample to the next conjecture, 'all
loopless graphs are acyclic', is a graph with two nodes, a and s(a), with edges running
from a to s(a), and from s(a) to a, producing the cycle. Reif remarked that that this one
of the toughest conjectures he tested his system on, and it took several seconds to find
the counterexample. Coral takes just under one second on a Pentium III machine.
The final example involving the greatest common divisor function, gcd, is in¬
cluded because previous methods of proof by consistency could not refute this con¬
jecture. This was because the gcd function could not be specified by a convergent
rewrite system. Comon and Nieuwenhuis showed in theory how it could be tack¬
led, [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000], and here we confirm that our implementation
of their method works.
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In addition to the results in the table, we also present the comparison between the
number of clauses derived by coral and the number derived by a standard prover in
a graph, Figure 5.2. Here, the clauses required by a standard prover are plotted on the
x-axis and the number of clauses required by coral on the y-axis. Both scales are
logarithmic. We only have a small number of data points, but we can see that Coral
appears to save more time over the cruder approach as the examples get larger. This is
encouraging. We discuss our results on these examples in §11.7.
Coral's Performance on some Non-theorem Examples
10 10 10
Log (clauses required by standard prover)




We have presented in this chapter our implementation of the Comon-Nieuwenhuis
method for proof by consistency. It involved the adaptation of a state of the art first-
order prover SPASS, to allow it to carry out the restricted inference steps to compute a
fair induction derivation, and to allow it to carry out consistency checking. The key fea¬
tures are the separate indexes for axioms and lemmas, and the parallel I-Axiomatisation
checker utilising sockets.
The results achieved on some examples from the non-theorem literature were
enough to convince us that Coral was working properly. Our work continued to








































































































































































Formalisation of the Protocol
Verification Problem
In this chapter we describe our formal model for cryptographic protocol analysis. It
is based on Paulson's higher-order inductive model, [Paulson, 1998], which he for¬
malised in Isabelle/HOL. Comon and Nieuwenhuis' 'Proof by Consistency' is a first-
order technique, so we required a first-order model for the problem. Since we want to
provide a complementary counterexample finding tool for the Isabelle/HOL approach,
we tried to produce a model that is as close as possible to being a first-order version of
Paulson's. We will show why it is possible to construct such a model in a satisfactory
way, and then give details of our solution.
6.1 The Nature of the Paulson Model
A key feature of most cryptographic protocols is the typed nature of the information
exchanged. Items sent in a message can be intended as keys, nonces, timestamps etc.
Some protocols have been found to be susceptible to type attacks, where a principal
accepts a nonce as a key for example (see §2.3.6). These kind of attacks assume
that such type confusion is possible, e.g. that the same number of bits are used to
specify a nonce and a key. Good engineering practice can easily prevent these kind of
attacks, [Heather et al., 2000]. Paulson's model assumes that such an implementation
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is used, i.e. that items of one type cannot be confused with items of another type.
Consequently, he uses typed higher-order logic to formalise protocols. Each item has
its type, and the type cannot change. However, no other higher-order features are used,
such as quantification over sets. This means we can produce a first-order version of the
model using some notion of first-order types or sorts.
6.2 Example - Needham-Schroeder Public Key
To explain how our model works, we will use the example of the Needham-Schroeder
public key protocol (see §2.2). This protocol was one of the first proposed in the origi¬
nal paper on cryptographic protocols, [Needham and Schroeder, 1978], The discovery
of a flaw in the protocol 17 years later was a major event, [Lowe, 1995], Since then, it
has been used as the standard example for almost all tools for protocol analysis. Ex¬
plaining our formalism for this protocol facilitates comparison with other approaches.
6.3 Free Constructors, Deciding Equivalence




Note that spy is an agent. For trusted third party protocols like Otway-Rees (see
§2.3.5), we will have a key server as well, but this is not accepted as an agent. In¬
stead the server is a special 0 arity function symbol.
A free constructor theory allows us to easily produce axioms to decide (in)equality
of any pair of symbols. This allows us to restrict the overall theory to Horn clauses (i.e.
clauses with at most one positive literal). This restriction is achieved by using an equa-
tional theory where everything is equated to two symbols, true, orfalse (this follows an
example given by Comon and Nieuwenhuis, [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000]). Sup¬
pose we would like to add a rule
A A ~>B AC —>■ D
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(this matches the pattern of the rules for principals sending new messages in §6.5). In
more usual disjunctive form, the clause would be written
—iA V ' C V 5 V D
We can see from the two positive literals, B and D, that it is not Horn. However, when
we convert to the equational theory described above, the original rule looks like
A = true AB = false AC — true —> D = true
which is a Horn clause. We require suitable axioms for deciding the falsity of literals
equated to false. For example, we have a set of axioms for deciding if two agents are
the same person:








Note that we only need the one clause to decide if the agents are the same person,
since in a free constructor theory, two terms are equal only if they are syntactically
identical.
We also have functions agent and number for checking that symbols belong to the
sorts defined above. The slightly unusual construction for testing if a symbol is an







Protocols for key distribution often involve a secure server. In these cases, we represent
this principal as a special symbol, server.
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6.4 Principals, Keys and Nonces
There are a number of different types of object that may form part of a message sent
in a protocol. However, to keep our formalism general and easily extensible, we don't
want to have to define a set of symbols for each one and a set of axioms for deciding
equivalence of their constructor symbols. So instead we base them all on numbers, and




Note that these keys are short term keys generated by a server for shared key protocols.
Long term keys and public keys are based on the names of the principals:
Public keys: pubk(a), pubk(s(a)),...
Long term keys: longtermkey(a), longtermkey(s(a)),...
The names of agents, when they appear in the contents of a message, are represented
in a similar way:
Agent identifiers: principal(a), principalis(a)),...
We usually want to put groups of symbols together to send in a message. We decided
to do this using fixed sized tuple symbols {pair, triple, quad etc.) rather than flexible
length lists, as this will enable Coral to tell the difference between two unequal length
messages quickly without having to dig down the list. Some protocols have a flexible
amount of data in certain messages, but we can model this by including a list inside
the appropriate tuple symbol (for an example of this, see the modelling of message 3
of the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, Chapter 9).
A trace of messages exchanged by the principals is represented by a list, with the
usual cons and nil symbols being employed. The list consists of elements of the form
sent(A,B,M), with sent a special arity 3 symbol. The first two arguments store the
identities of the agent who sent the message and the intended recipient. The third
holds the body of the message. The reason for using this special symbol (rather than
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just triple) is to increase readability, but to also enable a shortcut in the definition of
the eq symbol, since we know that the first two elements of the triple will be agent
identifiers (see below).
As a final message element, we need to consider encrypted information. This is
represented by an arity 2 symbol encr, with the first argument being the data and the
second being the key. We can use the tuple symbols inside the first argument to encrypt
a package of data. Note that we don't specify whether this is public or symmetric key
encryption - this is handled for a particular protocol by the rules governing what each
agent (and the spy) is able to do. As in most protocol models, we assume 'perfect
cryptography', i.e. that the only way someone may decrypt encr(X,Y) is by knowing
the appropriate symmetric key Y or private key F_1, depending on the encryption
scheme used.
These identifiers allow us to define an arity 2 function eq which can be used to

























Note that the clauses for defining eg on terms with sent as their outermost function
symbol pass the check on the first two arguments on to the special eqagent function.
This speeds up the check and prevents nonsense values for agent identifiers being found
when the check is performed on uninstantiated variables (as will often be the case).
These would be detected later, but might waste a lot of proving time.
6.5 Protocol Messages
Our message trace model follows Paulson's very closely. We define a unary function m
which is true just when its argument is a valid trace (with respect to the protocol being
modelled). It is defined recursively. The empty trace nil is a valid trace, and a valid
trace may be extended by a protocol message from an agent, or by a faked message
from the spy. To decide whether an agent can extend a trace with a particular message,
we need to be able to decide things about the messages that have already been sent.
For this, we first need a standard member function, defined like this:
eq(Hl ,H2) = false A member(HI ,L) — false
—> member(H1, cons(H2,L)) — false




This allows an agent to decide, for example, only to send a message 2 when a valid
message 1 has been received. We also need agents to be able to generate fresh nonces.
We assume that fresh nonces are 'perfectly fresh', i.e. no freshly generated nonce
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ever coincides with a previously used one. In a practical implementation of a pro¬
tocol, agents would probably just choose random numbers from a suitably enormous
range so as to make coincidentally equal nonces almost impossible. To get a perfectly
fresh nonce, we have to define a 'parts' operator, similar to the one used by Paulson,
[Paulson, 1998, p. 12]. If H is a list of messages, then parts(H) is the least set contain¬
ing the messages in H closed under projection and decryption. We are only concerned
with determining when something is not in parts(H). So we define the operator and a
set membership function in like this:
in(U,parts(V)) = false Ain{U,parts(W)) = false
—> in (U, parts (cons (sent (X, Y, W). V))) = false
in{U,parts{V)) = false AinfU,parts (W)) = false
—» in(U,parts(encr(V, W))) = false
in(U,parts(V)) — false A in(U,parts(W)) = false





Having defined member and parts, we can then model the agents participating in a
protocol. For an explanation of this, we return to our example: the Needham-Schroeder
public key protocol. The protocol, explained in §2.2, looks like this:
1. A —>■ B : {] Na,A^puI,Kb
2. B->A-.$NA,NB\}puhKA
3. A -»■ B : {] NB%ubKB
These three messages are modelled in our formalism like this:
agent(A)=trueA agent(B)=trueA number(NA)=trueA m(Trace)=trueA
in(nonce(NA),parts(Trace))=false
-Am(cons(sent(A, B, encr(pair(nonce(N),principal(A)),pubk(B))), Trace))=true
number(NB)=trueA m(Trace)=trueA in(nonce(NB),parts(Trace)) -false
member(sent(X, B, encr(pair(nonce(NA),principal(A)),pubk(B))), Trace)=true
—> m(cons(sent(B,A,encr(pair(nonce(NA),nonce(NB)),pubk(A))), Trace))=true
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m(Trace)=trueA
member(sent(X,A,encr(pair(nonce(NA),nonce(NB)),pubk(A))),Trace)=trueA
member(sent(A,B, encr(pair(nonce(NA),principal(A) ),pubk(B))), Trace)=true
—> m(cons(sent(A,B,encr(nonce(NB),pubk(B))), Trace))-true.
The first clause specifies that any agent can add a message 1 to the trace provided
the types for the nonce number and the agent identifiers are correct, and provided that
the nonce is fresh. Recall that we use the pubk(A) symbol to mean the public key
belonging to A. This makes it easy to decide who can decrypt the package (only agent
A). The second clause says that any trace with a message one in it may be extended
with a message 2 from the recipient of the message 1. Note that the agent responding
to message 1 cannot know for certain who the message 1 was from. We model this
with the new variable X in the member literal as the first argument of the sent function.
Again we require the nonce to be fresh.
The third clause specifies that a trace containing a message 1 from agent A, and a
message 2 apparently in response to that message, may be extended by a message 3
from A. The reader may have noticed that we allow principals to respond any number
of times to a message - this is the same as in Paulson's formalism.
Finally, we need a clause specifying that the empty list is a valid trace, again fol¬
lowing Paulson's model:
—>■ m(nil)=true
A difference between our model and Paulson's model is that the Paulson model
explicitly specifies that an agent should not send a message to himself. We could quite
easily add this specification to our model, using the eqagent symbol, but we omit it.
Instead we specify in our conjectures that if we are interested in some property for
party A in a run with party B, then they must be distinct agents. In practice, this speeds
up the discovery of counterexamples, since there are slightly fewer literals to consider.
6.6 Modelling Intruder Knowledge
To define what messages an intruder or spy may send, we need to define two more
operators. These are almost identical to those proposed by Paulson, [Paulson, 1998,
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p. 12]. The first is analz(H), defined to be the least set containing H closed under
projection and decryption by known keys. The second is synth, which is the least
set including agent names closed under pairing and encryption by known keys. Our
definition differs slightly from Paulson's: since we will only ever be concerned with
the contents of synth(analz{X)) rather than just synth(X), we combine the definitions
together. The final content of synth(analz(X)) is identical to that in Paulson's model











-A in(U, synth(analz(nil))) =false
—» in(TJ,analz(nil))-false
Finally, we have a rule allowing the spy to add to a trace any message that he knows
how to make.
m{Trace) = true A eq (spy, AGENT) = falseA
in(MSG, synth(analz(Trace))) = trueA
—> m(cons(sent(spy,AGENT,MSG),Trace))=true (|)
6.7 Term Ordering
Superposition theorem proving requires a term ordering, as described in §4.2. For our
protocol formalism, we use a recursive path ordering (RPO), as defined in §4.1, with
one minor modification. In order for the analz operator to work as desired, we need
the ordering to work the opposite way when comparing two in(X,analz(Y)) terms.
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Normally under the recursive path ordering, if one term has a function symbol as its
top functor, and the other term has a variable which is an argument of the first term's
function symbol, then the first term is considered largest. An example makes this
clearer. We have rules which look like:
in(pair(U,V),analz(W))=true->in(U,analz(W))=true
The idea of this rule is that it allows the spy to decompose pairs of terms into com¬
ponent parts. Under the RPO, the left hand side will be considered larger, since it
contains the variable U inside the function pair. However, we want the right hand side
to be maximal, as otherwise we won't be able to use it for inferences by conjecture su¬
perposition on negative literals (informally, we expect to encounter conjecture clauses
with the interpretation 'the spy can send a particular fake message if he can get term
7", which corresponds to a clause with a negative in(T,analz(Trace)) literal). In order
to make the rule applicable to these clauses, we reverse the ordering for these kinds of
rules. This modification to the ordering requires a very simple addition to Coral's
implementation. When the SPOrd flag is set, the result of a comparison between two
in(x,analz(Trace)) literals is reversed.
Note that our new ordering is in general now not well-founded. To see this, con¬
sider a sequence
in(U,analz(Y)) >- in(pair(U, V),analz(Y)) >- in(pair(pair(U, V), W))...
However, we prevent a sequence of terms like this from ever arising in our theory
by using flat constructors for messages of length 2,3 etc. as outlined in §6.4 above.
A heuristic reduction rule (described in §7.1) prevents terms with nested constructors
from arising. Note that our list constructor cons, which of course does have to occur
nested in order to make a list, does not arise inside the X in in(X, analz(y)) terms. This
is because the cons part of the trace is stripped away by the rule
member(sent(U,V,W),X)=true —)■ in(W,analz(X))=true
giving us just the message contents. Messages do not contain lists in fixed 2 and 3 party
protocols. In the case of group protocols however, like the one studied in Chapter 9,
we do indeed have lists inside messages. We discuss this problem in §9.2.2.
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In general, choosing the precedence for an ordering to be used for superposition
theorem proving is very much a matter of trial and error. One obvious restriction is
that defined symbols should be considered larger than the things they are defined in




As we saw in §4.5 (page 57), Comon and Nieuwenhuis recover refutation completeness
in the case of a non-saturated theory by means of reductive definitions (Definition 12)
and definition patterns (Definition 13). They use these two concepts in Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 Let E be a reductive definition and let c be a conjecture such that c\p, with
p the position of the innermost defined symbol, is a definition pattern.
Then for every ground instance cct where a is normal, there exists some inference
by conjecture superposition at position p with a conclusion d, and a normal substitu¬
tion a' such that I f ca implies I \fi c'a', andfurthermore, ca >- c'a'.
This lemma is then used to complete the proof of refutation completeness for the
Comon-Nieuwenhuis method for reductive definitions. However, although our formal¬
ism is reductive, we do not in general have definition patterns. Comon and Nieuwen¬
huis give a method for producing definition patterns in general formulae, but this adds
to the complexity of the inference process and is something we would like to avoid.
Fortunately, we can prove a version of Lemma 2 specific to our formalism, but with
the same conclusion. This is then sufficient to complete the proof of refutation com¬
pleteness (see [Comon and Nieuwenhuis, 2000, p. 21]). Our form of the lemma is:
Lemma 3 Suppose E is the formalism for security protocols given above. Then for
every non-normal ground instance ca where a is normal, there exists some inference
by conjecture superposition with a conclusion d, and a normal substitution a' such
that 1 \fi ca implies I \f= c'a', andfurthermore, ca >- c'a'.
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Proof: First note that in our theory, all literals take the form of f{t\,...,tn) =
{trueIfalse}, with / a defined symbol from m, in, eq, agent, number, member, and no
further defined symbols occurring in the fi. This means that all superposition inferences
happen at the first position. Recall also that our formalism is a free constructor theory,
so equality in the formalism corresponds to syntactic identity.
To simplify the proof, we restrict the conjectures we will pose to Prolog-style
queries, i.e. with only negative literals. One literal specifies that we have some valid
trace Trace, and the other literals specifying properties of the trace using member, eq
and in(.,analz(.)), or specifying types using number or agent. This is sufficient to
cover secrecy, authenticity, resistance to disruption, and other properties. All the con¬
jectures used to rediscover known attacks in Chapter 8, and also to carry out the case
studies described in Chapters 9 and 10, fit into this category.
Now, take a ground instance of a conjecture cg, with a a normal substitution.
We will now show that if I ^ cg, then a literal in the conjecture clause is reducible,
resulting in a smaller clause c'. Since cg is non-normal, there must exist a literal
I = f(t\,. ..,tn) = {trueIfalse}. Now we treat the case where / is each defined sym¬
bol in turn:
m{t\) = true\ if t\ is nil, then I is immediately reducible to the tautology true = true.
Otherwise, t\ is equal to some other ground term. Since I cg, then a counterexample
exists to our security conjecture, in which case t\ must be a sublist of a valid trace. Then
t\ is of the form cons(sent(.For a valid trace, this is always reducible by rule |
(above, §6.6, page 81) if the first message was sent by the spy, or one of the rules in
§6.5 if it was sent by an honest agent. Note we will not pose conjectures of the form
m(X)-false, since this is rather pointless.
member{t\,t2) = [true/false}: From our definition in §6.5, I is reducible for any
ground term provided t2 is a list. But since t2 always will be the trace, and in the case
of 1 cg, as above, t2 must be a sublist of a valid trace, so it must be a valid list and
hence / is reducible.
eq{t\,t2) — {trueIfalse}: In §6.4 we defined clauses specifying eq over all ground
terms. One of these will always apply to I in this case reducing it to {true/false} =
{true/false} as appropriate.
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in(t\,analz(t2)) = true: Always reducible by the rules in §6.6.
in(t\,synth{analz({t2))) = true: Always reducible to in(ti,analz(t2)), by the rule in
§6.6.
in(ti, partsfa)) — false: The rules in §6.5 reduce I for any ground term t2 provided
t\ is a nonce. But the only occurrences of parts in our theory refer to nonces, so I is
indeed reducible.
number(t\) = true: Since I [A ca, t\ is a valid number, so / is reducible by the rules in
§6.3.
agent{t\) = true: As for number above.
□
6.9 l-Axiomatisation
As we have a free constructor theory, and a completely defined equality function eq,
the job of constructing an I-Axiomatisation is an easy one. We can simply use Musser's
technique (see §4.6). Hence the only equation we need in our I-Axiomatisation is
true f false
I-Axiomatisations constructed by Musser's method are not necessarily normal.
However, ours is normal:
Theorem 4 The I-Axiomatisation as defined above is normalfor our theory.
Proof: Suppose s y t and s is minimal w.r.t. its congruence class. The eq function in
our theory reduces any two ground terms arising in the theory to true ox false. Hence
if s y t, then s = t = false = true, hence J4 |= s =A t. □
6.10 Comparison between Paulson's Formalism and
Coral's Formalism
Paulson's inductive model for security protocol analysis is well established, and ac¬
cepted as being a suitable model for the problem. Our model retains the key features
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of Paulson's model that give it its expressivity: we model an unbounded number of
agents, nonces, and messages in the trace. The formulae for modelling the honest
agents behaviour are almost identical. The formalism of the parts, synth and analz
operators is the same modulo the fact that we combine their definitions with the def¬
inition of the in set membership operator. However, we cannot prove an equivalence
in the sense that any protocol and security property that can be formalised in Paul¬
son's model can also be formalised in ours. The problem is that Paulson's model is in
higher-order logic, allowing quantifications to be made that we cannot make. Perhaps
someone might propose a protocol that establishes properties of some arbitrary set of
different types of object, and we will want to prove properties that quantify over all
possible types.
More differences between our formalism and Paulson's are introduced in the next
chapter, where we introduce optimisations to make the search for refutations more
efficient. These optimisation are based principally on the results of Syverson et ah,
[Syverson et ah, 2000], where it is shown that it is not necessary to model an arbitrary
number of bad agents, that is agents with compromised keys, nor is it necessary to
model a spy who may send any term. It is sufficient to model a spy who has a single
long term key (or a single malicious insider) who only sends messages which look like
messages from the protocol, i.e. will be accepted as valid protocol messages by some
hones agent. We show how we incorporate these results into our formalism in §7.2.1.
The salient point is that thanks to the results of Syverson et ah, we have not reduced
the expressivity of our model in terms of finding protocol attacks.
Key advantages of the Paulson model are its naturalness and simplicity, which we
believe we have retained. In particular, these features have allowed the Paulson model
to be easily adapted to new non-standard protocols and security properties, for example
where the timeliness of messages must be modelled, [Bella and Paulson, 1997], or an
arbitrary number of principals may be involved, [Paulson, 1997], or properties such as
non-repudiation must be considered, [Bella and Paulson, 2001], We believe that our
model has similar properties, as is demonstrated by its adaptation to two very different
kinds of group protocol in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. We will return to this point in
our evaluation in §11.5.
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6.11 Formulating Conjectures in the Formalism
The conjectures we have disproved in Coral are very similar to those Paulson at¬
tempts to prove. For example, here is the 'possibility property' for the Needham-
Schroeder public key protocol. A possibility property basically states that there are
valid traces that reach the end of the protocol. In our formalism, we effectively refute
an impossibility conjecture, i.e. that there are no valid traces that reach the end. The
counterexample is a valid trace. With the conjecture
% A and B are distinct honest agents
eqagent(A,B)=false A
eqagent(A,spy)=false A eqagent(B,spy)-falseA
% Trace is a valid Needham-Schroeder trace
m(Trace)=trueA
% Trace contains a message 3
memberjsent(A, B, encr(pair(nonce(NA),principal(A)),pubk(B))), Trace)=true





which is just a straight run of the protocol (note that message 3 appears first and mes¬
sage 1 last, because of the way the lists are built in Coral). We wrote a simple pretty-
printing script in Perl reverse the message order and give the output in a something
close to standard notation, for example, for the counterexample above, it produces the
output:
s(a) —> a : { N(l) , s(a) }_PK(a)
a --> s(a) : { N(l) , N(0) }_PK(s(a))
s(a) --> a : { N(0) }_PK(a)
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which corresponds to a straight run of the protocol:
1. s(a) —>«:{] Ni,s(a)$pubKa
2- n ^ s(c) • D N\iNofypUbKs(aj
3. ^(a) -A a : {| N($pubKa
Attacks on protocols are found by refuting security properties. In Chapter 8, we
show how we posed conjectures to find known attacks on four security protocols. In
Chapter 9, we show how we posed conjectures which allowed Coral to discover three
new attacks on a protocol. However, before this could be done, we had to add some
heuristics to Coral to make the search problem tractable. These are described in
Chapter 7.
6.12 Summary
In this chapter we have shown how we formulated a first-order version of Paulson's
inductive model, giving the formalisation of the Needham-Schroeder public Key pro¬
tocol as a worked example. Our formalism consists only of Horn clauses, and uses
simple first-order types. We have shown why the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method is refu¬
tation complete with respect to our formalism. We have also demonstrated the kind
of output coral gives when a counterexample is found, and how our pretty printer
renders it easy to understand. To refute security conjectures in a reasonable amount of
time, we had to add some domain specific reduction rules to the basic Coral system
outlined in Chapter 5, and make some additions to the basic formalism. These heuris¬
tics are described in the next chapter. In Chapter 8, we show how some known attacks
were found using Coral and this formalism. In Chapters 9 and 10, we show how we
used the formalism to model group protocols, and find five new attacks.
Chapter 7
Optimisations
To make Coral effective in finding attacks on faulty protocols, we had to make some
optimisations, both to the formalism described in the previous chapter and to the imple¬
mentation of Coral itself. We describe those optimisations and the reasoning behind
them here. The development of these heuristics was carried out during the rediscov¬
ery of the attacks on the Needham-Schroeder, Otway-Rees, Neuman-Stubblebine and
Clark-Jacob protocols described in the next chapter. However, no further heuristics
were needed to carry out the case study described in Chapter 9, and for the case study
in Chapter 10, we simply had to re-implement the heuristic described in §7.3 to suit
the adapted formalism.
Throughout this chapter, it will help to bear in mind that the nature of Coral is to
construct traces backwards, from the final message towards the first.
7.1 Elimination of Invalid Terms
A key heuristic was to eliminate clauses containing malformed terms, i.e. terms con¬
taining nested pair, triple or quad type constructors. The exception is when the nested
constructor occurs inside an encr constructor - the correct way to represent a message
like
in our formalism is
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pair(nonce(NA ), encr(pair(nonce(NB),principal(B)), key(B)))
Coral contains a function that checks a term for nested pair type constructors taking
into account the encr constructor. Clauses containing malformed terms are discarded
as redundant.
7.2 Restricting the Spy's Messages
One large source of combinatorial blow-up is the specification of the spy. He can send
anything he can build out of the preceding traffic in the network. This gives him the
potential to send a lot of garbage that has no chance of fooling the honest principals.
We use several heuristics to combat this problem. Heuristics of this type are used in
many protocol analysis tools, and are sometimes referred to as step compression, since
they combine steps taken by the spy to intercept and send messages with the steps
taken by honest agents to send messages in the protocol.
7.2.1 Spy Only Sends Protocol Messages
The spy has nothing to gain from sending messages which honest players will not
recognise as part of the protocol (this is shown formally in [Syverson et al., 2000]).
Therefore, we can cut down the search space by allowing the spy only to send mes¬
sages which fit the protocol pattern. For example, in our formalism for the Needham-
Schroeder public key protocol (see §2.2), we turn the single rule:
m(XT)=true a eq(spy,AGENT)=false a
in(MSG,synth(analz(XT)))=true
—> m(cons(sent(spy,AGENT,MSG),XT))=true
into the set of three rules (one for each protocol message):




m(cons(sent(spy, B, encr(pair(nonce(NA),principalA)),pubk(B))), Trace))=true
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co/rsfsen/fspy, B, encr(nonce(NB),pubk(B))), Trace))=true
7.2.2 Spy Only Expects Protocol Messages
A similar idea is to adapt the rules which model the spy learning new information to
the protocol being considered. Coral builds traces in reverse, so what we are aiming
to do is remove clauses that involve the spy sending a message containing terms he
cannot possibly obtain from previous messages in the trace. For example, we don't
want the spy to send messages based on the assumption that an honest agent will have
sent his long term key in clear text. To this end, in the case of the Needham-Schroeder
public key protocol, we exchange the single rule:
member(sent(A,B,MSG), Trace)=true->in(MSG, analz(Trace))=true
for the set of rules:
member(sent(X, Y,encr(pair(nonce(NA),principalA)),pubk(B))), Trace)=true
—>in(encr(pair(nonce(NA),principal(A)),pubk(B)), Trace)=true




Now the spy can only expect to gain information from messages that conform to the
protocol. To save the user some effort, we wrote a short Perl script to take the messages
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required to specify a protocol and produce both the rules required for eavesdropping
on messages like the ones above, and the rules required for the spy faking messages
like the ones in §7.2.1.
7.2.3 Spy Only Expects Subterms from Protocol Messages
As an enhancement to the above heuristic, we prevent the spy from expecting not just
invalid messages, but also terms which are not a subterm of a valid protocol message.
We can eliminate such terms very quickly by taking advantage of the term indexing
mechanism used in SPASS and similar modern provers (see §4.2). In order to speed up
the search for candidate literals for the next inference step, the prover indexes terms
by storing only one copy of every subterm, along with pointers to all of its superterms,
in the worked off clause index. In CORAL, where we have a separation between the
axioms and the worked off clauses in order to implement the proof by consistency
strategy (see §5.1.2), we also have such an index for the axiom clauses. The result of
this is that, for any given subterm, we can quickly extract a list of all literals in the
axiom set that contain candidate unifiers for that subterm1. We can then quickly check
to see if any of these are a succedent m() literal. These only occur in the description
of the protocol for honest users (see §6.5), and in the optimised version of the rules for
the spy's faked messages (above, §7.2.1). So, a subterm found in such a situation must
be a subterm of a valid protocol message.
A clause containing a literal of the form in(X,analz(Trace)) indicates that the spy
has sent a message containing the subterm X, and expects to find it in an earlier mes¬
sage in the trace. If this subterm X, fails the test described above, i.e. it does not occur
in any succedent m() literal, then such a subterm does not exist in any valid message,
so the clause is pruned away as redundant.
7.2.4 No Two Spy Messages in a Row
In a normal two or three party protocol, where no honest party sends two messages in
a row, it can be seen that the spy gains nothing from sending two messages in a row. If
1 The statistics in Table 8.2, on page 106, give an indication of how fast these operations are compared
to those required for subsumption checking and rewriting
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there is an attack on such a protocol involving the spy sending two messages in a row,
then there must also be one where he sends the first, waits for a response, and then
sends the second. We don't want to have both of these in our search space, as such
duplication wastes search time.2
In Coral, this simplification is implemented as a redundancy rule, turned on by
the SPRed command line flag (this also turns on the redundancy rule described in
§7.2.3). Clauses containing an answer literal which represents a trace with two con¬
secutive messages from the spy are marked as redundant, and hence pruned out.
7.3 Eager Elimination of Unsatisfiable parts Literals
As explained in §6.5, we follow Paulson in using a parts operator to model freshness.
For a trace T, the set parts(T) contains all the keys, nonces and other message elements
that appear in T. A nonce N is only fresh with respect to T if in(nonce(N) ,parts(T)) =
false. This suggests another pruning heuristic. If a clause contains an antecedent literal
in{nonce{N),parts(T)) = false, and the term nonce{N) occurs in term T, then the
clause cannot possibly be reduced to the empty clause, so it is pruned from the search
space. These literals would eventually be removed anyway by the unpacking of the
definition of parts, but by eagerly pruning them away, we save time.
7.4 Literal Selection
Standard first-order theorem proving using an ordered superposition rule usually em¬
ploys literal selection, as explained in §4.2. The intention is to exert a certain amount
of control over the theorem proving strategy, which will eliminate some duplication of
effort, i.e. in our case prevent different sequences of inferences that lead to the same
trace being examined. The standard literal selection function in Spass chooses the lit¬
eral of maximal weight. However, after some experimentation, we found that a slightly
customised selection strategy resulted in a significant performance increase. With the
2Note however that this is not necessarily useful for group protocols, where the spy may have to
imitate an agent sending out messages to several different members of the group. There is an example
of this is the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, examined in the next chapter.
94 Chapter 7. Optimisations
command line flag SPSel set, the strategy first chooses in(x,analz(trace)) literals, and
if none of these can be found it chooses m() literals. If the clause contains neither of
these then the standard selection strategy is used.
We look for in() literals first because we don't want to proceed further in examining
a clause with a spy's message in it without determining what he needs to see earlier
in the trace. The second priority of the m() literals is for the same reason. Processing
each of these will generate further member{) literals, which will in term lead to further
in() and ra() literals.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter we have described the 5 heuristics developed to allow CORAL to redis¬
cover security protocol attacks. These included new reduction rules, and some mod¬
ifications to the way we formalise the protocols. These modifications are carried out
by an automatic pre-processor. In the next chapter, we show how CORAL was used to
rediscover 10 known attacks on security protocols, and evaluate the part these heuris¬
tics played in this. In the subsequent chapters, we see that no further heuristics were




In this chapter, we explain how Coral was used to rediscover known attacks on some
standard security protocols. The protocols in this chapter are 'standard' in the sense
that they were all proposed in the academic literature, and involve just two parties
who wish to communicate with each other and, in some cases, a secure key server.
We follow standard AI methodology in that the heuristics described in the previous
chapter were refined on a small 'development set' of four protocols described in the
next section. We show how security properties were conjectured for these examples,
and the counterexamples coral found. We give timing information and evaluate
the effectiveness of the heuristics we developed, as described in the previous chapter.
For the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol, we also give a close analysis of the
search pattern. After completing the development, we applied coral to a 'test set' of
ten protocols from a standard corpus, [Clark and Jacob, 1997], The ten protocols were
chosen to reflect the five different kinds of attacks in the corpus. We give timing results
for the test set, and then evaluate the performance of Coral on these examples.
8.1 The Development Set of Protocols
The four protocols in the development set were chosen to reflect different kinds of
protocol and different kinds of attacks. Three involve shared key encryption, and one
a public key system. They were also chosen to vary from the simplest to the most
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complex 'standard' protocol, in the hope that this would allow for smooth develop¬
ment of heuristics. We present here first the results on the Needham-Schroeder public
key protocol, since this was used as example to explain the formalism in Chapter 6.
The next three attacks are presented in approximate order of complexity: first a sim¬
ple parallel session attack on a didactic Clark-Jacob protocol, then an attack on the
Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, and finally a quite complex attack on the BAN Otway-
Rees protocol.
8.2 Attacking Needham-Schroeder Public Key
We used this protocol to demonstrate our formalism in Chapter 6. To discover the
well known attack on the NSPK protocol, we refute a conjecture which would be B's
guarantee of the authenticity of A. Our conjectures are all in terms of a trace, and are
very similar to those used by Paulson in his work, [Paulson, 1998], In this case, the
conjecture states that if B receives a message 3 apparently from A, and has sent out a
message 2 to A, then there is no valid trace in which that message 3 didn't really come
from A. We formulate the conjecture like this:
% B has sent a message 2
member(sent(B,A, encr(pair(nonce(NA), nonce(NB)),pubk(A))), Trace)-trueA
% message 3 has been received
member(sent(X,B,encr(nonce(NB),pubk(B))), Trace)-true/\
% but A hasn't sent it to B
member(sent(A,B, encr(nonce(NB),pubk(B))), Trace)=false
-A
The counterexample is found in 38 seconds, and having been passed through Coral's
pretty printer, looks like this:
a --> spy : { N(1) , a }_PK(spy)
spy --> s(a) : { N(1) , a }_PK(s(a))
s(a) --> a : { N(1) , N(0) }_PK(a)
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spy --> a : { N(1) , N(0) }_PK(a)
a --> spy : { N(0) }_PK(spy)
spy —> s(a) : { N(0) }_PK(s(a))
The counterexample coral has found is the well known attack discovered by Lowe:
1. A -A C {| NA,A§pubKc
1'. CA -> B {| NA,AfypUbKB
2' B —> A {] NA)NB%ubKA
2 CB ->• A {] Na , NB\}puhKA
3. A —> C {] Nfl|}pubKc
3/ CA -» B {] NB§pubKB
8.2.1 How Coral Finds the NSPK Attack
We wrote a short script to analyse the output from Coral's rediscovery of the NSPK
attack. We used this to look at the path through the search space that lead to the attack,
the point in time at which each node on this path was considered, and what Coral
was doing in between considering those nodes. The raw data for the attack path is in
the form of pairs consisting of a clause number and a number showing when this was
considered as the given clause. This is shown in Table 8.2.1.
Broadly speaking, there were three significant gaps in the search, between clauses
151 and 154 being considered, between clauses 154 and 520, and between clauses 902
and 912. Inspecting the output with our pretty printing tool gives some insight as to
what is going on:
Clause 151 represents a trace ending with the spy sending message 3. Between
clauses 151 and 154, coral considers other traces where the final message is sent by
an honest agent. These traces only involve honest agents and/or the spy behaving as an
honest agent, and so contain no literals requiring the spy to break down previous traffic
and replay messages. This makes them smaller and so more attractive to Coral's
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Clause Step Clause Step Clause Step
93 1 916 350 1346 366
97 3 1295 351 1350 367
104 5 1298 352 1352 370
109 7 1301 353 1364 371
119 8 1303 356 1366 372
122 13 1314 357 1370 373
143 15 1318 358 1371 375
151 16 1320 360 1377 376
154 122 1326 361 1384 377
520 231 1333 363 1395 380
898 232 1385 378 1435 381
902 235 1340 365 1438 382
Table 8.1: The pattern of search for the NSPK attack.
standard lightest-first heuristic. Once these possibilities have been exhausted, the spy
comes back to clause 154, originally derived from clause 151.
Clause 154 represents the fact that the spy has replayed message 3 rather than
sending it as an honest participant in the protocol. Between clause 154 and clause
520 being considered, Coral considers traces where the spy is involved in an honest
session with the agent who sends a message 3 for him to replay. Having exhausted all
these possible combinations, coral considers clause 520, where someone else has
sent message 2 to the agent whose message 3 he will eventually replay.
Coral runs quickly through to clause 902. From here, it considers various ways
the sender of message 2 could be involved, until coming to clause 916, where the spy
sees a message 2 in the trace and replays it. From here, once clause 916 in considered,
Coral runs straight through to the finish.
An interesting feature of coral highlighted by this analysis is the way that sub-
sumption checking prunes away redundant states in the search space. For example,
Coral derives a clause corresponding to the trace fragment:
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spy ^ Y : {] N2\}pubKY
Y -> X : {] Ny,N2\}PubKx
Later, CORAL derives a clause representing this trace:
Y -A X : {\N{,N2$PuhKx
spy Y : -fl N2§pubKY
This second clause is subsumed by the first, and so deleted as redundant. This is
because the second clause is identical except that it contains an additional literal, so it
must be a more specific instance of the original clause. This kind of subsumption is
used to prune 219 clauses from the search space during the rediscovery of the NSPK
attack.
This search pattern illustrates the way CORAL genuinely rediscovers the attack,
without any prior knowledge about who should be involved in the attack and what role
they should play in the protocol. However, this openness also explains why CORAL
finds the attack comparatively slowly. In the first gap in the search, it considers many
different honest principals being involved in a run, all represented by uninstantiated
variables, and how different bindings of the variables could possibly lead to an attack.
Of course, this turns out not to be possible - a dishonest player must involved. Although
subsumption checking rules out the checking of a lot of equivalent clauses, this still
takes up a lot of time. Other tools that are constrained to use one of two possible
ground terms to represent honest agents would not suffer this problem, and tools that
predetermine what roles the agents will play even less so (see §8.8).
8.3 Attacking a Clark-Jacob Protocol
On page 26 of their security protocol survey, [Clark and Jacob, 1997], Clark and Jacob
give a protocol intended to demonstrate the principle of parallel session attacks. The
protocol and the attack are very simple indeed, but the attack does demand that an
honest principal plays both roles in the protocol, i.e. he should be involved in two
parallel sessions, one as an initiator playing the part of A, and one as a responder
playing the part of B. This is something that some protocol models do not allow, e.g.
100 Chapter 8. Rediscovering Known Attacks
Weidenbach's, presented in §2.4.4.2. The protocol assumes two parties already share
a key Kab, and wish to establish a fresh shared nonce Na to protect against replayed
messages. Here is the protocol.
1. A ^ fl : )] AWfc.
2. B -> A : fl
The only issue in modelling this protocol was the symmetry of key Kab• Normally,
we represent symmetric keys in our formalism as key(n) with n a number, assigned
by the key server. However, for this simple handshake, we are assuming the key has
already been given out. So we model the key as key{A,B), with A and B principal
names. The problem is now that syntactically key(A,B) ^ key(B,A), but in fact they
are the same key. So, we must add a commutativity axiom to our model for such keys,
i.e:
key(pair(X,Y))=key(pair( Y,X))
Being able to add these kinds of axioms is one of the advantages of using a theorem
prover that supports equational reasoning. All the clauses for the model are given in
Appendix A.
The attack arises when Coral is given a simple authenticity guarantee for A. The
guarantee for A says that ifA has initiated a protocol run with nonce Na, and receives a
response containing s(Na), then B must at some point have sent a response containing
s(Na). The conjecture in Coral's formalism looks like this:
% Trace is a valid trace
m(Trace)=trueA
% A and B are two honest agents
eqagent(A, spy) -falseAeqagent(B, spy) -falseA
% A has started a run
member(sent(A,B, encr(nonce(NA),key(pair(A,B)))), Trace)-trueA
% someone (X) has sent a response
member(sent(X,A, encr(s(nonce(NA)), key(pair(A,B)))), Trace)-trueA
% B has not responded
member(sent(B,A, encr(s(nonce(NA)), key(pair(A,B)))), Trace)=false
->
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Note that this conjecture states that there is no trace in which A has started a run, A has
received a response apparently from B, and B has not responded. A counterexample
to this conjecture will be a trace in which these things have occurred in conjunction.
Coral finds the following counterexample in 13 seconds:
a --> s(a) : { N(0) }_K((a,s(a))
spy --> a : { N(0) }_K((s(a),a)
a —> s(a) : { s(N(0)) }_K((s(a),a)
)_K((a,s (a))spy --> a : { s(N(0))
We can see that CORAL has found the
protocol to demonstrate, viz.:
1. A —>• Cg : {] Na$kab
1.' Cb ->• A : {J Na$Kab
2:A-^Cb-.^s(Na)^ab
2. Cb->A:^(Aa)^b
same attack that Clark and Jacob used the
8.4 Attacking Neuman-Stubblebine
The Neuman-Stubblebine protocol was used as an example by Weidenbach is his first-
order protocol model, [Weidenbach, 1999]. In order to show that Coral extends this
work, we wanted to be sure that Coral can also find this attack. The attack is a type
attack, but our formalism, like Paulson's, was explicitly designed to be strongly typed,
taking into account the fact that is has been shown that type attacks can be eliminated
from protocols, [Heather et al., 2000], However, we can allow type confusion between
nonces and keys (which is what is required to effect this attack) to occur by relaxing
our formalism a little. The vital change is to specify in our conjecture only that the spy
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has a term which has been sent to B as a key, and not to specify it is a term nonce(X)
or key{X).
The Neuman-Stubblebine protocol was explained in §2.3.6. Here again is the key-
establishment part of the protocol:
1. A-aB:A,Na
2. B-^S:B^A,Na,Tb^Kb,Nb
3. S^A:^B,Na,KabJBUa A ^Kab,Tb^Kb,Nb
4. A^B:1\A,Kab,Tb$Kb^NbUab
The clauses we used to model this protocol are given in Appendix A. The attack is
found when we give Coral the following conjecture, which is a secrecy guarantee
for B:
% B has sent a message 2
member(sent(B,server, triple(principal(B),encr(triple(principal(A),nonce(NA),
nonce(T)), longtermkey(B)), nonce(NB))), Trace)=trueA
% B has been sent key Key (note - untyped)
member(sent(X,B,pair(encr(triple(principal(A),Key,nonce(T)),longterrnkey(B)),
encr(nonce(NB), Key))),Trace)=trueA
% and that key is in the spy's knowledge
in(Key, analz(Trace))=true
-A
Coral refutes this conjecture in 10 seconds giving the following counterexample:
a —> s (a) : a , N(s(0) )
s(a) —> server : s(a) , { a , N(s(U)),time(t) }_longtermK(s(a)) , N(0)
spy —> s(a) : { a , N(s(0)),time(t) }_longtermK(s(a)) , { N(0)}_,K(N(s(0)))
This corresponds to the same attack Weidenbach found, originally discovered by
Hwang et al., [Hwang et al., 1995]:




8.5 Attacking BAN Otway-Rees
An important example of an attack which is not in the standard corpus,
[Clark and Jacob, 1997], is the attack on the simplified Otway-Rees protocol proposed
by Burrows, Abadi and Needham, [Burrows et al., 1990]. The Otway-Rees attack, dis¬
covered by Paulson, [Paulson, 1998], is a significant example in that it requires one
agent to play both roles in the protocol, and also requires her to take part in two in¬
terleaving runs at the same time. Formal approaches relying on small abstractions of
the protocol problem, e.g. Weidenbach's, §2.4.4.2, are not able to find these kinds of
attacks. It also requires quite a lot of disassembling and reassembling of messages by
the intruder. As such it seemed a good example to complete the development set. Here
is the protocol, which we presented and explained in §2.3.5:
1. A^B:Na,A,B,^Na,A,B^Ka
2. B -> 5 : Na,A,B, {] Na,A,B$ka,NB, fl NA,AMKB
3. Kab^
4. B^A:Na,^Na,KabUa
The details of the clauses used to model the Otway-Rees protocol are given in Ap¬
pendix A. When Paulson originally analysed the protocol, [Paulson, 1998], he found
he could not prove a conjecture about the security of the key received by Alice. Even¬
tually he was able to discover the reason for the failed proof - there is an attack on the
protocol. Finding this attack automatically from such a conjecture is precisely what
we want CORAL to be able to do. The conjecture Paulson could not prove stated that
if Alice starts a run with a message 1 using nonce NA, and then receives a key from the
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server under her long term key KA tagged with the same nonce Na, then the key must
be secret, i.e. not be known to the spy. We state the conjecture the same way:




% message 4 received by A with same nonce NA
member(sent(X,A,pair(nonce(NA),encr(pair(nonce(NA),key(K)),
longtermkey(A)))),Trace)=true
% the spy has that key
not(equal(in(key(K),analz(Trace))=true
After 7 minutes 12 seconds, CORAL gives the counterexample:
a --> s(a) N(2) , a , s(a) , { N(2) , a , s(a) }_longtermK(a)
spy --> a N(0) , spy , a , { N(0) , spy , a }_longtermK(spy)
a --> server : N(0) , spy , a , { N(0) , spy ,a}_longtermK(spy),
N(1) , { N(0) , spy , a }_longtermK(a)
spy --> server : N(0) , spy , a , { N(0) , spy , a}_longtermK(spy) ,
N(2) , { N(0) , spy , a }_longtermK(a)
server --> a N(0) , { N(0) , K(0) }_longtermK(spy) ,
{ N(2) , K(0) }_longtermK(a)
spy --> a : N(2),{N(2),K(0) }_longtermK(a)
which represents the same attack that Paulson found:
1. A^Cb:Na,A,B^Na,A,B^Ka
i:C^A:Nc,C,A^Nc,C,A^Kc
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2: A -> C5 : Nc,C,A, {| iVc,C,A^,NA,, {] Nc,C,A^ka
2VCa -> 5 : Nc,C,A, {] Nc,C,A^Kc,Na, {] Nc,C,/§Ka
3" S^Ca:NcA NcKcaUc fl NA,KCAUa
4. CB->A:Na,{INA,KcaI}Ka
8.6 Development of Heuristics
In order the find the very simple attack on the didactic Clark-Jacob protocol,
[Clark and Jacob, 1997, p.26], only the invalid term elimination rule (§7.1) is nec¬
essary, though without the others the attack takes longer to find. For the NSPK
protocol and the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, [Needham and Schroeder, 1978,
Neuman and Stubblebine, 1993], the literal selection heuristic (§7.4), the faked mes¬
sages heuristic (§7.2.1), the rule preventing the spy sending two messages in a row
(§7.2.4), and the invalid term elimination heuristic (§7.1) were required to find the at¬
tacks, though again, without the other optimisations Coral needs much more time.
For the attack on the BAN Otway-Rees protocol, [Burrows et al., 1990], the heuris¬
tics governing what terms the spy could expect to see, described in §7.2.2 and §7.2.3,
were needed to find the attack. The Otway-Rees protocol has much longer messages
that the others, giving the spy many more possibilities for combining terms that might
eventually make up a valid message. It was this example which lead us to develop the
heuristics described in §7.2.2 and §7.2.3. The heuristic that prunes away unsatisfiable
parts literals, described in §7.3, was developed after all the development examples had
been attempted, but before testing on the test set. It lead to much better times on all
protocols, up to a factor of four on the Otway-Rees protocol.
We added code to coral to allow us to profile the amount of time used to ap¬
ply these heuristics. In Table 8.2, we show the results of this profiling on the NSPK
protocol and the Otway-Rees-BAN protocol. Thanks to our use of the term index¬
ing for implementing the most complex heuristic (§7.2.3), the total time used is for
domain-specific reductions is only a very small fraction of the total time taken.
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NSPK
Total problem time 37.30 sec








Other reductions 4.02 sec
Otway-Rees-BAN
Total problem time 7 min 10.95 sec





4 min 52.86 sec
1 min 34.74sec
1.49 sec
Other reductions 26.93 sec sec
Table 8.2: Profile of Coral's reduction time
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8.7 The Test Set of Protocols
The test protocols were chosen from the Clark-Jacob corpus, [Clark and Jacob, 1997],
the standard corpus in the field. There are five different kinds of attack demonstrated
in the corpus: replay, man in the middle (MITM), type confusion, parallel session, and
attacks based on the compromise of a short-term secret (STS). We chose two of each
kind, giving a test set of ten protocols. There are about 33 examples in the corpus
in total1. Our main reason for not devoting more time to testing coral on the whole
corpus was that we did not expect coral to produce ground-breaking performance in
terms of attack finding speeds. Other tools have been built from the ground up to anal¬
yse these kinds of standard protocols, strictly in a Dolev-Yao intruder scenario, with
tailor made representations and pre-setting of the roles to be played by particular agents
in order to find the attacks in the minimum possible time, e.g. [Basin et al., 2003]. As
explained in Chapter 1, the aim of Coral was to build a flexible tool with the ad¬
vantages of Paulson's approach in that it can be easily adapted to slight changes in the
protocol scenario, such as a weaker intruder, or a protocol with an unbounded number
of different roles and agents, something that would be very difficult with tools tailored
to Clark-Jacob protocols. We investigate the flexibility of coral in the case studies
in the next two chapters, and discuss the issue further in our evaluation of coral with
respect to related work in Chapter 11. Notwithstanding these provisos, we felt that a
test on some standard protocol was necessary, to demonstrate Coral's coverage of
known results.
8.8 Results
The results of coral on the ten examples from the corpus are given in Table 8.3. All
timings are taken on a Pentium IV Linux box. coral found all 10 of the attacks we
searched for, 5 of them in under 10 seconds, 8 of them in under a minute, 9 in under
15 minutes and all ten in under half an hour. The total run time for all ten is a little
'The exact number is a matter of a interpretation. For example, some protocol analysis tool designers
count only one attack for each protocol, and others include type attacks that other authors consider
dubious.
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under 43 minutes and 30 seconds. The parallel session attack on the Andrew-RPC
protocol took a long time to find because it is 8 steps long, and requires the symmetry
of the key to be exploited 4 times. In fact this attack, though mentioned in the Clark-
Jacob survey, has often been left out in the testing of other protocol analysis tools, e.g.
[Basin et al., 2003], where only the simpler replay and type flaw attacks are found.
Coral's times are comparable with those achieved on the same examples by
some competing tools, e.g. [Chevalier and Vigneron, 2002], However, other tools
can achieve much more impressive run times - a fraction of a second for most of
the attacks in the corpus, even on significantly slower hardware, [Basin et ah, 2003,
Song et ah, 2001], There are two key reasons for this. One is that these tools were
designed and optimised for attacking these standard protocols. They model the pro¬
tocol and a system entirely under the control of the intruder, where each principal is
considered to be moved between states by the intruder under the rules of the protocol.
This means they do not have to re-infer information from the trace about what mes¬
sages a principal is expecting to receive when considering whether he should respond
to a message, as we have to in coral. Instead, it is encoded in the state information
for that principal. We could not practically do this in coral without pre-determining
the number of principals, since we cannot have rules applying to arbitrary predicates
in a first-order model. This leads on to the second reason for these tool's better perfor¬
mance - they restrict the number of agents involved in a run in advance. Indeed, the
tools described in [Basin et al., 2003] and [Chevalier and Vigneron, 2002] go further
in requiring the user to choose a scenario before modelling takes place. To rediscover
Lowe's attack on the NSPK protocol (§2.3.3), these tools require the user to tell the
tool to investigate a scenario where Alice starts one run with the spy, and Bob expects
Alice to start a run with him. The problem is then compiled so that just the right agent
identifiers are included, and the roles of the agents are set up exactly for the attack sce¬
nario (in [Chevalier and Vigneron, 2002], the number of nonces is also bounded). It is
arguable how much 'rediscovery' is really going on here - finding the right scenario
constitutes most of the work for finding this attack. Of course one could automatically
generate all possible scenarios for two agents and a spy, but this is not included in
the timings given in [Basin et al., 2003] and [Chevalier and Vigneron, 2002], In §8.2.1
8.9. Summary 109
above, we analysed how coral finds the NSPK attack with no previous knowledge
of the roles that are required to find it. This explains a little why Coral's times are so
much slower. Additionally, for a protocol involving a pre-existing symmetric key, like
the Andrew RPC protocol, these tools assume there is only one key available and give
it an atomic value, thus ruling out problems with modelling the symmetry of the key.
Athena, [Song et al., 2001], can discover the attacks in comparable times without
any pre-setting of roles and protocol instances. It relies on other simplifications - for
example, only atomic keys can be used, and agents can only encrypt and decrypt with
keys they already have, type attacks cannot be discovered, and each role in the protocol
must be finite. This would rule out study of protocols like SSL and SET, which can
be analysed in the Paulson model, [Paulson, 1998], and group protocols, including the
protocols we analysed using Coral in the next two chapters.
We were pleased that little effort was required to specify the protocols in our
formalism and discover the attacks using coral. The script for preparing intruder
messages described in §7.2.2 functioned properly, saving considerable time. Besides
changing the messages, the only change to the formalism that was required to complete
the test set was for the Hwang-Chen protocol, where we needed to model agents sign¬
ing messages with their secret keys. This required us to add two clauses to the intruder
model, one to allow him to sign messages using his own key, and one allowing him to
remove the signature from an item signed by someone else using their secret key. With
the addition of these clauses the attack was found without difficulty. Furthermore, no
new heuristics were required for the test protocols.
8.9 Summary
In summary, we were pleased with Coral's coverage of the test set, and though the
times are much slower than for some tools, the fact that Coral achieved these re¬
sults without a predefined 'scenario' and without restrictions on the number of agents,
nonces or roles, or the nature of keys or encryption/decryption operations meant we
were confident of success in analysing some new protocols outside the scope of exist¬
ing tools. In the next two chapters, we describe how we used coral to do that.
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Protocol Attack Type Attack Time
ISO Two Pass mutual authentication Replay 2.24 sec
Andrew RPC Replay 51.21 sec
Andrew RPC Parallel Session 29 min 43.36 sec
Woo-Lam n Parallel Session 9.98 sec
Needham-Schroeder shared key STS 5.64 sec
Neuman-Stubblebine (repeated au¬
thentication part)
STS 11 min 28.99 sec
Otway-Rees Type Attack 12.32 sec
Neuman-Stubblebine (complete) Type Attack (on final
part)
51.84 sec








It is important in the evaluation of any protocol analysis tool to test its ability to find
new protocol attacks. One advantage of the inductive formalism used in CORAL is
that is gives us the ability to reason about protocols where an arbitrary number of
agents might be involved in a single run, e.g. group key protocols. Attacking these
protocols is something other automated approaches have struggled with (see §11.4).
To test Coral's ability to find new protocol attacks, and also to test its suitability for
analysing multi-agent protocols, we selected two relatively new protocols for analysis.
The first is a protocol for group key agreement that had not been analysed before, the
Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, [Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000], We describe the process
of modelling the protocol and discovering 3 new attacks in this chapter. The second
protocol is for group key management in a scenario where agents may join and leave
the group at any time, and is covered in the next chapter.
9.1 Description of the Asokan-Ginzboorg Protocol
Bluetooth is a method for data communication that uses short-range radiolinks to re¬
place cables between computers and peripherals. A key idea of the technology is that
no setting up should be required in order to get a new Bluetooth enabled device talking
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to all the other Bluetooth devices in a room. Protocols exist to facilitate this, but they
contain little provision for ad-hoc security, i.e. in a situation where we don't know in
advance who is going to want to connect, and whether or not they are authorised to do
so. Instead, it is left up to application programmers to take these considerations into
account.
Asokan and Ginzboorg have proposed a protocol for one such application,
[Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000]. The scenario they consider is this: a group of peo¬
ple are in a meeting room and want to set up a secure session amongst their laptops.
They know and trust each other, but their computers have no shared prior knowledge
and there is no trusted third party or public key infrastructure available. The proto¬
col proceeds by assuming a short group password is chosen and displayed, e.g. on a
whiteboard. The password is assumed to be susceptible to a dictionary attack, i.e. it
could be guessed in a reasonable time by an attacker trying all the words from a nor¬
mal dictionary. However, the participants in the meeting use the 'soft secret' of the
password to establish a secure secret key. The protocol is contributory, i.e. all partici¬
pants contribute a secret number of their own to the final key, and the key is calculated
from these numbers using a carefully chosen function, thus ensuring a subgroup of
dishonest participants cannot conspire to keep the key within a certain restricted range.
The idea of restricting the key to a small range would be to make it easily breakable
by a co-conspirator outside the room. The key calculation function would be chosen
to ensure each agent's contribution may vary the key over its full range, much like a
hashing function.
Asokan and Ginzboorg describe two protocols for establishing such a key in their
paper, [Asokan and Ginzboorg, 2000], The first involves 'black box' public key and
shared key encryption, such as is generally modelled by protocol analysis tools. It is
this protocol we have analysed in coral. The second protocol uses a lower level
encryption method involving Diffie-Hellman style exponentiation that we can't model
in Coral yet (however, see §12).
Here is a description of the first Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol (which we will here¬
after refer to as simply 'the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol'). Let the group be of size n
for some arbitrary n G N,n > 2. We write the members of the group as Mi, 1 < i < n,
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with Mn acting as group leader.
1. Mn -> ALL
2. Mi —^ Mn
3. Mn Mi
4. Mi -> Mn
MnAEb
MiARiAih
{I {sj,j= i,..., "}[[*,
MiASi,h{Sh---,Sn)h
i = 11
i = 1,..., n — 1
some i, K = f(Si,...,Sn)
Informally, what is happening in a protocol run is this:
1. Mn broadcasts a message containing a fresh public key, E, encrypted under the
password, P, written on the whiteboard.
2. Every other participant M,-, for i = 1,1, sends Mn a contribution to the
final key, Si, and a fresh symmetric key,
3. Once Mn has a response from everyone in the room, she collects together the
Si in a package along with a contribution of her own (Sn) and sends out one
message to each participant, containing this package Sj,... ,Sn encrypted under
the respective symmetric key /?;.
4. One participant responds to Mn with the package he just received passed through
a one way hash function h{.) and encrypted under the new group key K =
f(S\,. ..,Sn), with / a commonly known function.
Asokan and Ginzboorg argue that it is sufficient for each group member to receive
confirmation that one other member knows the key: everyone except Mn receives this
confirmation in step 3. Mn gets confirmation from a random member of the group in
step 4. Once this message is received, the protocol designers argue, agents M\,...,Mn
must all have the new key K — f(Si,... ,Sn). A spy eavesdropping on Bluetooth com¬
munications from outside the room cannot know the key, and nor can he prevent the
agents in the room from setting up a key by sending spurious messages of his own. We
investigate these claims in §9.4.
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9.2 Modelling the Protocol
Our methodology for modelling the protocol was the same as for fixed 2 or 3 principal
protocols (see §6.5), i.e. to produce one rule for each protocol message describing how
a trace may be extended by that message, taking into account the tests which an honest
agent will apply. So for message 2, our rule express the fact that an agent will only send
a message 2 if he has seen a message 1 in the trace, and will only use fresh numbers 5/
and Ri in his message. However, for the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, message 3 posed
a problem. For a group of n participants, n — 1 message 3s will be sent out at once, each
encrypted under a different key. Moreover, the group leader for the run must check that
she has received n— 1 message 2s. In order to model this without predetermining the
size of the group, we needed to accommodate the possibility of different numbers of
messages being added to the trace in one instant. This problem was solved by the use
of a logic programming style approach. Note that this was only required for modelling
honest agents sending message 3, since they have to conform to the protocol. The
intruder can send any combination of message 3s, no matter what message 2s have
appeared in the trace. He is only constrained by what knowledge he can extract from
previous messages in the trace, by the same rules as for regular protocols.
9.2.1 Modelling Message 3
Figure 9.1 gives the clauses we used to model message 3 of the protocol. This requires
some explanation: we will examine it clause by clause. Clause 1 models the addition
of message 3s to the protocol. The first three literals require that A is an honest agent,
MN another agent, and Trace is a valid trace. The 4th literal requires that a message
1 has been sent by agent MN at some point in the trace. The 5th literal then calls
the all_msg2s_received function on the old trace. This instantiates the new trace
variable, NewTrace, which we assert as valid in the antecedent literal.
The purpose of the all_msg2s_received function is to check that sufficient mes¬
sage 2s have been received for agent MN to make a response, and also to work out what
that response should be. To avoid unnecessary duplicate representations for the equiv¬
alent protocol runs, we require that MN, the leader in this run, be the highest numbered
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1.
eqagent(A,MN)=false A eqagent(A,spy)-false A m(Trace)=true A





encr(pair(nonce(Ri), nonce(Si)), key(E)))), Trace)=true—}





encr(pair(nonce!Pi), nonce(Si)), key(E)))), Trace)-trueA
all jnsg2s-received!Trace, MX,MN, E, cons!nonce!Si), Package),
NewTrace, FinalPackage)=true-A
all jnsg2s-received!Trace, s(MX),MN, E, Package,
cons!sent!MN, s(MX), encr(FinalPackage,nonce(Ri))),
NewTrace), FinalPackage)=true
Figure 9.1: Clauses for modelling message 3
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agent in our numbering system which runs a,s(a),s(s(a)),.... The arguments to the
alljnsg2s_received function run like this:
Trace The trace of messages exchanged
MX At the first call to the function, the agent receiving the
first message 3. In subsequent calls, the next agent,
until MX = a, the first agent in our model.
MN Agent who initiated the run
E Public key used in message 1 of the run
Package Accumulator for the packaged S,-
NewTrace The new trace with the message 3 s in
FinalPackage The final package of S,s to be sent out, remains unin-
stantiated until the base case of all_msg2s_received is
satisfied.
Clause 2 in Figure 9.1 is the base case of the definition of all_msg2s_received. It
checks that is there is a message 2 (apparently) from agent a in the trace sent under
the correct public key and contributing nonce(Si) to the final package S\,...,Sn, used
to form the group key. If so, the antecedent literal asserts that this trace qualifies as
having sufficient message 2s if the first recipient of a message 3 is a, and instantiates
the response to be just that message 3, sent under the appropriate key The package
of S\,...,Sn to be sent is instantiated as nonce(Si) added to the packaged S\,...,Sn
passed in the accumulator (argument 5). The 7th argument is also instantiated to this
final package.
Clause 3 in Figure 9.1 models the recursive case of the definition. The antecedent
literals require that all appropriate message 2s are in the trace up to that apparently
from agent MX, and that a message 2 from agent s(MX) is also in the trace. Then
the succedent literal states that all message 2s must have been received up to s(MX),
making the appropriate instantiations to the new trace argument. Note that the message
3 added to the trace refers to the final package of S\,...,Sn, which is as yet still a pure
variable but gets instantiated in the base case. In the recursive call in the antecedent,
agent s(MX)'s contribution to the package is added to the accumulator argument.
This is fairly complex stuff for a protocol model, but shows some advantages of a
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theorem proving approach for these very flexible protocols. We have variables avail¬
able for things like accumulators and putting together response sequences, and can do
some fairly involved deduction to work out what responses are required. A key feature
of this part of the formalism is that it works backwards, i.e. given pure variables it will
give traces containing a valid set of message Is, 2s and 3s. This is vital, since it is
in the nature of Coral to start from a security conjecture and work backwards from
the final message to the first to produce a counterexample trace. The full listing of the
specification for the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol is given in Appendix B.
9.2.2 Ordering Considerations
One final complication of the Asokan-Ginzboorg model is that it requires us to deal
with compound keys, i.e. keys that are built out of the contributed numbers coming
from the other members of the group. In message 3 the leader sends out a package that
contains the numbers needed to make the key, S\,...,Sn . This is easily represented as
a list in our model, cons(sl,cons(.. .cons(sn,nil)...). However, we need to allow the
spy to be able to take the list apart and make new packages. This requires additional










This gives the spy the abilities we would like him to have, but it has the unwanted side
effect of making our adapted term ordering non-well-founded (see §6.7), because we
now have an infinite sequence:
118 Chapter 9. Case Study 1: The Asokan-Ginzboorg Protocol
in(U,analz(Y)) y
in(cons(U, V),analz(Y)) >-
in(cons(U, (cons{V, W))), analz(Y))...
A similar problem has been encountered by other designers of protocol analysis tools
in one form or another for such keys, and the most common solution is to fix a bound
on the depth of the terms. However, this would constrain the size of the group, which
we don't want to do. So, we have left things alone. In theory, this means our inference
system for this protocol is not necessarily refutation complete. Nevertheless, it still
successfully discovers new attacks as we shall see below. This is probably because
although Coral could consider the possibility of the spy obtaining a particular nonce
from larger and larger packages of key contributions, this would require larger and
larger clauses to be considered, which will not be favoured by Coral's basic heuris¬
tic of considering the least weight clause first. There may be better solutions to this
problem though, and we discuss this in § 12.
9.3 Modelling Spies in a Wireless Network
The Dolev-Yao model (see §2.3.2) is widely agreed upon as a realistic model of a spy
in a fixed network. However, some of the Dolev-Yao assumptions seem inappropriate
in a wireless situation. Although an attacker may be able to totally disrupt communica¬
tions by jamming the radio signal, it seems unlikely that he would be able to selectively
intercept some messages and remove them from the airwaves, while allowing other
messages to pass1. In fact, Asokan and Ginzboorg mention that they intend the proto¬
col to be tolerant to disruption attacks2 by an attacker who can add fake messages, but
not block or delay messages, so we assume these abilities for our spy.
There is also the question of whether the spy should be accepted as an honest
participant by the other players, as he generally is in fixed-network protocol models.
An honest participant will be present in the room and able to see the password on the
1 We are assuming here that a "single-hop" wireless network is used in the meeting room, i.e. par¬
ticipants receive messages direct from the sender. If an intruder was able to interpose a machine in a
multi-hop network, then the usual Dolev-Yao assumptions would apply.
2 A disruption attack is an attack whereby a spy prevents the honest agents from completing a suc¬
cessful run of the protocol.
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whiteboard, whereas the protocol is primarily intended to protect against attacks by
a spy in an adjacent room, who can interfere with communications but who does not
know the password. However, the protocol is also explicitly designed, by means of the
contributory key generation, to protect participants against conspiracy by a group of
other participants trying to restrict the agreed key to a pre-chosen range. Some possible
dishonesty from agents in the room must therefore be considered. We decided to test
the protocol against two attackers: one inside the room, and one outside. Different
outcomes are considered successful for the different spies.
Spy 1 - Outside the Room
This spy cannot see the whiteboard, so does not know the password. His objective is
to effect a disruption attack. Since he cannot block messages or remove them from the
airwaves, he must do this by adding messages in such a way as to disrupt the protocol
run, e.g. by making honest participants accept keys which are not mutually shared.
Spy 2 - In the Room
This spy's capabilities differ from the first in that he knows the passwords written on
the whiteboard, and is accepted as an honest agent. A disruption attack would be trivial
for this spy (he could just refuse to send any messages), so instead his objective is to
gain control of communication in the room, i.e. by making all participants agree on
different keys that only he knows.
9.4 Attacking the Protocol
The advantage of our approach is that we can model flexible group protocols without
having to restrict ourselves to a small concrete instance with a fixed number of partici¬
pants. This means that we don't have to guess how many players are needed to achieve
an attack, CORAL will search for attacks involving any number of participants.
As we have explained in the previous chapters, finding attacks in CORAL results
from finding counterexamples to security properties. These are formulated in a similar
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way to Paulson's model. We must formulate the required properties in terms of the set
of possible traces of messages.
9.4.1 Attacks by a Spy Outside the Room
The following conjecture was used to check for disruption attacks:
%% some honest xi has sent message 4, so has key /(Package):
eqagent(XI,spy)=false A
member(sent(XI,XK,pair(principal(XI),
encr(pair(nonce(SI) ,h(Package)) ,f(Package)))),Trace) = true
%% genuine messages 3 and 1 are in the trace to some agent XJ:
member(sent(MN,XJ, encr(Package, nonce(RJ))), Trace)=true
member(sent(MN,all,pair(principal(MN),encr(key(E), key(P)))), Trace)=true
%% but XJ never sent a message 2 under public key E with nonces SJ
%% (which is in Package) and RJ (which the message 3 meant for
%% him was sent under). That means he doesn't have RJ, and so can't
%% get the key from his message 3.
member(nonce(SJ),Package)=true
member(sent(XJ, MN,pair(principal(XJ), encr(pair(nonce(RJ), nonce(SJ)),
key(E)))), Trace)=false
This conjecture may look somewhat contrived, but it is a natural way of expressing that
a run had been finished (i.e. a message 4 has been sent) but that there is some agent
who does not now have the key. We assume that the disruption comes about as a result
of one agent not being able to read the message 3 intended for him. This is because
the leader can see how many people are in the room, and so will at the very least send
out one message 3 to each other member of the group. With the spy outside the room,
only honest agents can generate a correct message 1, so the leader cannot be the spy.
Note that conjecture is negative, i.e. it says that for all possible traces, no trace can
have the combination of genuine messages 4,3 and 1 without a corresponding message
2. When first run with this conjecture, CORAL produces the following counterexample
for a group of size 2:
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1. m2 -> all M2AEb
1'. spymi —> all Ml A eh
21. M2 -> mi M2A R2,S2h
2. spyM] -y M2 MIARIME
3. M2 —y m1 s'2Mr2
3'. spyMx -» m2 fl S'2Mr2
41 M2 -> mi M2AS2MS'2,S2)h(s'2,s2)
At the end of the run, M2 now accepts the key f(S'2,S2) as a valid group key, but it
contains numbers known only to M2. The attack requires that the spy manages to send
message 2 before the honest agent m\ can send her reply. In a single hop network,
there is a certain amount of luck involved. It might require m\ to invoke the command
to establish a key just after M2 does. This attack also assumes that the implementation
of the protocol does not protect against parallel sessions, i.e. by stopping an agent from
taking part in two concurrent attempts to set up a key. This is certainly possible, so
we should alter the protocol to protect against it. To do so is quite straightforward (see
§9.5). However, when we corrected the protocol to protect against this attack, and ran
Coral again with the same conjecture, Coral found the following counterexample
for a group of size 3:
1. mi -a all d Mi,E^p
2. m2 —» mi M2AR2,S2h
2. spym3 —y mi M2A R2,S2$e
3. mi -y m2 {] 52,52,5i|}/?2
3. mi -a m3 {] s2,5'2,5'i|}^2
4. m2 —y mi M2AS2MS2A2A i)h(s2,s2,Sl)
This is another disruption attack, where the spy eavesdrops on the first message 2 sent,
and then fakes a message 2 from another member of the group. This results in the
protocol run ending with only two of the three person group sharing the key. This
attack can also be prevented by a small change to the protocol (see §9.5 below). With
these two attacks prevented, Coral finds no further disruption attacks.
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9.4.2 Attacks by a Spy Inside the Room
When considering a scenario where one of the agents inside the room is a spy, we
were forced to consider what kind of behaviour might constitute an attack. Simple
disruption attacks would be trivial - the spy could just refuse to send any messages.
We decided to consider what might be possible when all the players in the room think
they have agreed on a key, but they have in fact agreed on different ones. What if
the spy knows all these keys? He could filter all the information exchanged, perhaps
making subtle but important changes to a document in a pre-defined way, such that the
other agents in the room are none the wiser. We checked for these kinds of attacks by
giving Coral the following conjecture:




% they both sent message 2s
member(sent(XI,MN,pair(principal(XI),
encr(pair(nonce(Rl) ,nonce(SI)) ,key(E)))), Trace) = trueA
member(sent(XJ,MN,pair(principal(XJ),
encr(pair(nonce(RJ) ,nonce(SJ)) ,key(E)))), Trace) = trueA
% and received message 3s under the correct keys, RI and RJ
member(sent(MN,X1, encr(Package1 ,nonce(RI))), Trace)=trueA
member(sent(MN,XJ, encr(Package2, nonce(RJ))), Trace)-trueA
% but the packages they received were different
eq(Package1,Package2)~false
Note again that the conjecture is negative, i.e. it states that there is no trace for which
this combination of conditions can hold. CORAL refuted this property, producing the
counterexample trace3.
3It should be noted that, as a result of examining the protocol to create the model, we realised that
an attack like this would be possible before Coral found it.
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1. spy ALL spy, fl E$P
2. mi —> spy MiJ /?i,5I|}£
2. m2 —> spy M2AR2ME
3. spy —>■ mi U <51,52, iSspyH/fi
3. spy —> m2 {] 51,52,5^2
4. mx -> spy Mi, {] 5i, h(Si,S2, SsPy)$f{Sx,s2,sspy
This attack is just a standard protocol run for three participants, except that in the first
message 3, the spy switches in a number of his own (S'spy in the place of S2). This
means that M\ accepts the key as f(Sspy,Si,S'), whereas M2 accepts f(SSpy,Si,S2),
and both of the keys are known to the spy.
Note that only the initiator of the run can effect this attack - the use of public key
cryptography in message 2 prevents another participant from being able to carry out a
similar deception. The attack can be easily adapted to a group of any size. We discuss
how to prevent this attack below, §9.5.
9.5 An Improved Version of the Asokan-Ginzboorg
Protocol
The disruption attacks are a result of the agents' identifiers being sent in cleartext in
messages 1 and 2. This allows a spy to deceive the honest players with faked versions
of these messages. The non-matching keys attack is a result of there being no way
to confirm that everyone has received the same key. We can say the protocol is non-
symmetric, in that the leader has an advantage over the other players, since he is in
control of what keys everyone receives.
To protect against the first disruption attack, we can include the agent identifier
inside the encrypted package in message 1. This will prevent the faked message 1'.
The agent identifier in message 2 should also be encrypted. This change prevents the
spy from faking message 2s as he does in the second disruption attack. With these
changes, CORAL finds no more disruption attacks after considerable run-time.
Protecting against the non-matching keys attack is a more subtle problem: one way
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to do it would be to have message 4 broadcast to all participants. This would make
sense in a normal run as it would allow other participants to see that someone had sent
message 4, and that the run was finished. Other participants could open the encrypted
package and check that the hashed number matches the hash of the key they received
in message 3. If anyone is unhappy, they could cry foul and get everyone to do another
run. The spy could fake a message 4 from an agent who has been given a duff key, but
since the message is broadcast to everyone, the agent concerned could recognise that
he is being impersonated and call a halt to proceedings.
Here is the revised protocol:
1. Mn —> ALL : { Mn MP
2. Mi —* Mn ■ fl Mi ,Ri,S$E,i= 1
3. Mn —> Mi : fl {Sj,j= l,...,w}[}/?„/ = 1,... ,n — 1
4. Mi —> ALL : Mi,§Si,h(Si,...,Sn)$K, some i.
9.6 Summary
In general the results achieved in the case study were very pleasing. We were able to
model a group protocol in a general way without predetermining the size of the group,
and we discovered three new attacks, all quite novel and requiring unusual security
properties to be formulated. However, formulating the 2 security properties was a
non-trivial task. It took several attempts to get them right, the first incorrect attempts
yielding traces that were quite clearly not attacks. In each case, the bugs were easy
to track down. For example, for the conjecture about resistance to disruption attacks,
we realised it was necessary to specify that nonce Sj be part of the package sent in a
message 4. This need to debug the conjecture slowed down the attack finding process
considerably, because CORAL takes a long time to run on these protocols, so some
bugs took hours to come to light. In extremis, the second disruption attack took 73
hours run time to find (the first took 1 hour 30 mins, and the non-matching keys attack
3 hours 12 mins). This is not really acceptable compared to run times for competing
tools, though no competing tools can attack group protocols in such a general fashion.
This point is investigated more fully in the next chapter, where we evaluate CORAL
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in the context of the most closely related work in the field. Some ideas for improving





This chapter describes our analysis of a different kind of group protocol. The protocol
in the previous chapter dealt with the problem of group key establishment, whereas the
Tanaka-Sato protocol, [Tanaka and Sato, 2001], addresses the problem of group key
management, where agents may join and leave the group at any time, and the group key
must remain secure. Following the pattern of the previous chapter, we first describe
the protocol, then describe the modelling process. We present the results, including
two new attacks discovered by Coral, and then propose an improved version of the
protocol.
10.1 Description of the Tanaka-Sato Protocol
(Taghdiri-Jackson version)
Unlike the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol modelled in the previous chapter, the Tanaka-
Sato protocol has been analysed using formal methods before, by Taghdiri and Jackson,
[Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003]. The protocol was formalised in the Alloy specification
language, [Jackson, 2002], and a SAT checker was used to search for counterexamples
to desirable properties of the protocol. Several counterexamples were found, the most
serious one indicating that current members of the group will accept as valid messages
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broadcast by ex-members of the group. Taghdiri and Jackson proposed an improved
protocol. However, their formal protocol model differed from the norm established
over the last 25 years in that no active attacker was included. If anything, it would
seem even more likely that a multicast protocol would be subject to attack by an active
intruder compared to a unicast protocol, as argued in [Mittra, 1997], There are inher¬
ently more opportunities for interception of traffic, and the 'crowd' of principals would
typically make it easier for an intruder to pose as another legitimate principal. Such
protocols should therefore be subjected to analysis under the full Dolev-Yao attacker
model, as is standard for unicast protocols. In this chapter, we describe the modelling
of Taghdiri and Jackson's improved protocol, and show how CORAL discovered two
new attacks, just as serious as the ones the improvements were supposed to prevent.
The protocol that Tanaka and Sato originally proposed, called the Pull-Based Asyn¬
chronous Rekeying Framework, [Tanaka and Sato, 2001], was primarily concerned
with minimising the burden of key updates in terms of network traffic and proces¬
sor time. Two main design features were introduced for this purpose: the first was the
division of the group into subgroups, each under the management of a key distribution
server (KDS). The communication between the KDSs is assumed to be not only se¬
cure but also conducted under a reliable totally ordered multicast protocol (RTOMP).
Taghdiri and Jackson, [Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003], modelled this by assuming that as
soon as one KDS updates its key, all the other KDSs instantaneously update theirs, ef¬
fectively reducing the model to a single server. Our model also makes this assumption.
The second design feature of the protocol is that agents retain a list of keys rather than
just one key. They discard an old key as invalid t units of time after having received
a more up-to-date key, where t is set with respect to the delay in the network. Keys
are distributed only when an agent sends a request to the server. An agent will make
such a request when he wants to send a multicast message, or if he receives a message
encrypted under a key he doesn't already have. In both cases, he will send a message
to the server giving the ID number of the newest key he has, and the server will send
back all newer keys. Only the newest key is used for multicast broadcasting.
This retention of a list of keys was shown in Taghdiri and Jackson's analysis to lead
to major security problems. The most serious attack involved members of the group
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accepting messages from a principal outside the group. An member of the group A
can simply broadcast a message from inside the group, leave, and then broadcast a
message using the same key. Though the group key has been updated as a result of
A leaving, the other agents in the group will still accept the second message as valid
as they all have the old key. To counter this, Taghdiri and Jackson suggested changes
to the protocol. Each agent should retain only the most recent key he has received,
and upon receiving a multicast message, should contact the server to confirm that it is
encrypted under the newest key. This may result in some message loss, because delays
in the network might mean that by the time a multicast message has been received and
a key request sent to the server, the group key has changed, but this was reckoned to
be acceptable compared to the potential security breach.
The Tanaka-Sato protocol assumes the existence of a unicast authentication proto¬
col that allows the server to establish an individual key (IK) with a new member joining
the group. This IK is used to encrypt all communication between that member and the
server. We model the underlying authentication protocol by assuming the existence of
a long-term key shared by each valid potential member of the group with the KDS.
Since we are looking for attacks on the protocol rather than trying to verify it, we can
easily justify this. We can simply take the attacks we discover and examine them to
see if the specific way we implemented the authentication phase was exploited. The at¬
tacks described in this paper would be effective for any initial authentication protocol.
Additionally, we make the standard assumption that the spy has access to one valid
long term key, i.e. he is able to pose as a legitimate agent.
Here is a description of the improved version of the protocol as described by
Taghdiri and Jackson:
Joining the Group
1. Mi —> S : H join \)Km,
2. S -> Mi : D lkMpGk(n)$KMi
In message 1, M; wants to join the group, so sends a join request under his long term
key KMr The server generates a fresh individual key, Ik^i, and a new group key Gk{n).
Each group key has a unique ID number (n). The new individual key and group key
are sent to the joining member in message 2.
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Leaving the Group
1. Mi —> S : {]leave[}rtM(
2. S Mi : {|ack.leave[}/itM.
In message 1, M,- sends a request to leave encrypted under his individual key Ik. The
server acknowledges the leave in message 2, and generates a new group key. This key
is not distributed though, and if another membership change occurs before a request
for a key is received, it will never be distributed.
Sending a message
1. Mi —> S : {]send,n[}/%(
2. 5 -> Mi : {] n',Gk(n%ku.
3. Mi ->• ALL : {Jmessage|}G/t(n/)
In message 1, agent Mt- signals to the server that he would like to send a message by
sending what the protocol designers call a 'sequence request' message together with
the ID number of the newest key he has, n. The server checks that M,- is in the group,
and then sends back the newest key Gk(n'). If no joins or leaves have occurred since
Mi last received a key, it may be that n = n', but this will not be the case in general. In
message 3, agent M,- broadcasts his message to the group.
Receiving a message
1. Mj -> S : {read,n\},lu,
2- S —> Mj:iGk(n')UMj
Suppose a multicast message has been broadcast, as in message 3 of the 'sending a
message' fragment above. When another agent Mj receives the message, he first sends
a request to the server for the newest key. He then receives the newest key Gk(n'), and
will only accept the multicast message if it was encrypted under that key.
10.1.1 Commentary
The revised protocol as proposed by Taghdiri and Jackson contains some redundancy
as a result of their security improvements. For example, there is no reason for the
server to send the key to a new member when he joins, since he is required to ask for
a key update whenever he sends or receives a multicast message. Additionally, the
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sequence number sent in the request for a key update before sending a message also
seems redundant. Previously, the server would have used it to decide which keys to
send back, but in the revised version, the server only ever sends back the most recent
key. It would be better to replace this with a nonce, as we argue after presenting the
attacks we discovered, in §10.4.
10.2 Modelling the Protocol
A feature of our model described in Chapter 6 is that all the information about the
state of the system, i.e. the state and knowledge of all the principals involved, is stored
in the trace and inferred from the trace each time it is needed. This was particularly
useful when we were modelling the Asokan-Ginzboorg group key agreement protocol
in the previous chapter. This was the key feature that allowed us to model message
3 in a general way, and so to perform the analysis without pre-setting the size of the
group. However, for the Taghdiri-Jackson protocol, this was not so helpful. Some
information about the state of the system does not normally appear in the trace. For
example, when an agent leaves the group, the server generates a new key, but this key
does not appear in the trace. A further consideration with this protocol is that we often
need to know who is in the group, in order to model the control conditions, i.e. tests
that honest agents apply before sending a protocol message. An honest agent will only
apply to join the group if he is not already in it, and will only send a message if he is
in the group etc. With the trace based model, a lot of examination of the trace would
be required to determine group composition, and we would need to do this almost
every time an agent sent a message, creating an enormous search problem. So, for this
protocol, some slight changes to the model were made, to include some information
about the state of the principals. The unary function m() that was previously used to
store just the message trace is now an arity 4 function storing the trace, a counter, the
current group key stored by the server, and the composition of the group stored as a
list of triples. The triples store the agents name, the individual key which he shares
with the server for this session in the group, and the most recent group multicast key
he has received. We define a boolean function ingroup on these lists of triples that
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determine whether or not a particular agent is in the group. A further change is our
modelling of freshness. We used to use the parts operator as used by Paulson, but in
our model for this protocol, we have a counter, and use this to model fresh values.
Our motivation for this was that so many fresh values have to be created in a typical
scenario, for individual keys, group keys and multicast messages, that our checking
of the parts literals would quickly slow down the search process. We model multicast
messages as hello(T), where T is the counter value when the message was sent, thus
ensuring all (honestly sent) messages are unique.
Having chosen to use a counter-based model, our heuristic for eager elimination
of parts literals (see §7.3) was now no use. However, an analogous heuristic using an
occurs check immediately suggests itself: if the counter variable occurs in term X in
a literal ingroup{X, Y,Z) = true, then the clause is redundant, since this would require
an agent at some point in the past to join the group and obtain a group key or individual
key that is only available now. A similar check can be applied to member(X, Y) = true
literals. The implementation of this heuristic required only a minor adjustment from
the existing parts heuristic, and results in the elimination of a lot of unreachable states
from the search. This rule could be generally applied to backward searching tools
using a tick based model.
As an illustration, in Figure 10.1, we give the clauses required for modelling the
sub-protocol for the sending of multicast messages. Note that we record the composi¬
tion of the group at each point in time in the fourth argument of the send constructor.
This is important for making conjectures about security properties later on. Note also
that ingroup is an arity 3 function, with the third argument returning the a list of group
members without the agent named in the first argument. This is used when agents leave
the group or update their keys, as in the third clause in Figure 10.1. A further point to
note is that we still infer state information about principals from the trace, for example
to decide if they should be expecting a key update message in the third clause. Our new
model is something of a hybrid between a Paulson style trace model and a state-based
model like that used, for example, in [Basin et ah, 2003]. We would like to experiment
further with more state-based model using Coral's backwards search (see §12.1).
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Figure 10.1: Clauses for modelling the 'send' sub-protocol
10.3 Attacking the Protocol
In [Pereira and Quisquater, 2003], Pereira and Quisquater attempt to lay down a list
of desirable security properties for group protocols. They define implicit key authen¬
tication, that an outsider cannot learn the group key; two flavours of perfect forward
secrecy, i.e. that the compromise of long term keys does not compromise past ses¬
sion keys; and resistance to known-key attacks, i.e. that compromise of session keys
does lead the loss of future session keys. However, the properties Taghdiri and Jack¬
son found not to be satisfied by the original protocol design fall outside of this cate¬
gorisation. Essentially, this seems to be because, unlike the protocols in the Pereira-
Quisquater case study, we are dealing with a protocol involving a trusted key server.
This means that there are no key establishment sessions involving all the principals in
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the group. Since principals aren't party to decisions the server makes about updating
the key to account for new group membership, this leaves them open to different kinds
of attack.
The property vital to a multicast key management protocol is that throughout the
evolution of the group, agents currently outside the group should not be accepted as
group members by the agents inside the group. We could perhaps call this group
multicast authenticity. This property has two flavours: the first, which Taghdiri and
Jackson call 'outsider can't read', implies that no agent outside the group should be
able to read a message sent by a member of the group. The second, which they call
'outsider can't send', implies that members of the group should not accept as valid a
message sent from outside the group. We posed the former property as a conjecture to
Coral in this form:
% A trace ending with an honest agent broadcasting under Mk
m(cons(sent(Mj,all,encr(hello(Y),Mk),Xgroup),
cons(sent(X,Mj, encr(pair(Mk, send(Sq2)), Ikey),Xgroup),
cons(sent(Mj,server,encr(send(Sq2),Ikey),Xgroup),
Trace))), Group,Keyseq, Tick)=true a
eqagent(Mj,spy)=false a
% But Mk is known to the spy
in(Mk,analz(Trace)-true a
% and the spy is not legitimately in the group
ingroup(triple(principalspy),X3,X2 ),Xgroup,Newgp2)=false
—>
This conjecture is negative, i.e. it states there should be no trace Trace ending with the
3 messages specified in the first literal, with the spy outside the group, and with the
message hello(y) being sent under a key the spy knows (analz(X) is the set of terms
the spy can learn from a trace X). The three final messages had to be specified together
because otherwise coral finds a rather trivial attack where the spy leaves the group
between the server sending a key update out to Mj and Mj broadcasting his message.
Then he can read the message quite legitimately, since he was in the group when it was
sent. Given the above form of conjecture, coral gives the following counterexample:
























































This is an attack on the protocol which hinges on the spy sending a replayed key update
message in message 13. Since in general the key may or may not have changed since
she last saw it, agent a will accept the same key again. The problem is that there is
no freshness information sent in the request for a key, just the sequence number of the
key an agent currently holds. Enclosing a nonce inside the package sent to the server
requesting a key update would blunt this attack. Having discovered this attack, we
realised that there should be a similar one whereby a spy can send a message from
outside the group and have it accepted by an agent inside the group. To confirm this,
we gave CORAL the following conjecture:
% A trace ending with someone accepting a message from the spy
m(cons(sent(X,Mj, encr(key(Mk), ik(Ikey)),Xgroup), cons(
sent(Mj, server, encr(read, ik(Ikey)),Xgroup), cons(
sent(spy, all, encr(hello(Y), key(Mk)), Group), trace))), Group, Keyseq, Tick)-true
A
eqagent(Mj, spy)=false
% but the spy is not in the group
ingroup(triple(principal(spy),X3,X2),Xgroup,Newgp)=false
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Given this conjecture, Coral finds the following counterexample
1. a -> server D a[} ongtermK(a)
2. server —> a D ik{l),K{\)\} ongtermK(a)
3. spy server D spyfy ongtermK(spy)
4. server —> spy D ik(3),K(2)\} ongtermK(spy)
5. spy -> server D read§ k(3)
6. server —> spy fl*(2)|}*(3)
7. a -» server D read\} k( l )
8. server —» a ^(2)p(l)
9. spy ->• server {) leave[} ^(3)
10. server —> spy |j ackleavefy k(3)
11. spy -> all H hello(12)[k (2)
12. a —>■ server {] readj}k( 1)
13. spy a ^(2)P(1)
This attack is similar to the first one, also relying on the spy replaying an old key
update message, but this time in response to a read request. This attack could also be
prevented by enclosing freshness information in key updates. We propose to do this
using nonces in the improved protocol below.
10.4 An Improved Version of the Protocol
Sending a message
1. Mi S
2. S -> Mi






Mj : { Gk(n'), NMj UMj
The boxes highlight the changes to the protocol. The idea is that each time an agent
wants to update his key, he includes a fresh nonce in his request. This is returned to
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him along with an update key. So, although the message may be delayed, the honest
agent knows that the key was issued after he made his original request, which is the
best we can hope for in this protocol scenario.
10.5 Summary
The attacks described above are serious and do not even require the spy to have full
Dolev-Yao capabilities - he need only be able to replay an old message, he does not
need to stop a message from being received or break messages apart etc. As such, it
can hardly be argued that Taghdiri and Jackson's improved protocol was secure. After
making the improvements required to secure against this attack, the protocol doesn't
look like a good candidate for solving the problem of multicast key management. Al¬
most all the original optimisations to ensure the scalability of the protocol have had to
be removed for security reasons, and we now have to generate fresh nonces every time
we want to send or read a message. There are many other protocols for this scenario,
but few of them have been subject to any formal security analysis. There is much
potential for future work here (see §12).
We were quite pleased with the way Coral performed on this protocol. Firstly,
the use of an inductive model meant we didn't have to make fundamental changes to
our modelling strategy to accommodate an open-ended protocol with an unbounded
number of agents, joins, leaves, messages sent and received etc. Secondly, modelling
at the first-order Horn clause level in a theorem prover meant making the adaptations
required to store and manipulate a list of current group members was just an evening's
work. Thirdly, coral was able to discover attacks requiring a long trace of messages
to be sent, indicating it has scaled up well, despite exploring a model without any
pre-setting of the number of agents, joins and leaves etc.
There were two weaker aspects to Coral's performance: one was the run times
(up to 3.5 hours to find the second attack). This is not as long as was required for the
Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, but it is still a long time. The second weaker aspect was
the difficulty of posing conjectures. It took several attempts to pose the security prop¬
erty in such a way that counterexamples really were attacks. However, we think that
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having analysed this protocol, it would be much easier to now go ahead and analyse
other similar protocols (see §12).
Chapter 11
Related Work
The field of automated security protocol analysis has matured considerably over the
last few years. There are now dozens of rival tools and techniques. To evaluate coral
we must therefore compare it to the best systems which are designed to achieve the
same goals, i.e. to automatically detect and present attacks on protocols. Two highly
regarded systems for this purpose are Athena, [Song et al., 2001], and the On-The-fly
Model Checker, [Basin et al., 2003]. The first two sections in this chapter compare
Coral to these two approaches.
A closely related approach is the Casrul system proposed by Chevalier et al. using
the daTac theorem prover, [Chevalier and Vigneron, 2002]. We discuss the relation¬
ship in §11.3.
Coral's advantage over other approaches is its ability to find attacks in a very
flexible model, allowing us to, for example, attack a general model of a group protocol
without predetermining the size of the group, or what roles agents will play once they
join. We compare Coral to other attempts to attack group protocols in §11.4.
The Coral approach is closely related to Paulson's inductive method for protocol
analysis, [Paulson, 1998], We explore this relationship in §11.5. Coral also builds on
previous work on analysing protocols in first-order logic carried out by Weidenbach,
[Weidenbach, 1999]. We compare coral to Weidenbach's work in §11.6. We briefly
compare Coral to the general refutation tools developed by Reif and Protzen in § 11.7.
There is a summary of the chapter in §11.8, including a discussion of the ultimate
applicability of Coral in §11.8.1.
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11.1 Athena
Athena, [Song et al., 2001], is widely considered to be the state of the art as far as
automatic protocol analysis tools are concerned. It is a dedicated tool designed from
the ground up for security protocol analysis, using a combination of theorem proving
and model checking techniques.
11.1.1 Description of Athena
Athena uses a model based on the strand space of Fabrega et al [Fabrega et al., 1999],
We looked at the strand space model in §2.4.5. We will recap here the definitions
of strands, bundles and strand spaces: a strand space is a collection of strands, with
a graph structure which expresses causal relations. A strand is a sequence of events
that a single party may engage in. An event is the sending or reception of a message,
represented by a node in the graph. Nodes have a sign: a positive sign indicates a
message was sent, and a negative sign indicates it has been received. There are two
kinds of strands in the model, those for honest participants and intruder strands. A
strand belonging to an honest agent contains that agent's actions in one particular run
of the protocol. If an agent is involved in several runs, each of these will have its own
strand. Nodes in separate strands are adjacent when they represent the sending and
receiving of the same message.
A bundle is a finite acyclic subgraph of the strand space that is in a certain sense
backwards-closed: all received messages occurring in strands in the bundle must have
come from nodes also in the bundle, and if an event on a strand is in the bundle, then
all preceding events on that strand must also be in the bundle.
Athena additionally uses the notions of semi-bundles and goal-bindings. A semi-
bundle is like a bundle but closed only under backwards tracing of strands, not under
sending of received messages. Goal-bindings are used to keep track of the search for
ways a message might have originated, from another honest agent or from an intruder.
In other words, goal-bindings record ways in which a semi-bundle could be expanded
towards becoming a bundle. These concepts are used to remove some redundancy
from the protocol trace representation. The idea is to eliminate search space explosion
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caused by infinite forwarding of a message, where arbitrarily many intruder strands
may receive and pass on the same message. Coral uses the step compression heuris¬
tic, described in §7.2.1, to achieve the same effect. However, by the same technique,
Athena can additionally remove the redundancy caused by duplicate representations
of what are the effectively the same protocol runs where only the order of interleaving
actions has changed. Coral does a similar kind of pruning by subsumption check¬
ing (see §8.2.1). However, it is not as efficient as the representation-based approach
Athena uses. In the strand space model, a single representation captures the exchange
up to a certain amount of permutation of messages. For example, take the attack Paul¬
son found on the simplified Otway-Rees protocol, §2.3.5 (p. 17). There is also an
attack which is identical except that the first two messages are swapped round, since
the spy requires no information from the honest agent's message 1 to send a faked
message 1'. In the strand space model, both these traces would be represented by the
same bundle. Furthermore, this applies not just to the final result, but to the interme¬
diate stages of the search for an attack or a security proof. So Athena's representation
is more efficient. Coral's representation is simpler, and subsumption checking is not
always sufficient to spot when two traces are effectively identical.
Athena has a dedicated logic for expressing security properties in terms of strands
and bundles. Properties are expressed as sequents of the form
P;T F A (11.1)
where T and A are sets of strands under the protocol P. The semantics of the sequent
are that for any bundle C representing a run of the protocol P, if T C C then A n C ^ 0.
In order to prove such a property, Athena tries to show that all possible bundles con¬
taining T contain at least one strand from A. Proof search is carried out by a dedicated
inference algorithm. The first step is to convert the sequent to a form that also repre¬
sents the state. Informally, this includes information about the set of possible semi-
bundles under consideration and their possible goal-bindings, i.e. ways they could be
extended to bundles. If the state contains a strand in A, then the property is proved.
Otherwise, a split rule is applied, and a next state function calculates the possible dif¬
ferent ways of extending the semi-bundle. Each of these ways generates a new sequent
and state, and each of these sequents must be proved. If there are no unbound goals in
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a sequent, that is it cannot be extended by further strands, but the state does not contain
a strand in A, then the security property is false. In this situation, the state information
contains the counterexample or attack.
Athena contains some additional optimisations to improve efficiency, such as prun¬
ing theorems. These prevent Athena from wasting time considering contradictory
states. For example, if a state requires that an intruder be given a secret key k, but
that key is never sent in any protocol traffic, then the state is contradictory. coral
also includes a heuristic that prunes out these kinds of states (see §7.2.2). However,
Athena's pruning mechanism is generic, and users can easily add pruning theorems of
their own. In coral, they are currently 'hard wired' in the modifications to Spass.
However, the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method allows for user-defined lemmas to be used
to prune out redundant states, so it is possible to to add lemmas to coral as well. The
only restriction is that, because the answer literals in coral containing the trace are
hidden from the general proving mechanism, lemmas cannot currently refer directly
to properties of the trace represented by a particular clause. It would be possible to
modify coral to accept these kinds of lemmas though, (see §12.1).
By using a dedicated representation, logic and inference algorithm, Athena
achieves considerable improvements over previous tools in terms of efficiency. How¬
ever, using a new and hence untrusted program to provide proofs of security is risky.
For example, an attempt to implement the Athena algorithm in the SyMP model prover
revealed a number of implementation considerations that are not described in the orig¬
inal Athena paper, [Berezin andGroce, 2001]. If steps are not taken to treat bound
variables in a particular way not described by Athena's authors, false attacks may be
produced. This erodes confidence in Athena's proofs of security.
11.1.2 Results
Athena's results on what has become the standard corpus of 2 and 3 party protocol
examples, the Clark-Jacob library, [Clark and Jacob, 1997], are impressive. 30 proto¬
cols from the library have been checked by Athena, with a security property taking on
average 0.16 seconds to check. Coral is much slower, taking for example 37 sec¬
onds to discover the well known attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol (see §8).
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Athena's authors do not mention explicitly the rediscovery of the attack on the sim¬
plified Otway-Rees protocol, [Mao and Boyd, 1993], which coral has rediscovered,
but there seems to be no reason why Athena should not have discovered this. This
attack is significant because it requires an honest player to play two parallel roles, and
generate two nonces. This was something which older formal models for protocols
would not allow, but newer models such as the inductive model used by Paulson and
in coral, and the strand space model, do allow.
It does not seem, however, that Athena has been used to discover any new attacks
on known protocols. The only new attacks reported are on a set of 1641 artificially
generated protocols produced by an automatic protocol generator written by the Athena
authors. CORAL, however, has discovered five new attacks on two serious protocols
proposed new applications (see Chapter 9 and Chapter 10).
Athena has not been used to analyse any group protocols. Indeed, the only men¬
tion of the use of the strand space model to analyse group protocols seems to be in
[Millen and Shmatikov, 2003]. However, the method sketched here requires the ana¬
lyst to choose in advance how many principals will be involved in the group. As we
saw in Chapter 9, and is further shown in [Pereira and Quisquater, 2001] where attacks
require a group to be of size at least 4, this choice is critical, as it can affect whether or
not attacks are detected. Coral can model group protocols in a general way, allowing
attacks on different sized groups to be found, as is evidenced in Chapter 9.
It seems that any method for group protocol analysis in Athena would require
the group size to be pre-determined. This is because of the semi-bundle construct.
Athena requires that semi-bundles are finite and closed under backwards traversal
along strands. This is not possible in a general model of the Asokan-Ginzboorg pro¬
tocol attacked by coral in Chapter 9. If a bundle contains a node modelling the
sending of a general message 3, this must occur in a strand for the group leader role.
This strand is infinite, as there may be an unbounded number of different, preceding
message 3s in the strand, one for each member of the group, and we must in general
consider the group to be of unbounded size. To work around this would require some
non-trivial modifications to the strand space model and/or the notions used in Athena.
Perhaps a set of message 3s could be considered to be sent simultaneously, represented
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in some generic way by a sort of supernode, then only expanded later in the proof
search when it became relevant. Some thought would be required to make this adap¬
tation successfully. Additionally, in our second case study in §10, Coral analysed
a protocol where the same agents may take part in an unbounded number of runs of
different sub-protocols, one after the other. Each time they must preserve values from
one sub-protocol (such as keys distributed by the server) to use in the next sub-protocol
(for example to leave the group). This would also produce infinite semi-bundles, which
cannot be handled by the Athena tool.
Athena is also tied to the notion of the Dolev-Yao attacker. For wireless proto¬
cols like the one considered in Chapter 9, we model a weaker intruder who cannot
block messages from being received. To do this in Athena would require some repro-
gramming, to force semi-bundles to be constructed in such a way that messages sent
on honest strands must reach their recipient, and before any messages from intruder
stands using terms contained in the honest message.
11.1.3 Summary
In summary, Athena gains efficiency from dedicated representation and inference al¬
gorithms, and from its generic interface for pruning theorems. It has been applied to
more of the standard protocols than Coral, and can check these protocols for attacks
extremely fast. It can also prove protocols to be correct, which coral as yet does not,
though it has the theoretical ability to do so (see §12.4). However, the use of a new
dedicated algorithm and implementation introduces an element of required faith in its
results that one might not consider to be so great for e.g. a proof in and LCF prover like
Isabelle. This is of more significance when Athena concludes a protocol is secure, of
course. In the case of attacks, one can always write the attack down and then debate its
validity. Athena has not yet been used to discover any significant new attacks though.
The representation used in Athena improves on trace based models such as that
used in Coral in terms of the clever way it avoids considering many states which are
equivalent to states already seen. However, along with the greater efficiency comes less
flexibility, as is evidenced by the difficulties in representing group protocols like the
Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol in Athena's model, and particularly protocols comprising
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a suite of sub-protocols like the Tanaka-Sato protocol. This seems to be an unavoidable
trade-off.
11.2 On-The-Fly Model Checker
Basin, Modersheim and Vigano have written an on-the-fly model checker (OFMC) for
searching for security protocol attacks, [Basin et al., 2003]. Its results have also been
impressive.
11.2.1 Description of the OFMC
The OFMC features two key innovations over the 'standard' model checking ap¬
proaches, e.g. Lowe's, [Lowe, 1996], The first is lazy data-types. A lazy data type
is one in which constructors such as cons build data types without evaluating their
arguments. This allows protocol models to be formalised as infinite trees, with the
tree only being computed on-the-fly as the states are explored. This presents a clean
way of handling the infinite state space that occurs in a security protocol model. Ad¬
ditionally, the OFMC employs a lazy intruder model, whereby instead of generating
all the intruder's knowledge at each point in the space of possible traces, the intruder's
knowledge is represented in a symbolic fashion. At each point in the search space,
the OFMC checks to see if the intruder can generate a message that an honest player
expects.
The OFMC requires as input a parameterised version of the protocol under analysis.
That is, the user must choose a scenario for investigation, which must specify the exact
runs of the protocol to be considered. For example, for the NSPK protocol, the user
would specify a run between an agent Alice and the spy, and between Alice and Bob in
order to discover the attack. This cuts down the search space considerably. Input can
be given to the OFMC in the same high-level language as is used by the Casrul system,
[Jacquemard et al., 2000].
The search procedure for the OFMC is the same as for most model checking ap¬
proaches, i.e. to start with an empty trace and search forwards to generate the set of
reachable states. An attack is defined by a set of goal states, i.e. states in which secu-
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rity has been violated in some way. The OFMC compares each generated state with the
goal states to see if an attack has been found. Both secrecy and authenticity properties
can be specified.
The OFMC's primary aim is to discover attacks. It is a semi-decision procedure
for finding attacks on faulty protocols, as coral is at present. Additionally, a limit to
the number of sessions can be used to guarantee termination and give some indication
of protocol security.
11.2.2 Results
The OFMC has been applied to 33 flawed protocols from the Clark-Jacob corpus,
[Clark and Jacob, 1997], and has found attacks on 32 of them, including a previously
unknown flaw. For each flawed protocol, a flaw is found in under 4 seconds. Flowever,
for all these timings, the OFMC was given exactly the right scenario for the attack.
The OFMC can also find the attack on the simplified Otway-Rees protocol, which as
we explained in §11.1.2 above, is an important test example from outside the standard
corpus, [Compagna, 2002], Perhaps more impressively, the OFMC has also been used
to find a previously unknown flaw in a protocol proposed by Siemens for multimedia
communication in mobile devices (H.530). This flaw was quite a serious one, and
Siemens have now changed the protocol to protect against it, [Basin et al., 2003],
It seems that the OFMC has not been used to analyse any group protocols yet.
It should be able to so this so long as the number of agents in the group is fixed in
advance. Modelling a general-sized group protocol in the OFMC does not seem to be
so straightforward. The problem lies in the fact that, although the intruder knowledge is
modelled symbolically, the state transitions still have the interpretation of one message
being sent, or the intruder carrying out one action, albeit with variables representing
some of the terms in the message or action. In order to model the Asokan-Ginzboorg
protocol in a general way (see Chapter 9), Coral had to use variables to represent
arbitrary numbers of message 2s and 3s, with these variables later being instantiated as
required. There does not seem to be a way to do this in the model used by the OFMC,
although it could perhaps be adapted to do so.
The need for an explicit scenario would cause problems when trying to model a
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protocol like the one we analysed in Coral in Chapter 10. In this multicast protocol,
we not only have an unbounded number of agents to consider, but additionally each
agent may play any number of roles, i.e. he may join the group, send messages, receive
messages, and leave the group in any valid combination, any number of times. Differ¬
ent kinds of interaction are required to effect the attacks we found - for example for the
first attack, an agent must send a message in order to generate the message which the
spy can later replay, and in the second attack, an honest agent must receive a message
in order to generate the message the spy will later replay. It would be hard to guess the
right scenario in terms of roles without already knowing the attack.
11.2.3 Summary
The OFMC finds attacks on standard protocols much faster than Coral, for similar
reasons to those behind Athena's speed: the representation is more tailored to the prob¬
lem, and the inference algorithms, particularly the lazy generation of intruder knowl¬
edge, are designed specifically for the job. Coral also generates intruder knowl¬
edge in a lazy way, although as it is performing backwards search, it is really doing
knowledge checking rather than knowledge generation. However, Coral's intruder
knowledge is handled by axioms in the model which are then repeatedly applied by the
prover to compute messages the intruder would have to intercept. The intmder knowl¬
edge handling in the OFMC is hard wired into the model checker, making it much
faster.
The OFMC, like Athena, does not seem to have the flexibility to attack a general
model of a group protocol. Instead, one would have to choose the number of players
in advance. It does not seem to be able to model a protocol where the same agent may
take part in an arbitrary number of sub-protocols, because it requires the scenario to be
fixed in advance.
11.3 The Casrul System
Chevalier et. al proposed a first-order model which has some similarities to the one
we use in coral, [Chevalier and Vigneron, 2002]. Their main innovation is the use
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of puppet principals, i.e. dummy principals who can be sent messages by the intruder
in order to act as oracles. These oracles may give the intruder the terms he needs to
generate attacks. The real principals are restricted to a particular scenario, as they are
for the OFMC described above, and the dummy principals are set to always generate
the same nonces. These two restrictions ensure the system terminates. The Casrul
system also uses a lazy intruder model, like the OFMC, whereby instead of generating
all the terms the intruder knows at a certain point, the system just checks to see if the
intruder can generate a particular message that an honest player (or a puppet principal)
expects.
Coral's model is similar in that the heuristic described in §7.2.3 also stops the
intruder from considering terms which don't match protocol messages, but because
Casrul model is bound to particular scenario, this can be used to restrict further the
messages the intruder might generate, i.e. Casrul will only generate those that fit the
scenario, and not just those which match the pattern of the protocol. The Casrul model
also takes advantage of the associative and commutative (AC) unification supported
in the theorem prover daTac, [L.Vigneron, 1996], This facilitates the definition of an
AC operator for combining elements in a set, which is used to represent the set of all
sent messages, and the set of all states of principals. Now AC unification can be used
to allow the rules for state transitions to be applied to any previously sent message,
and any principal. Casrul gains a significant efficiency advantage over Coral here.
We have to explicitly define a member function for extracting candidates from a list
of previously sent messages. Each time a member literal is satisfied, many inference
rules may have to be applied. This is particularly laborious if we are checking for non-
membership, i.e. satisfying a member(X, Trace) = false literal, when we have to check
every message in the trace. The use of lists does mean that Coral's model retains the
ability to reason about the order in which messages were sent, but this could perhaps
be recovered in Casrul if necessary, using a counter or similar mechanism.
Casrul's run times on the standard protocols from [Clark and Jacob, 1997] are sig¬
nificantly slower than those for the OFMC or Athena, and are broadly comparable with
Coral. For example, for the Otway-Rees protocol, times are almost identical; for the
Flwang-Chen Splice protocol, coral is significantly faster; and for the Andrew RPC
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protocol, Casrul is significantly faster (though it is not clear which attack the timing
is for). Both systems were tested on Pentium Linux boxes of similar vintage (though
exact hardware details are not given in [Chevalier and Vigneron, 2002]). Bearing in
mind that the Casrul system must have the scenario for the attack specified before the
search starts, Coral compares favourably here. The Casrul system typically requires
the consideration of far fewer states than Coral, which would seem to give it better
potential for scaling up. However, the Casrul system as it stands is bound to the notion
of the Dolev-Yao intruder and to the analysis of specific scenarios, which would hinder
adequate formalisation of the protocols we used as case studies in Chapters 9 and 10.
Additionally, it doesn't seem possible to model an arbitrarily-sized group protocol in
the Casrul system, since a rule to send arbitrary numbers of different messages at the
same instant would not be first-order in the model they use.
Casrul has been used to discover one new attack on the Denning-Sacco symmetric
key protocol, [Denning and Sacco, 1982], though some may consider it slightly dubi¬
ous. It requires an extreme case of type confusion, where an agent mistakes a package
of the form T, {| BKabT\ka for a timestamp T. Since the package itself begins with a
timestamp, this might seem unlikely, but the authors do give particular implementation
scenarios where it could possibly occur, such as if the recipient of the package reads
the timestamp and then disregards the rest of the message.
In summary, Casrul has some efficiency advantages over coral in terms of the
number of states explored thanks mainly to its use of a theorem prover supporting
AC unification and a model which is restricted to a specific scenario. However, run
times are about the same as Coral and the Casrul model is not as expressive. It has
discovered a single new attack on a standard protocol, but has not been used to model
any group protocols.
11.4 Other Work on Group Protocols
Various other attempts have been made to analyse group protocols. The most suc¬
cessful in terms of finding new attacks was [Pereira and Quisquater, 2003], where the
case study was from the CLIQUES protocol suite, [Ateniese et al., 2000], Pereira and
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Quisquater discovered a number of new attacks, using a pen-and-paper approach and
borrowing some ideas from the strand space model. Their attacks were quite subtle,
involving properties of the Diffie-Hellman exponentiation operation widely used in the
CLIQUES suite. They also involved the spy doing some quite imaginative things, like
joining the group, leaving, and then forcing the remaining members to accept a com¬
promised key. This showed the value of by-hand analysis taking algebraic properties
of cryptographic functions into account, but only when undertaken by experts.
Meadows made an attempt to extend the NRL protocol analysis tool
(NPA), [Meadows, 1996b], to make it suitable for analysing group protocols,
[Meadows, 2000a]. Again the CLIQUES protocols were used as an example. How¬
ever, NPA was not able to rediscover the attacks Pereira and Quisquater had discovered,
because of the intricate series of actions the spy has to perform to effect the attack. NPA
is tied to quite constrained notions of secrecy and authenticity, which may be where
the problem lay.
It would be interesting to see whether these kinds of attacks could be found auto¬
matically by Coral. We hope that the very flexible inductive model used might mean
that these attacks are within Coral's scope. However, some work would be required
to model the associative and commutative properties of the exponentiation operation
used. We are at an advantage here because of our access to equational reasoning in
Spass- we already use this to model the commutative properties of symmetric keys
(see §8.3). Modelling these properties is a topic which has recently started to attract
more research interest, [Millen and Shmatikov, 2003, Bertolotti et al., 2003]
As we mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 10, the Pull-Based Asynchronous
Rekeying Framework of Tanaka and Sato, [Tanaka and Sato, 2001], has previously
been modelled by Taghdiri and Jackson, [Taghdiri and Jackson, 2003]. The Taghdiri-
Jackson model is general in terms of the number of members of the group, but does not
model a malicious intruder trying to break the protocol. Instead, they just investigate
correctness properties of the protocol, using a specification language called Alloy and
a verification tool for this language based on a SAT-solver. One correctness property is
found not to hold, revealing a flaw whereby a member of the group may accept a mes¬
sage from an ex-member of the group as being current. Taghdiri and Jackson proposed
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a fix for the protocol, and could find no more attacks, but by modelling the protocol in
coral (see Chapter 10) we were able to discover two new attacks, both as serious as
the one found by Taghdiri and Jackson.
11.5 Paulson's Inductive Approach
The Coral system was inspired by the idea of a counterexample finder for Paulson's
inductive model. Paulson's formalism for security protocol analysis, [Paulson, 1998],
is mechanised in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL, [Paulson, 1989], To for¬
malise a protocol, an inductive datatype is defined using rules that define how agents
might add messages to the trace. Additionally, further rules establish what the knowl¬
edge the spy can extract from previous network traffic, and how the spy might add
fake messages. The rules we use in our formalism are very similar (§6.5 and §6.6). In
particular, the same synth and analz operators are used in our model. Paulson's model
is unconstrained in terms of the number of agents who might possibly take part in a
protocol, the number of nonces each agent might generate, the number of interleaving
sessions, etc. Coral's is similarly unbounded. The spy is not accepted as an honest
agent in Paulson's work, but instead a subset of the agents are considered 'bad', that is
the spy has their long term keys. This has since been proved to be equivalent to having
the spy alone accepted as an agent by the other players, [Syverson et al., 2000], So
here Coral's model is also equivalent. The security properties Paulson attempts to
prove are very similar to the conjectures Coral refutes.
The main difference between the formalisms is that while Coral's is first-order,
Paulson's is in higher-order logic. Using higher-order logic makes it easy to create a
strongly typed model. However, in our model, we were able to use unary functions
number, agent to specify sorts, and then modifiers like key and nonce to distinguish
between message objects. In this way we were also able to create a typed formalism.
Of course, we cannot recover the full power of higher order logic, but this does not
seem to be necessary to specify and analyse most protocols. This is perhaps not so sur¬
prising, since a protocol model has conceptually simple semantics. The main problems
with protocol analysis occur not in trying to specify the model, but from the combina-
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tonal blow up caused by the agent's infinite knowledge, the infinite number of agents
etc.
In Coral we have specified a number of protocols that Paulson has also investi¬
gated, and found the relevant attacks. Additionally we have found attacks on a group
protocol. One of the unusual features of Paulson's work is that his approach has been
used to prove properties of a (different) group protocol, [Paulson, 1997]. So, we have
gone some way to make a convincing case for Coral as a complementary counterex¬
ample finder for the Paulson approach. Coral's long run-times are perhaps not so
much of an issue in this context, as the process of finding a proof in the Isabelle/HOL
prover is a fairly long one even for an expert user. Coral could run on a parallel
machine attempting to disprove the conjecture the user is trying to prove.
We tried giving Coral 'failure information' from the Paulson proofs. For a faulty
protocol, we gave Coral hints, in the form of extra member specifications, from the
final subgoal where Paulson's proof broke down. These false subgoals typically spec¬
ify that several different messages are in a trace, and that this implies something false,
such as that the key remains secure. However, giving this information to coral in
fact made run-times much longer. This is perhaps because, even though these failed
subgoals are far from full specifications for an attack, they are still too much informa¬
tion to give to coral. If coral is given a conjecture with many member literals in
it, it tends to slow it down, since coral can arrange for the required material to be
in the trace in many different orders, and then has to work out which of these might
lead to a valid trace. The conjecture we used for looking for disruption attacks on the
Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol is a good example of this (see §9.4.1). When Paulson
looks at such a failed subgoal, he uses human common sense to help work out what
a likely guess at what order the messages must be in an attack trace, for example that
a message 3 is probably after a message 1. coral currently doesn't do this kind of
reasoning, but we could perhaps define some rules like this to act as heuristics to assist
Coral in choosing which clause to consider next.
An important feature of Paulson's model that we wanted to preserve was its easy
adaptability to non-standard protocols, as we discussed in §6.10. We believe that Chap¬
ters and 9 and 10 provide some good evidence that we have succeeded. The Asokan-
11.6. Weidenbach's First-Order Formalism 153
Ginzboorg protocol in Chapter 9 required us to model compound keys, a weaker in¬
truder, and an arbitrary number of agents. A couple of extra Horn clauses were needed
to allow the spy to manipulate compound keys. Our trace based model allowed us
to make conjectures about attacks in a wireless network without difficulty. The trace
based inductive model allowed us to model the addition of an arbitrary number of dif¬
ferent messages to the trace in one instant, which was the vital feature for the modelling
of the protocol without pre-setting the size of the group. For the Tanaka-Sato protocol
in Chapter 10, we had to add knowledge about the composition of the group to the
trace, and also to store the current group key at each point. This was very simple. Our
model needed no adaptations to account for the fact that agents may take part in any
valid combination of runs of the join, leave, send and receive sub-protocols. All of
these features are a real challenge to rival attack finding systems.
Cohen's TAPS system, [Cohen, 2000], is related to Paulson's in that the proving of
security invariants is somewhat similar to proving security properties by induction. It
has the advantage over Paulson's technique that proofs are often completely automated.
Cohen's method also provides no support for finding counterexamples. coral could
perhaps help out here too. The proof obligations generated by TAPS are currently
discharged by a resolution theorem prover, which suggests that it should be possible to
adapt Coral to use this model.
11.6 Weidenbach's First-Order Formalism
Weidenbach formalised the security protocol problem in a simple first order model,
suitable for the Spass theorem prover, [Weidenbach, 1999], His stated aim was to
combine the benefits of Paulson's inductive model with the push-button nature of
model checking approaches. However, the simplifications he had to make to get the
very fast Spass proofs were too drastic. They would prevent many attacks from be¬
ing discovered, and so give false guarantees of security. For example, the attack on
the simplified Otway-Rees protocol, which coral rediscovered (§8.5), and even the
very simple attack on the Clark-Jacob protocol, which coral has also rediscovered
(§8.3), are beyond the scope of Weidenbach's model. This is because the two agents
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in his model are restricted to playing only one part in the protocol. One is always the
initiator, and the other always the responder. Additionally, there are only two nonces
available for use, and the spy is not accepted as an honest agent. For the Otway-Rees
attack, we need three nonces, and a spy who can pass himself off as an honest player.
In fact, the attack on the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, which Weidenbach used as a
case study, is one of the few in the literature that his approach would have been able to
find. We showed, for the sake of completeness, that Coral can also find this attack in
§8.4.
11.7 General Inductive Refutation Tools
In §3.2, we introduced two tools for finding counterexamples to false inductive conjec¬
tures, those of Protzen, [Protzen, 1992], and Reif, [Reif et al., 2001]. Though Reif's
more recent tool is more powerful than Protzen's, neither would be adequate for finding
security protocol attacks. This is because their approaches are designed for datatypes
that are easy to enumerate. To generate all valid protocol traces is a non-trivial task,
taking into account the calculation of possible faked messages from the spy. Both tools
would tend to generate a lot of invalid traces, and get stuck very quickly.
In §5.3, we reported on experiments with Coral on the kinds of simple non-
theorems these systems were designed for. Coral's performance was good. Although
it is hard to make valid comparison with Protzen's work, given how much faster com¬
puter hardware has become in the last 10 years, Reif's experiments were carried out
quite recently. He reported run times of several seconds on his hardest problem, but
coral was able to find the counterexample in under a second. The reason for this
is that Reif's system, and Protzen's, were designed to be subsystems of larger provers
that would tackle the refutation of false conjectures in the context of a large inductive
proof. In Coral, we bring all the power of a full first-order theorem prover to bear
on the problem of finding counterexamples. Given that computer hardware costs are
relatively low, it would not be unrealistic to have Coral running on a parallel ma¬
chine doing refutation tasks as part of a larger proof effort. This would seem to be a




We can summarise our comparison of CORAL to related work in a few key points:
• Purpose built protocol analysis tools like Athena and OFMC have a huge speed
advantage over Coral, due to the fact that coral is essentially a modified first-
order theorem prover, using general inference rules and algorithms. However, we
also model protocols under fewer assumptions about the number of agents and
what roles they will play.
• No other automated tools have been able to find attacks by an active intruder
on a group protocols, as coral has. The nearest efforts have been the Alloy
model used by Taghdiri and Jackson, which was general with respect to group
size and found a rather obvious flaw, but did not include a malicious intruder.
When we modelled this protocol in coral, with an active intruder, we found
two new attacks. Coral's success in this area is a product of the very general
inductive model used. There seems to be an inevitable trade-off in designing
protocol analysis tool between flexibility and speed.
• Coral's model is a satisfactory first-order version of Paulson's higher order
model in that it maintains the essential expressiveness in terms of numbers of
agents, nonces etc. It also maintains the simplicity and level of abstraction that
allows the model to be rapidly adapted to slightly different protocol scenar-
ios.This is demonstrated by Coral's modelling of a group key establishment
protocol and a multicast key management protocol. coral would be a useful
tool to run in parallel to an attempt to prove a protocol secure using Paulson's
methods.
• Coral builds and improves on Weidenbach's first-order protocol model, as it
provides the intruder and also the honest agents with much more realistic ca¬
pabilities. This enabled coral to find attacks that Weidenbach's model would
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not allow. The price is that coral only finds attacks, not proofs of security at
present, though this could perhaps be addressed by future research (see §12.4).
• Outside of the protocol analysis field, Coral is also a powerful tool for quickly
finding counterexamples to smaller false conjectures in simpler datatypes. It
improves on previous work in this area.
11.8.1 Ultimate Applicability of the Technique
The comparison with other protocol analysis approaches gives us a picture of Coral
as a niche tool, which although able to find the standard attacks on two and three
party protocols, is not in its present form the most efficient tool for this task. Instead,
its strength is to be found in its flexibility. It is suitable for analysing more unusual
protocols where the parameters such as number of participants, the roles they play
in the protocol and size of key may vary, or, where the goals are unusual, and may
require several parts of the trace of messages to be considered rather than just some
final state. Additionally, Coral's model can be very quickly adapted to new protocols
which don't fit the pattern of the well-analysed Clark-Jacob corpus. This is illustrated
by the fact that Coral has been used to find five new attacks on serious protocols
from the literature. The OFMC has found two new attacks, and none have been found
using Athena. This was a direct result of the fact that we could very quickly make the
small adaptations to the model required to analyse protocols that OFMC and Athena
could not analyse in their present forms. Coral's applicability then is a little like the
applicability of a high level language like Prolog - it can be quickly adapted to deal
with a new example which differs from previously considered protocols, but will not
give the kind of performance that can be obtained from optimising a tool for a set of
very similar protocols.
11.8.2 The Way Ahead
The further development of Coral would require the decision to be made as to
whether we attempt to fully retain generality, so that Coral can continue to be used
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for finding counterexamples in any inductive specification, or whether we specialise




There are many possible ways in which coral may be developed. Here we discuss
some ideas for improving Coral's performance on security protocol problems, for
making it easier to use and for other application areas where coral might be useful
tool.
12.1 Improving Coral as a Protocol Analysis Tool
There are a number of small tweaks we could make to coral that would improve its
efficiency as a special-purpose protocol analysis tool. When searching for an attack in
our model, Coral often generates clauses that contain a literal stating true ^ false.
This is of course an axiom of our theory, and so the clause is detected as redundant by
subsumption. So many clauses are deleted this way that it may be faster to detect and
prune them away by a simple special-purpose syntactic check. At the moment, coral
spends a lot of time doing subsumption checking, a little under half of the time spent
doing reductions. Looking for reductions and detecting redundancy constitutes about
99% of the total run time for a hard problem. So, any time we can save here would be
worthwhile.
The dedicated security protocol redundancy rules, described in Chapter 7, take
very little time to check, but have a big impact on the search space. This suggests that
more special purpose redundancy rules would further improve Coral's performance.
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We should also like to allow the user to add his own redundancy rules in the form
of lemmas. As discussed in §11.1.1, coral already allows the user to add lemmas,
but because of the way the answer literal is hidden, they cannot currently refer to
properties of the trace represented by a clause. This restricts their efficacy. It would
take a little work, but it would be quite possible to alter coral to extend the scope of
these lemmas to reasoning about the trace, and so to give them the same power they
have in the Athena tool.
Another idea is to hard-wire a certain amount of the inference that is standard
across all protocols, e.g. the calculation of the spy's knowledge. This could be used
to more effectively prune out states which require information to be revealed that is
never sent in the trace. Currently, this may take a while to do, because of having
to process several synth rules in order to break a faked message down into all the
terms required. If we had the breaking down and rebuilding of messages hard-wired
in Coral, we could check redundancy for every synth{analz{...)) term instead of ev¬
ery analz{...) term, and thereby save considerable time, particularly for protocols with
long messages or complex message structure. This hard-wiring of the spy's knowl¬
edge calculations could also fix the problem we had in trying to keep the ordering well
founded for the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, as mentioned in §9.2.2. We could do
some meta-reasoning about the number of players in the group, and that way avoid
problems involving calculating what the intruder might learn from a message with in¬
finite key length. Coral still successfully found attacks using the imperfect ordering,
but it would be good to recover our refutation completeness for these compound key
protocols.
coral is at present a general counterexample finding tool with some domain-
specific heuristics. This means we should be able to experiment with changing our
representation for the security protocol problem. In particular, as we saw in §11.1.1,
the strand space model is attractive in that is cuts out some redundancy from the search
space. It should be possible represent strands and semi-bundles as inductive first-order
objects, and then to reason about them in Coral. This would provide an interesting
comparison, as we would be able to see just how much of an advantage the strand
space representation gives to a protocol analysis tool.
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Another interesting experiment would be to try to use Coral on the models used
by the OFMC and Casrul tools (see §11.2). This would allow backwards search and
forwards search in the same model to be directly compared. The main obstacle to
immediately using the Casrul model in coral is that Spass does not have explicit
support for AC unification. We would have to add explicit equations to the formalism
to model associative and commutative properties of the relevant operators. It may be
easier to implement the Comon-Nieuwenhuis strategy and Coral's heuristics, appro¬
priately adjusted to the new model, in daTac.
As coral is built on Spass, a theorem prover capable of equational reasoning,
we should be able to find a way to reason about some simple algebraic properties
of the cryptosystems underlying protocols, such as Diffie-Hellman type operations.
This would allow us to analyse the second Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, which is quite
different to the first, and seems not to be susceptible to the same attacks. Also it would
allow us to look at the CLIQUES protocols, which have already been shown to be
faulty as we discussed in §11.4. The problem of reasoning effectively about protocols
utilising Diffie-Hellman type exponentiation operations is currently being tackled by
several research groups, [Millen and Shmatikov, 2003, Bertolotti et al., 2003] . Our
approach would be to extend the current simple equational part of our formalism with
axioms specifying commutative and associative properties of keys constructed from
exponentiation.
12.2 Further Protocol Experiments
Having used Coral to discover attacks on one multicast key management protocol,
one obvious area for experimentation is to try coral on some other protocols de¬
signed to address the same task. There are dozens of protocols for this scenario in the
literature, most of which have received little or no formal attention. Our experience so
far suggests that they are likely to be vulnerable to attack.
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12.3 Other Encryption Models
One weak point of almost all current protocol analysis is the perfect encryption model
they use, i.e. they assume that either a principal has the correct key and can read a
message, or he hasn't and so he can't. Recently, several attacks have been found on
the API's used by hardware modules which implement electronic payment systems.
These attacks involve finding a sensitive piece of information, e.g. an account holder's
PIN, by making successive guesses and using the output from the API to improve the
guess, [Bond and Anderson, 2001], The attacks are potentially very serious, but are
completely outside the scope of current tools. It would interesting and exciting to try
to extend and develop coral to find attacks like these. Several changes would be
required. We would have to take into account the complexity of obtaining different
pieces of information, in terms, perhaps, of average number of guesses required. One
idea would be to carry this information in constraint literals, similar to the answer
literals coral currently uses. Axioms defining the API protocol could then specify
the effect of a particular command on the complexity of obtaining specific terms. This
idea would need a lot of work, but the hope is that the flexibility that Coral showed
in its adaptability to group protocols would make it suitable for adaptation to security
APIs.
12.4 Proving Theorems
Though we have used it in this work to refute non-theorems, the Comon-Nieuwenhuis
method for proof by consistency was originally conceived for proving inductive theo¬
rems. This means that in theory, Coral can also show security properties of proto¬
cols to be correct when there are no attacks to be found. However, to make this work
in practice would require some considerable work. The formulae to be proved are
significantly larger than the kinds of examples that have been proved by proof by con¬
sistency in the past. The proof by consistency method has recently been used success¬
fully for a verification case study on JavaCard bytecode, [Barthe and Stratulat, 2003].
'Application Program Interface - a protocol describing how other processes can interact with the
process in question.
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This was carried out using the SPIKE prover, [Bouhoula and Rusinowitch, 1995],
which utilises a divergence critic developed by Walsh to assist in finding proofs,
[Walsh, 1996]. Similar critics could be added to coral.
A key to any attempt at inductive proof is devising and proving appropriate inter¬
mediate lemmas in order to eventually prove the goal. Walsh's divergence critic is
one way of suggesting lemmas. In the specific case of security protocols, there may
be some fixed lemmas we can use to increase our chances of achieving saturation in
the case of a correct protocol, or speeding up attack finding in the case of faulty one.
For example, we could experiment with the various 'forwarding' and 'unicity' lemmas
used by Paulson in his inductive protocol model.
Several redundancy detection techniques for general first-order proving have been
suggested that are not implemented in spass, for example, contextual rewriting,
[Nivela, 1993]. These could be implemented spass and used in Coral in order to
assess their usefulness for aiding proof by consistency.
12.5 Other Application Areas
There are other areas of automated reasoning where a tool for detecting and refuting in¬
correct inductive conjectures would be of use. The most significant of these is perhaps
inside an automated inductive theorem prover. The application here would be to refut¬
ing incorrect lemmas and generalisations suggested by the system during the course
of a proof. As mentioned above, most inductive proofs of any size require several
intermediate lemmas to be proved before the main conjecture can be proved. These
lemmas may have to be generalised to facilitate a proof in the system, or indeed the
original conjecture itself may have to be generalised. Many tools contain mechanisms
for suggesting these lemmas and generalisations, e.g. [Ireland, 1996], but the lemmas
and generalisations may actually be false. If we can detect this early, for example using
Coral, then we can save a lot of work for the prover. Furthermore, the counterex¬
ample discovered could be useful in suggesting a correction to the formula. Given the
parallel nature of Coral's architecture, it should be simple to set up a version that
would run on a separate machine, accepting conjectures to investigate from the main
164 Chapter 12. Further Work
prover as they arise in a proof attempt. This arrangement would prevent the resource-
hungry theorem prover at the heart of CORAL from slowing the main inductive prover
down.
12.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have suggested several ways in which Coral might be developed
in future work. These can be split into two main areas:
1. Specialising CORAL to security protocols, where ideas include hard-wiring more
of the model into the inference process, developing new domain-specific heuris¬
tics, experimenting with more multicast key management protocols and adapting
the model to deal with protocols requiring more detailed cryptographic models.
2. Applying CORAL to other problems, such as refuting incorrect conjectures inside
an automated inductive theorem prover.
Further development in these areas will allow us to build a more complete picture of
the potential of the Comon-Nieuwenhuis approach, as well attacking some of the major
outstanding problems in automated cryptographic protocol analysis.
Chapter 13
Conclusions
In this chapter, we discuss in more detail the research contributions of the thesis that
were outlined in Chapter 1, in the light of the presentation we have given in Chapters
2-11. This serves to summarise and evaluate the thesis.
13.1 Evaluation of Research Contributions
In Chapter 1, we presented very briefly the research contributions of this thesis. These
were given in in the form of two hypotheses that we believe are supported by the
evidence presented in this thesis. Having described the background, the theory, the
implementation, the experiments we have carried out and related work in more detail,
we are now in a position to discuss these hypotheses more fully.
Hypothesis 1 By using the Comon-Nieuwenhuis strategy to refute incorrect inductive
conjectures in a first-order version of Paulson's security protocol model, we can
effectively find attacks on faulty security protocols.
In Chapter 5 we showed how we adapted the Spass proved to use the Comon-
Nieuwenhuis strategy. We presented our model in Chapter 6, and showed how, together
with the heuristics described in Chapter 7, it could be used to discover 10 standard pro¬
tocol attacks in Chapter 8.
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Hypothesis 2 The use of a simple first-order trace based formalism for analysing pro¬
tocols allows us to quickly adapt to unusual protocols, such as group key agree¬
ment and key management protocols, which approaches optimised for standard
2 and 3 party protocols would struggle with
The model we presented in Chapter 6 was shown to be flexible enough to model
general-sized group protocols in Chapter 9, and, with minor changes, to model a mul¬
ticast group key management protocol in Chapter 10. As we saw in §11.1.1 and §11.2,
some other models used for protocol analysis have less redundancy and so can find at¬
tacks on standard protocols from the Clark-Jacob corpus faster. However, these special
purpose models with their associated special purpose inference mechanisms generally
lack the ability to formalise arbitrary sized group protocols and protocols allowing the
same agents to play an arbitrary number of different roles in a protocol. As we saw in
Chapter 2, the field of standard protocol analysis is now somewhat saturated. Coral's
ability to adapt to new non-standard protocols is therefore important. Coral's flexi¬
bility is a result of its simple, open ended, Horn clause inductive model, and the fact
that this model is mechanised in a first-order theorem prover with support for equa-
tional reasoning.
How significant is the ability to model group protocols in a general way, i.e. with¬
out predetermining the size of the group? We have seen from our first case study that
it is at least of some significance, since the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol had an attack
on a group of size 2 and one on a group of size 3. The attack for a three person group
is impossible for a group of size 2, since in the smaller group, once a single message 2
has been sent, there is nobody remaining for the spy to impersonate by replaying that
message 2. This means that if we had chosen the simplest model, we would not have
found the attack. On another group protocol, Pereira and Quisquater found an attack
on a group of minimum size 4, [Pereira and Quisquater, 2001], So predetermining the
size of the group certainly does prejudice the chances of finding an attack. However,
if we can analyse and check a group protocol of fixed size very fast, then we could
perhaps analyse many different sized groups from size 1 to size n, and then conclude
the protocol is secure for groups up to n if we have not found any attacks. This would
require the person doing the analysis to construct different models for each different
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sized group however, increasing the risk of making a mistake. Given that protocol de¬
signers generally seem reluctant to use formal tools as it is, making the user do even
more work is undesirable.
Our second case study, on the Tanaka-Sato ARF Framework, is also significant, for
several reasons. One is that the protocol requires the same agents to play a possibly
unbounded number of different roles during one run. Protocol analysis approaches
tailored to the Clark-Jacob corpus would struggle to deal with this, and would certainly
require significant adaptation, whereas Coral's simple trace based model handled it
very naturally. The case study also highlights the inadequacy of the only previous
attempt at mechanised analysis of a multicast key management protocol. Taghdiri and
Jackson made a model of this protocol, but neglected to model anyone who actually
trying to break the protocol. Coral's model included a standard active intruder, and
this allowed us to discover 2 new attacks.
As a final remark in support of our second hypothesis, we observe that in the course
of the project, CORAL found five previously unknown attacks on two very different
group protocols, making it currently the leading automated tool for finding group pro¬
tocol attacks.
13.2 Final Summary
• Coral succeeds as a counterexample finder for inductive conjectures in a first-
order version of Paulson's inductive protocol model, and thanks to its use of such
an expressive formalism, as a tool for discovering novel attacks on protocols that
other tools have difficulty modelling.
• Compared to some other protocol analysis tools, CORAL is quite slow. This is a
result of its generality. Further specialisation towards protocol analysis, and in
particular to particular types of protocols, would enable the implementation of
heuristics to make it faster.
• Other possible future directions include: trying to prove security properties in
the absence of attacks using critics and lemmas; developing an encryption model
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adequate for finding attacks where many guesses are made and the results used to
break cryptographic functions; applying CORAL to other areas where incorrect
inductive conjectures must be refuted.
Appendix A
Protocol Model Files
This appendix contains the specification file for the Needham-Schroeder public key
protocol. The specification for the Needham-Schroeder protocol was used as a worked
example for explaining the formalism in Chapter 6, but then we explained in Chapter 7
how we optimised the formalism using step compression. Here, we give the specifica¬
tion in its final form, with the step compression optimisations marked in the comments.
Additionally, this appendix contains the changes to the protocol-specific part of the
formalism required to model the Clark-Jacob, Neuman-Stubblebine and BAN Otway-
Rees protocols.
A.1 The Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol
Recall that in our protocol notation, the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol runs
like this:
1. A —» B : {] NA , A§pu£,KB
2. B-^A:^NA,NB^pubKA
3. A —>• B : |] NB%ubKB
The clauses for modelling the protocol are:
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% defining basic sorts














% The eq function
—> eq(U,U)=true













—> eq(principal(U), nonce(V)) =false.









% The list member function
eq(Hl,H2) = false Amember(Hl ,L) = false





% The parts operator
in(U,parts(V)) = false Ain(U, parts (IT)) = false
—¥■ in(U,parts(cons(sent(X, Y, W), V))) — false
in(U,parts(V)) = false A in(U,parts(W)) = false
—» in(U,parts(encr(V, W))) = false
in(U,parts(V)) = false Ain(U,parts(W)) — false

















-A in( U, synth(analz(nil))) =false
—> in( U,analz(nil))=false
%%% The rest of the clauses are specific to NSPK
% honest agents taking part in the protocol:
agent(A)=true A agent(B)=true A number)NA)=true A m(Trace)=true A
in(nonce(N),parts(Trace)) -false
-Am)cons(sent(A, B, encr(pair(nonce(N),principal(A)),pubk(B))), Trace))=true
number(NB)=trueA m(Trace)=true/\ in(nonce(NB),parts(Trace)),false
member)sent(X, B, encr)pair)notice)NA),principal)A)),pubk(B))), Trace)=true
-Am)cons)sent)B,A, encr)pair)nonce)NA), nonce)NB)),pubk)A))), Trace))=true
m)Trace)-trueA
member)sent)X,A, encr)pair)nonce)NA), nonce)NB)),pubk(A))), Trace)-trueA
member)sent)A, B, encr)pair)nonce)NA),principal)A)),pubk(B))), Trace)=true
—» m(cons(sent(A,B,encr(nonce)NB),pubk(B))), Trace))=true
% spy learning things from the trace




membe r)sent)X, Y,encr(nonce)NB),pubk(B))), Trace)=true
-A in)encr)nonce)NB),pubk(B)),analz(Trace))=true
% Spy adding messages to the trace
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rn(cons(sent(spy,A, encr(pair(nonce(NA), nonce(NB)),pubk(A))), Trace))- true





A.2 Changes for the Clark-Jacob Protocol
Here we give the clauses required to model the Clark-Jacob protocol. These take the
place of the clauses marked above as being specific to the Needham-Schroeder proto¬
col. No other changes to the model were required. The Clark-Jacob handshake consists
of just two messages:
1. A ' B : {|
2.












m(cons(sent(B,A, encr(s(nonce(NA)),key(pair(A,B))) ), Trace))- true
% additional axiom to make keys symmetric
key(pair(X, Y))=key(pair(Y,X))
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A.3 Changes for the Neuman-Stubblebine Protocol
For this protocol, we allowed type confusion between nonces and keys. The Neuman-
Stubblebine protocol runs like this:
1. A B : A,Na
2. B-^S:B^A,Na,Tb^Kb,Nb
3. S —>A : {] B,Na,Kab,Tb$kaA A,Kab,Tb\^kb,Nb
4. A-*B-.S\A,KabJb§KbANbUab














m(cons(sent(B, server, triple(principalB), encr(triple(principal(A,nonce(NA),
time(T)), longtermkey(B)),nonce(NB))), Trace))-true




m(cons(sent(server,A, triple(encr(quad(principal(B), nonce(NA), key(NA), time(T)),
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agent(B)=true A




m(cons(sent(A, B,pair(packet,encr(nonce(NB), key(NA)))), Trace))=true






%% spy faking a message 2
m(Trace)=true
in(triple(principal(B), encr(triple(principal(A, nonce(NA), time(T)),
longtermkeyiB)), nonce(NB)),synth(analz(Trace)))=true A
-y
m(cons(sent(spy, server, triple(principal(B), encr(triple(principalA, nonce(NA),
time(T)), longtermkeyiB)),nonce(NB))), Trace))=true
%%%% faked message 3
%%% note for type confusion, we allow Key instead of key(NA) here
m(Trace)=true A
in(triple(encr(quad(principal(B), nonce(NA), key(NA), time(T)), longtermkeyi^),




micons(sent(spy,A, triple(encr(quad(principal(B), nonce(NA), key(NA), time(T)),
longtermkeyiA),encr(triple(principal(A,Key,time(T)),
longtermkeyiB)),nonce(NB))), Trace))=true
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%% spy eavesdropping on message 1
member(sent(X,Y,pair(principal(A,nonce(NA))), Trace)=true
—> in(nonce(NA), analz(Trace))=true
% two clauses to model two possible things




in(encr(triple(principal!A,nonce(NA), time(T)), longtermkeyiB)), analziTrace))=true
member(sent(X, Y, triple(principal(B), encr(triple!principal!A,nonce(NA), time(T)),
longtermkeyiB)),nonce(NB))),Trace)=true
—> in(nonce(NB),analziTrace))—true
%%% three things from a message 3
member(sent(server,A, triple(encr(quad(principal(B), nonce(NA), key(NA), time(T)),




member(sent(server,A, triple(encr(quad(principal(B), nonce(NA), key(NA), time(T)),
longtermkeyiA), encr(triple(principal(A, key(NA), time(T)),
longtermkeyiB)),nonce(NB))),Trace)=true
-»
in(encr(quad(principal!B), nonce!NA), key(NA), time(T)), longtermkeyiA), analziTrace))—true
member(sent(server,A, triple(encr(quad!principal(B), nonce(NA), key(NA), time(T)),
longtermkeyiA), encr(triple(principal(A, key(NA), time(T)),
longtermkeyiB)),nonce(NB))), Trace)-true
->
in(encr(triple(principal(A, key(NA), time(T)), longtermkeyiB)),analz(Trace))-true
%two things from a message 4
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Whereas the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol only has messages of length 1
and 2, the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol has messages of length 2,3 and 4. So, we
require the following additonal axioms:









—>in(X,parts(quad( Y, Z, G, H))) -false


































eq(Ml,M2)=false —> eq(quad(G,Ml,M,I),quad(X,M2, Y,Z))-false
eq(Ml,M2)=false —> eq(quad(G,H,Ml,I),quad(X,Y,M2,Z))=false
eq(Ml,M2)-false —> eq(quad(G,H,I,Ml),quad(X,Y,Z,M2)) =false
A.4 Changes for the Otway-Rees Protocol
Here we show the different clauses required to model the Otway-Rees protocol. The
Otway-Rees protocol (or to be exact, the Burrows-Abadi-needham version of the pro¬
tocol, [Burrows et al., 1990]) runs like this:
1. A^B:Na,A,BJNa,A,BUa
2. B —> S : NA,A,B, {| NA,A,^KA,NB, -fl NA,A,B^Kb
3. S-yB:NA^NA,KABUAANB,KAB\^KB
4. B A: Na , -{] NA , KAB$KA
The clauses for modelling honest agents taking part in the protocol are:
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% message 1: A to B
agent(A)=true A agent(B)=true A
number(NA)=true A
m(Trace)=true A
% nonce NA must be fresh
in(nonce(NA),parts(Trace)) -false
->
m(cons(sent(A, B, quad(nonce(NA),principal(A),principal!B), encr(
triple(nonce(NA),principal!A),principal!B)), longtermkey!A)))), Trace))=true
% message 2: B to server
m(Trace)=trueA
number(NB)=trueA
% Note B cannot read Packet, he just passes it on
member!sent!X, B,quad!nonce!NA),principal!A),principal!B),
Packet)), Trace) = true
















encr(pair(nonce!NB), key!NA)), longtermkey!B)))), Trace))=true
% message 4: B to A
m(Trace)=true A
member!sent(X,B, triple!nonce!NA), Packet,
encr(pair!nonce!NB), key(K)), longtermkey!B)))), Trace)=true
member!sent(B,server,sex!nonce(NA)uprincipal!A),tprincipal!B),
Packet2, nonce!NB),




The Otway-Rees problem file also has different clauses for the spy's sending and re¬
ceiving of messages, following the heuristics outlined in Chapter 7.

















% spy faking a message 3
m(Trace)=true A
in(triple!nonce!NA), encr(pair(nonce!NA), key(K)), longtermkey!A)),
encr(pair(nonce!NA), key(K)), longtermkey!B))), synth(analz(Trace)))-true
A eq(spy,A)=false-A
m(cons(sent(spy,A, triple!nonce!NA), encr(pair(nonce(NA), key!K)), longtermkey!A)),
encr!pair!nonce!NA), key(K)), longtermkey!B)))), Trace))=true
% spy faking a message 4
m(Trace)=true A
in(pair(nonce!NA), encr(pair(nonce!NA), key(K)), longtermkey!A))),
synth(analz(Trace)))=true A
eq(spy,A)=false -A
m(cons(sent(spy,A,pair!nonce!NA ), encr(pair(nonce(NA), key(K)), longtermkey!A)))),
Trace))=true
% spy eavesdropping on a message 1































% spy eavesdropping on a message 3
memberisent(X, Y, triple(nonceiNA), encr(pair(nonce(NA), key(Z)), longtermkeyiB)),
encr(pair(nonceiNB), key(Z)), longtermkeyiB)))), Trace)=true
—>in(nonce(NA),analz(Trace))=true
member(sent(X,Y,triple(nonce(NA),encr(pair(nonce(NA),key(Z)),longtermkeyiA)),
encr(pair(nonceiNB), key(Z)), longtermkeyiB)))), Trace)=true
~^in(encripairinonceiNA), key(Z)), longtermkeyiA)),analziTrace))=true
memberisentiX, Y, triple(nonce(NA), encr(pair(nonceiNA), key(Z)), longtermkeyiA)),
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encr(pair(nonce(NB), key(Z)), longtermkey(B)))), Trace)=true
—>in(encr(pair(nonce(NB), key(Z)), longtermkey(B)),analz(Trace))=true
% spy eavesdropping on a message 4
member(sent(X, Y,pair(nonce(NA), encr(pair(nonce(NA), key(Z)), longtermkey(A)))), Trace)=true
—rin(nonce(NA),analz(Trace))-true
member(sent(X, Y,pair(nonce(NA), encr(pair(nonce(NA ), key(Z)), longtennkey(A)))), Trace)=true
—> in(encr(pair(nonce(NA ), key(Z)), longtermkeyiA)), analz.(Trace))—true
Finally, whereas previous protocol have had messages of length 1,2,3 and 4, the Otway-
Rees protocol has messages of length 2,3,4 and 6. So, we require the following addi-
tonal axioms:
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—»in(sex(X, Y, Z, G, H, I),synth(Xset))=true
% rules for eq
eq(Ml,M2)=false —> eq(sex(Ml,G,H,l,J,K),sex(M2,X,Y,Z,A,B))=false
eq(Ml,M2)=false -A eq(sex(G,M1 ,H,I,J,K),sex(X,M2, Y,Z,A,B))-false
eq(Ml,M2)=false —> eq(sex(G,H,Ml,I,J,K),sex(X,Y,M2,Z,A,B))=false
eq(Ml,M2)=false —> eq(sex(G,H,I,Ml,J,K),sex(X,Y,Z,M2,A,B))-false




The Model for the Asokan-Ginzboorg
Protocol
This chapter gives details of the specification file for the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol,
used for the case study in Chapter 9. Here again is a description of the Asokan-
Ginzboorg protocol. It is explained in §9.1.
1. M„ —» ALL
2. Mi —> Mn
3. Mn Mi
4. Mi -> Mn
MnAEb
Mi, {| Ri,S$E z=l,...,n-l
{| {Sj,j= 1,-• •,"}[}/?, z = 1,...,n — 1
Mi, {| Si, h(S\5„)}/r some i, K = f(S\ ,...,Sn)
We now give the parts of the specification file specific to the protocol.
% Message 1 % MN initiates a run as leader
agent(MN)=true A
% uncomment this to keep the spy out of the room:
% eqagent(MN,spy)=false A
in(key(E),parts(Trace))=false A number(E)=true A
number(Pass)=true A m(Trace)=true
—>
m(cons(sent(MN,all,pair(principal(MN), encr(key(E), key(Pass)))), Trace))-true
% Message 2
m(Trace)=true A
number(Ri)=true A number(Si)-true A
185




% again, uncomment this to keep the spy out of the room:
% eqagent(MN, spy)-false A
agent(Mi)=true A
member(sent(x,all,pair(principal!MN), encr(key(E), key(Pass)))), Trace)=true
—t
m(cons(sent(Mi,MN,pair(principal!MI), encr(pair(nonce!Ri), nonce(Si)), key(E)))), Trace))=true
% Message 3
eqagent(A,MN)=false A eqagent(A,spy)=false A m(Trace)=true A
member!sent!MN,all,pair(principal(MN),encr(key(E),key(P)))),Trace)=true A





% anyone might send message 4. They must have sent a message 2 and
% received a message 3
m(Trace)=true A
agent(Mi)=true A
member!sent!Mi,MN,pair(principal!Mi), encr(pair(nonce!Ri), nonce!Si)), key(E)))), Trace)=true
A member(sent(Y,Mi,encr(Package,nonce(Ri))),Trace)=true A
—> m(cons(sent(Mi,MN,pair(principal!Mi), encr(pair(nonce!Si), h(Package)),
f!Package)))),Trace))=true





cons(sent(MN,a, encr(cons(nonce!Si), Package), nonce(Ri))), Trace),
cons(nonce!Si),Package)-true
% recursive case for all_msg2s_received
member!sent(X,MN,pair(principal(s(MX)),





all jnsg2sjreceived(Trace, s(MX), MN,E, Package,
cons(sent(MN, s(MX), encr(FinalPackage, nonce(Ri))),
NewTrace), FinalPackage)=true
% spy eavesdropping on trace
member(sent(X, Y,pair(principal(xa), encr(key(E), key(Pass)))), Trace)=true
—> in(encr(key(E), key(Pass)), analz(Trace))=true
member(sent(X, Y,pair(principalMi), encr(pair(nonce(Ri), nonce(Si)), key(E)))), Trace)-true
—> in(encr(pair(nonce(Ri), nonce(Si)),key(E)), analz(Trace))=true
member(sent(X, Y, encr(FinalPackage, nonce(Ri))), Trace)=true
—>in(encr(FinalPackage,nonce(Ri)),analz(Trace))-lrue)))
member(sent(X, Y, encr(pair(nonce(Si), h(Package)),f(Package))), Trace)-true
—> in(encr(pair(nonce(Si),h(Package)),f(Package)), analz(Trace))=true)))
% spy faking a message 1
m(Trace)=trueA
in(pair(principalMN), encr(key(E), key(Pass))), synth(analz(Trace)))-true
-»
m(cons(sent(spy,all,pair(principal(MN),encr(key(E),key(Pass)))),Trace))=true)))
% spy faking a message 2
m(Trace)=trueA
eqagent(spy,MN)=falseA









m(cons(sent(spy,Mi, encr(FinalPackage, nonce(Ri))), Trace))-true
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m(cons(sent(spy, MN,pair(principal(Mi),encr(pair(nonce(Si), h(Package)),f(Package)))), Trace))=true
% spy knows some fresh nonces
in(nonce(N),parts(Trace)=false
—> in(nonce(N),analz(Trace))=true
% to allow the spy to make fake compound keys










The Model for the Tanaka-Sato
Protocol
This appendix gives the clauses used for modelling the Taghdiri-Jackson version of
the Tanaka-Sato protocol, described in Chapter 10.
% m function now takes args (Trace, Group, Keysequence, Tick)
% nobody in the group at the start
m(nil,nil,x,nought)-true
%%%% JOIN




encr(principal(Mi), longtermkey(Mi)), Group), Trace),
group, Keysequence, s(Tick))-true
%%% server acknowledges join, makes new key, sends key
m(Trace,Group,Keysequence, Tick)-true A
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encr(pair( ik(Tick), key(s(Keysequence))), longtermkey(Mi)),
cons(triple(principalMi), ik(Tick), key(s(Keysequence))), Group)), Trace),
cons(triple)principalMi), ik(Tick), key(s(Keysequence))), Group),
s(Keysequence), s(Tick) )=true
%%%% LEAVE
m(Trace, Group,Keysequence, Tick)=true A
ingroup)triple(principal(Mi),Ikey, Gk), Group,Newgp)=true
—> m(cons(sent(Mi, server, encr(leave,Ikey), Group), Trace), Group, Keysequence,s(Tick))=true
m(Trace, Group,Keysequence, Tick)=true A
ingroup)triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,Gk),Group,Newgp)-true A
member(sent(X,server, encr(leave, Ikey), Tgroup), Trace)=true
—> m(cons(sent(server,Mi,encr(ackleave,Ikey),Newgp), Trace),Newgp,s)Tick),s)Tick))-true
%%%%% SEND a message
m(Trace, Group,Keysequence, Tick)-true A
ingroup(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,key(Sq)), Group,Newgp)-true
—> m(cons(sent)Mi,server,encr(send)Sq), Ikey), Group), Trace), Group,Keysequence,s)Tick))-true
%% server gives key
m)Trace, Group,Keysequence, Tick)-true A
ingroup)triple(principal)Mi),lkey, Oldk), Group,Newgp)=true A
member)sent)X, server, encr)send)Sq),Ikey), Tgroup), Trace)=true
—> m)cons)sent)server,Mi, encr)pair)key)Keysequence),send)Sq)),lkey),
Group), Trace), Group, Keysequence, s)Tick))-true
%% agent broadcasts his message, updates his key
m(Trace, Group, Keysequence, Tick)=true A
ingroup)triple)principal)Mi), Ikey, oldk), Group,Newgp)-true A
member)sent(X,Mi, encr)pair)key)Xk), send)Sq)), Ikey), Tgl), Trace)=true A
member)sent)Mi,server,encr)send)Sq),Ikey), Tg2 ), Trace)=true
—> m(cons)sent)Mi, all, encr)hello)s(Tick)), key)xk)),
cons)triple)principal)Mi), Ikey, key)xk)), newgp)), Trace),
cons)triple)prmcipal)Mi), Ikey, key)xk)), newgp), Keysequence,
s(Tick))=true
%%%%% RECEIVE a message - sends request for key
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m(Trace, Group, Keysequence, Tick)-true
ingroup(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,Gk), Group,Newgp)=true
—> m(cons(sent(Mi,server, encr(read, Ikey), Group), Trace),
Group,Keysequence,s(Tick))-true




—» m(cons(sent(server,Mi, encr(key(Keysequence), Ikey),
Group), Trace), Group, Keysequence, s(Tick))-true
%% agent updates his key
m(Trace, Group,Keysequence, Tick)=true A
ingroup(triple(principalMi),Ikey, Oldk), Group, newgp)=true A
member(sent(X,Mi,encr(key(Xk),Ikey),Somegp2), Trace)=true A
member(sent(Mi, server, encr(read,Ikey), Somegp), Trace)=true
—> m(Trace, cons(triple(principal(Mi), Ikey, key(Xk)),Newgp), Keysequence, s(Tick))=true















Here we give a reference to the definition of technical terms used in the thesis.
Term Section Page
Analz 6.6 81
Answer Literals 4.2.3 49
Authenticity 2.3.1 11




Completely Defined Equality Function 4.6 59
Compound Keys 9.2.2 117
Confluent 4.1 42
Congruence 4.1 42
Conjecture Superposition 4.4 53
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Term Section Page
Dictionary Attack 9.1 112
Disruption Attacks 9.3 118
Encryption 2.1 7
Equality Factoring 4.2.1 45
Events 2.4.5 27
Factoring 4.2 43
Fair Induction Derivation 4.4 52
Free Constructors 4.6 59
Freshness 2.2 9
Given Clause 4.2 43
Goal-Bindings 11.1.1 140
Ftandshake 2.3.4 13
Herbrand Model 4.1 42
Horn Clause 4.1 42
I-Axiomatisation 4.4 50
Index (of a literal) 4.2 43
Inductive Reducibility 4.6 59
Irreducible 4.1 42
Fiteral 4.2 44
Local Rewriting 4.2.1 45
Monotonic 4.1 42
Multiset 4.1 41
Next State Function 11.1.1 140
Node 2.4.5 27
Normal 4.4 51
Normal I-Axiomatisation 4.4 51













Proof By Consistency 4.3 50
Public Key Cryptography 2.1 8
recursive Path Ordering (RPO) 4.1 43
Reduction Ordering 4.1 43
Reduction Rules 4.2.1 45
Reductive Definition 4.5 57 Defn. 12
Redundancy
-general 4.2.1 45 Defn. 1&2
- in the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method 4.4 53 Defn. 7 & 8
Refutation Complete 4.2 44
Replay Attack 2.3.4 13
Resolution 4.2 44
Resolvent 4.2 44
Rewrite Rule 4.1 41
Saturation
-general 4.2.1 45 Defn. 3
- in the Comon-Nieuwenhuis method 4.4 53 Defn. 9
Secrecy 2.3.1 11
Selection (of Literals) 4.2.1 45
Semi-Bundies 11.1.1 140
Session Key 2.1 7
Set of Support 4.2 43
Skolem Function 4.2 44
State (in a strand space context) 11.1.1 140
Step Compression 7.2.1 90




196 Appendix D. Index of Terms
Term Section Page
Superposition 4.2.1 45
Superposition Left 4.2.1 45
Superposition Right 4.2.1 45
Symmetric Key Cryptography 2.1 8
Synth 6.6 81
Tautologies 4.2.1 45
Term Indexing 4.2.2 48
Term Rewrite System 4.1 42
Terminating 4.1 42
Timely 2.3.4 13
Type Attack 2.3.6 18
Usable 4.2 43
Well-Founded 4.1 41
Worked Off 4.1 41
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